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Abstract 
 
A Public-private partnership (PPP) is a settlement between a public party and a 
contractor or private sector consortium to engage in a long-term contractual 
agreement for designing, building, operating and/or maintaining capital intensive 
projects, while trying to attain value for money. PPPs are globally gaining 
importance in the construction industry. The risk transfer from the contracting 
government towards the private entity has important repercussions on the tender. 
Contractors need to carefully prepare the bid proposal and need to make an 
assessment of the project risk. These investigations require expensive investment 
efforts that might go down the drain in case the bidder loses the tender. The 
competitive context might be an inhibitor for players to participate in the high-risk 
tender process. Besides, it is in the social interest that public entities select 
consortia capable of performing the project with outstanding quality, yet at a 
reasonable price. Therefore, governments are currently seeking for mechanisms to 
increase competition. A literature review on the academic PPP field did not bring 
solace into how to deal with these challenges and theoretical models are lacking. 
This dissertation develops a theoretical procurement model that imitates the PPP 
market by means of a bi-level experimental single-project and multi-project 
bidding setting. At the lower level, the bidders are heterogeneous in their 
experience, so that more experienced contractors have a cost advantage and, 
additionally, they are able to more accurately estimate the project cost.  
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A contractor’s project strategy is composed of two elements. On the one hand, the 
pre-tender investment reflects the monetary effort a contractor is willing to 
undertake to prepare the proposal. The investments could lead to cost effective 
innovations and to the capability of more precisely estimating the project cost. On 
the other hand, the targeted mark-up consists of a risk premium and a profit 
margin. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Markov perfect equilibrium of the 
games are heuristically approximated by best response mechanisms. At the upper 
level, the impact of governmental contractual policies on the bidding equilibrium 
is investigated. The computer experiments are subsequently triangulated with the 
findings from a laboratory experiment and with views from practitioners in order 
to gain understanding of the complex international PPP field.  
The government impersonates the architect of the tendering process and should 
aim for a clear funneling principle with respect to the number of bidders to invite. 
In order to create a levelled playing field that guarantees competitive forces in the 
long run, additional incentive mechanisms are necessary to close the gap between 
incumbents and entrants. In this vein, the introduction of a partial reimbursement 
of the bid cost in complex project settings is proven to add value. Furthermore, the 
public entity could aim to reduce non-value adding pre-tender costs by means of 
standardized contracts. Finally, a project pipeline effectively stirs up the 
enthusiasm of the consortia rendering a lower government procurement cost.  
The results of the dissertation underline the importance of the assessment of the 
project’s complexity and the competitive environment. Additionally, consortia 
could benefit from making the pre-tender investment efforts transferable to future 
project opportunities. However, the interplay of project risk, the competitive forces 
and the contractual setup makes it a daunting field of operation and the 
disheartening winner’s curse amplifies the adagio “look before you leap into 
marriage”.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation deals with the study of the procurement mechanism of high-risk 
projects. Traditionally, governments aimed to build economic and social public 
infrastructures by selecting a low-cost contractor that executes the project without 
having any further obligations. Contractors just needed to account for the project-
specific contingencies, but incurring a risk premium sufficed to mitigate these 
risks. This is in contrast to high-risk projects that would require careful preparation 
of the project proposal and a thorough identification and assessment of the risks. 
One of the most recent and most innovative kinds of these prototype high-risk 
contracts are public-private partnerships (PPPs) and these type of projects 
consequently define the focus of this dissertation.  
1.1 Definition of a public-private partnership 
Public-private partnerships have appeared on the scene as a cutting-edge long-term 
contractual arrangement between a private contractor and the government. The 
concept is widely known around the world, but there is quite some disagreement 
about its content. Wettenhall (2010) claims that PPPs have been developed from 
the earliest civilizations onwards, but that might be somehow misleading. The PPP 
acronym itself has been used since the seventies and got a buzzword status in the 
nineties with the rise of the importance of the Public Finance Initiative (PFI) in the 
United Kingdom for social and economic environment renewal under surveillance 
of the public expenditures (Bovaird, 2010).  
1.1. Definition of a public-private partnership 
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PPPs were believed to guarantee greater value for money for the government 
compared to traditional public contracting, because the transfer of the design, 
operation and maintenance responsibilities and risks towards the private 
consortium or special purpose vehicle (SPV) generates synergies and efficiency 
gains. Since they have seen the daylight, PPPs have gained importance and their 
number has proliferated. The PPP landscape is wide which is proven by the variety 
in definitions (e.g., Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001, Hodge and Greve 2007, 
Wettenhall 2010). Yang et al. (2010) attribute this to the plethora of contract types: 
build-own-operate-transfer, joint ventures, sale-and-lease-back, design-build-
maintain, et cetera. Besides, legal requirements may provoke different 
interpretations of the concept. For the purpose of this dissertation, all the 
ornaments and often country- or sector-specific features are removed.  
A public-private partnership is defined as a settlement between a public party and 
a private sector consortium to engage in a long-term contractual agreement for 
designing, building, operating and/or maintaining capital intensive projects, while 
trying to attain value for money by the appropriate allocation of risk. 
A PPP has been a popular means to perform long-term public investments. Hodge 
and Greve (2007) describe PPPs as a mega credit card for governments, but other 
authors like Kumaraswamy et al. (2007) underline drivers that are based on 
efficiency gains and value for money in so-called second generation PPPs. 
Globally, the number of PPPs and the amount of money invested in this 
contracting method had an upward trend in the previous decades (EPEC 2012). 
This trend is also coupled with the observation by Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) that 
construction projects grow larger, making the societal value of the project surge.  
The global financial crisis resulted in a shrinkage of the European market, but the 
PPP market has been slightly recovering since 2012 (EPEC 2015). Not only 
developed countries increasingly adopt PPPs, but also in developing countries, 
private finance for public projects in the primary sector has gained importance, 
especially in the South Asian, the Latin American and the Caribbean regions. 
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According to the figures from The World Bank Group, the energy sector and the 
telecommunications sector absorb the most significant shares of the money that has 
been spent in the developing countries since 1990. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Because of the long-term feature, often covering a timespan of thirty years, PPPs 
are not always a bed of roses. Typical textbook cases that reveal time overruns, 
cost escalations or revenue shortfalls in for instance the Eurotunnel project 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2009) and the Sydney New Southern Rail project (Ng and 
Loosemore 2007) underline the possible disastrous outcomes for society and form 
another argument to put an emphasis on carefully planning these risky projects 
(Zwikael and Sadeh 2007) and one should look before leaping into marriage (De 
Clerck et al. 2012). 
After an initial prequalification of the interested consortia by the government, 
qualified concessionaires are invited for the tender. Due to the complex project 
nature and the high societal value that is at stake, financial performance 
requirements and high quality standards are important challenges one needs to 
face. Therefore, contractors ought to prepare a qualitative bid proposal to submit to 
the contracting government. The preparation of this proposal is costly (e.g., 
consultancy cost, working cost, design cost) and the risk of not being awarded the 
contract is empirically claimed to be a burden for contractors (Ahadzi and Bowles 
2004, Carrillo et al. 2008, KPMG 2010). Dudkin and Välilä (2005) report 
transaction costs of two to three percent of the total contract value. More recent 
empirical evidence by KPMG (2010) reports average research costs of 1.5% to 2% 
of the total project cost. Due to the complexity, the high contingencies and the 
bidding costs, policy makers often argue that the market is too narrow in some 
jurisdictions, like in Australia, New Zealand or western European countries where 
often only two or three private entities show interest in particular high-risk PPPs.  
1.3. Outline of the dissertation 
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In order to open up the playing field and to incentivize the consortia to submit 
qualitative bid proposals and for possible entrants to penetrate the market, policy 
makers are endowed to seek for feasible ways to substantiate the PPP market’s 
attractiveness. A recent KPMG report (2010) concludes with a set of guidelines to 
improve the efficiency of the PPP process and to reduce the bid costs which would 
in its turn stimulate the PPP market’s allure. Two of the suggested policies are 
investigated in detail in this dissertation. Firstly, public institutions sometimes 
introduce reimbursements to (some of) the losing bidders for the incurred pre-
tender bid preparation efforts. However, there is no global agreement on the 
magnitude of these compensations. Moreover, and supported by empirical 
evidence in Canada for instance, a pipeline of projects could increase the eagerness 
of consortia to enter and stay in the PPP market of a particular country (KPMG 
2010). This pipeline reduces a consortium’s risk of being unsuccessful, because 
instead of putting all one’s eggs in one basket, a consortium can spread out its 
investments across different projects and it can offset former losses in future 
tenders. 
Consequently, this dissertation presents a theoretical framework that models the 
procurement procedure and that grasps the main peculiarities of the PPP 
agreements. The purpose of the model is to get insights into the equilibrium 
bidding behavior of the contractors or consortia and into how the project 
characteristics influence the dynamics of the bidding behavior. Subsequently, we 
are able to assess how the government, as a decision maker, may shape the 
strategic choices of the contractors.  
The policies that we are mainly interested in are: 
- The number of players that are invited for the tender; 
- The fraction of the investment cost that is reimbursed to the losing bidders; 
- The construction of a pipeline of projects. 
CHAPTER 1.  Introduction 
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1.3 Outline of the dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we 
introduce the main lexicon of the PPP field and we give a detailed overview of the 
state-of-the art of this highly innovative way of contracting. In this vein, we want 
to give an overview of the current research trends and underline the academic 
opportunities within the operations research field. Moreover, this chapter positions 
the dissertation within the infrastructure bidding literature. The more specific 
methodology-focused literature of the subsequent topics is discussed in the 
respective chapters.  
Chapter 3 covers the model and assumptions of the overall procurement setting. 
The aim of the research project was to give a realistic representation of the real-life 
project environment, which distinguishes our work from the contemporary auction 
literature. Noteworthy is the fact that we include uncertainty in the project outcome 
and that we have introduced asymmetries in the bidders’ profiles. Moreover, the 
strategies that contractors need to determine have two dimensions. Firstly, they 
make an investment decision that reflects how much effort they are willing to put 
in knowledge acquisition that results in an uncertainty decrease and in a cost 
reduction. The second dimension concerns the mark-up that is applied to the 
estimated cost. Combining both choices for each of the projects under study 
determines the player’s strategy. 
Chapter 4 reports the results of the study of a single-project environment. For a 
given vector of experience levels that reflects the familiarity with this particular 
type of projects in this particular jurisdiction, the bidding equilibrium is 
approximated. The pay-off calculations rely on a simulation approach that allows 
flexibility in the modelling and that speeds up the experiments. Two 
approximation algorithms are presented. On the one hand, the Nash equilibrium 
method explicitly computes the pay-offs for each strategy profile and derives a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in unique strategies, but only considers a discrete 
number of strategies for each player. On the other hand, a strategy game algorithm 
1.3. Outline of the dissertation 
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studies a larger set of strategies and finds the best response for a particular player 
after narrowing down the strategy space of the opponents. The chapter also studies 
whether a fractional reimbursement of the investment efforts could level the 
playing field. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 extend the single-project environment towards a multi-
project setting, which is referred to as the project pipeline. Due to synergetic 
effects, contractors may use past experience from won projects in future 
opportunities. Usually, these pipelines have a limited nature, because of the large 
contingencies and the long timespan of the contractual agreements and because of 
the fact that governments and their agendas regularly change. Chapter 5 considers 
a situation in which the contractors make an ex ante bidding decision. Tendering 
processes are often overlapping and contractors need to spread their research 
budget over the pipeline of projects while they do not know in advance whether 
they will win or lose a project early in the pipeline. This is in contrast to Chapter 6, 
which allows contractors to modify their actions along the pipeline. In practice, the 
decision process has a mixed nature of both an ex ante as well as a sequential 
consideration so a study of these two extreme situations could guide us towards 
managerial insights on the effect of a pipeline of projects. Moreover, both chapters 
differ in their equilibrium solution concept. While the ex ante model of Chapter 5 
studies a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Chapter 6 introduces the Markov perfect 
equilibrium concept. Both chapters also differ in their algorithmic set-up. Chapter 
5 follows the strategy game methodology of Chapter 4 with the respective pay-off 
simulation. During the course of the research project, we succeeded in exactly 
defining the pay-offs for a given set of players and a given set of actions. 
Therefore, Chapter 6 exactly calculates the expected pay-offs under the assumption 
of Gaussian cost probability distributions. A best response heuristic is the 
implemented equilibrium approximation method for the sequential model.  
As data are scarce in this highly competitive environment, it has been a challenge 
to validate the theoretical findings and to get insights into human aspects of the 
CHAPTER 1.  Introduction 
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procurement process. Eventually, we succeeded in setting up a research network of 
contractors, public institutions, advisory firms and lawyers that were able to give 
feedback on our findings. Some important aspects of this triangulation process can 
be found in Chapter 7. Additionally, we have translated some of the scenarios into 
a laboratory experiment. 180 students were invited to participate in a bidding 
experiment that mimics the computer experiments. Chapter 7 summarizes the set-
up and findings. The study confirms the majority of the predicted dynamics that 
were identified in the computer experiment, but it also reveals that the subjects 
deviate from the social optimum, which has mainly its roots in the participants’ 
consistent underbidding behavior. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the conclusions 
and an overview of future research opportunities. 
Four appendices are added as additional relevant material. Appendix A lists the 
notation and the abbreviations and definitions. Appendix B reports the algorithms 
in a pseudo-code format. The ANOVA output that motivated why particular 
interaction effects draw attention is found in Appendix C. Appendix D serves as an 
addendum for the discussion in Section 7.1. 
1.4 Contribution of the dissertation 
While this study models the expected bidding behavior of contractors, the new 
insights that are generated have mainly an impact on the governmental policies. 
Since project and bidding data are scarce and since the societal value of the 
projects inhibit an empirical assessment of tender policies, the public sector could 
rely on the development of theoretical models to steer decision making. 
The subsequent chapters prove the added value of incentive creation mechanisms 
in order to maintain an appropriate level of competitiveness in the long run. 
Without governmental policies, the social benefits suffer from inviting more than 
two bidders for a high-risk PPP together with the danger of the winner’s curse. The 
1.4. Contribution of the dissertation 
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dissertation especially underlines the efficacy of governmental policies in 
heterogeneous markets (i.e., markets in which contractors may have a competitive 
advantage on their opponents). While these tendencies were already acknowledged 
by most policy makers, the views on the expected benefits differ across different 
jurisdictions, but the PPP model of this research project offers arguments for a 
general convergence of opinions. First of all, the standardization of contracts and 
processes could reduce the project-specific investment burden and would inflate 
investment incentives earlier in the project sequence. A second new insight relates 
to the impact of the fractional reimbursement of the losers’ pre-tender research 
cost. Especially in high-risk settings with more than two heterogeneous players, 
the reimbursements lead to more price competition and increased investment 
incentives. Besides, having a cemented pipeline amplifies the competitive forces 
which thus offsets the additional governmental cost of the reimbursements.  
Evidently, the insights from this dissertation are not only related to practitioners, 
but also contribute to the academic literature on procurement auctions and PPP 
bidding in particular. Incurring heterogeneity in the bidder’s experience levels 
revealed new insights on the asymmetric nature of the equilibria. Moreover, this 
dissertation pioneers in building a setting that entails a magnitude of characteristics 
that have been studied in distinct research streams: uncertainty in the project 
outcome, the investment decision to create a cost and knowledge advantage, the 
impact of incentive creation mechanisms and the consideration of a sequential 
project format. The remainder of this work proves that these determinants show 
important interactions that have not yet been considered in a generic setting. Also 
the PPP literature, that is currently mainly driven by empirical research on past 
project experiences, benefits from the predictive and theoretical insights. While the 
majority of academic PPP papers look at one-to-one contractual arrangements 
between the government and the contractor, this study introduces the competitive 
aspect of decision making under uncertainty. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review on project 
management in PPPs 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it aims to clarify the PPP glossary 
and the different aspects of the PPP procurement process. Secondly, it aims to 
create a map of the contemporary research topics of interest on which this 
dissertation can be pinned, in order to stress the contribution of the research 
project, highlighting some aspects that have not yet been extensively emphasized 
in previous studies.  
2.1 Delineation of the literature study 
PPP projects have been studied in a multiplicity of disciplines, like legal sciences, 
political sciences and economics. Within the operations management field though, 
coverage has been limited. Nonetheless, the project management literature and 
construction literature has dealt with important aspects of the PPP management 
process. Therefore, in order to set the research context, we opted to follow the 
methodologies of the literature reviews of Al-Sharif and Kaka (2004), Ke et al. 
(2009) and Tang et al. (2010). As a result, this review covers the literature of six 
important construction journals between 2006 and 2014. In addition, the key and 
often referenced articles concerning PPPs and bidding in a public procurement 
setting have been included in the discussion.  
The selection of the six journals is based on the journal ranking list of Chau 
(1997): Journal of Construction Engineering and Management (JCEM), 
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International Journal of Project Management (IJPM), Construction Management 
and Economics (CME), Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 
(ECAM), Journal of Management in Engineering (JME). Within the top six, also 
Proceedings of Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering (PICE-CE) is 
ranked. This journal has not been considered due to the negligible number of PPP-
related papers and instead, Public Money & Management (PMM) is added to the 
reference list. While it is rather a drawback that there are no more recent rankings 
of construction journals, an investigation of the top articles by search engines 
confirms that the six selected journals are appropriate and representative for the 
PPP literature. A keyword search on “PPP”, “PFI”, “Public-Private”, “Privately 
financed”, “BOT” and “DBFM” led to the database of selected references. A 
content analysis is necessary to confirm whether the main theme of the paper is 
related to PPPs.  
Next to some methodological classifications, this chapter also classifies the 
literature in line with the PPP research landscape that was drawn by Yuan et al. 
(2009). In the classification schemes, only the selected papers that were published 
between 2006 and 2014 in one of the six aforementioned journals are categorized. 
In total, 205 papers were selected for the PPP literature classification schemes. A 
classification is always suffering from some subjectivity, but the purpose is to 
classify the papers according to their focal purpose. Furthermore, the categories are 
non-exclusive, so that a paper may appear in several categories.  
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2.2 Classification of the PPP literature 
2.2.1 Country of application 
Every country has its own experience with PPP projects and it is argued that every 
country should be approached differently (e.g., Chan et al. 2009, McQuaid and 
Scherrer 2010, Zwikael and Ahn 2011, Rebeiz 2012). The drivers to engage in 
PPPs may differ and each jurisdiction is subject to its own risk factors. Developing 
countries deal with different challenges concerning for instance the external 
conditions, like political stability, corruption eradication or financial transparency 
(Wibowo and Alfen 2014). Therefore, a large number of empirical studies refrain 
from extrapolating the findings to a global perspective, but stick to a country-
specific study (Figure 2.1). Nevertheless, also other countries welcome PPP 
projects, but have not yet been studied in an academic vein.  
 
2.2.2 Sector of application 
Next to the geographic extension of the academic PPP research, also the sector 
focus has been widened (Table 2.1). While the majority of papers does not limits 
its scope to a particular sector, others concentrate on a specific industry for their 
empirical investigation or their theoretic application. The economic infrastructure, 
Figure 2.1 Geographical representation of PPP applications in investigated papers 
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usually dealing with the transportation sector, is still receiving the largest interest. 
Nevertheless, since social PPPs become more important in both developing as well 
as developed countries, one could expect this could be also reflected in the 
academic literature. 
Transportation Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Acerete et al. (2009), Ahmadjian & Collura 
(2012), Algarni et al. (2007), Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Ashuri et al. (2012), 
Aziz (2007a,b), Baeza & Vassallo (2010), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), Carbonara 
et al. (2014b), Carpintero & Petersen (2014), Chang (2013b), Cheah & Liu (2006), 
Chiara & Garvin (2008), da Cruz & Marques (2014), Garvin (2010), Girmscheid 
(2009), Henjewele et al. (2011, 2014), Huang & Chou (2006), Iyer & Sagheer 
(2010, 2011), Jupe (2007), Kokkaew & Chiara (2010), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), 
Laishram & Kalidindi (2009), Lenferink et al. (2013), Medda (2007), Meduri & 
Annamalai (2013), Ng et al. (2007a), Papajohn et al. (2011), Park & Chang (2013), 
Rajan et al. (2014), Rangel & Galende (2010), Rose & Manley (2012), Shan et al. 
(2010), Shaoul (2006), Shaoul et al. (2011), Singh & Kalidindi (2006), Soliño & 
Vassallo (2009), Subprasom & Chen (2006), Tamayo et al. (2014), Tawiah & 
Russell (2008), Thomas et al. (2006), Vassallo et al. (2012), Walker & Jacobsson 
(2014), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xiong & Zhang (2014), Xu & Moon (2014), Xu et 
al. (2012), Zhang (2009) 
Healthcare Acerete et al. (2012), Barretta et al. (2008), Cruz & Marques (2012, 2013b), 
Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010), De Marco & Mangano (2013), De Marco et al. 
(2012), Hellowell & Pollock (2007), Henjewele et al. (2011), Holmes et al. (2006), 
Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), McMurray (2007), Nisar (2013), Shaoul et al. 
(2008), Vecchi et al. (2010) 
Water 
provision 
Boudet et al. (2011), Chen (2009), Choi et al. (2010), Hassanein & Khalifa (2007), 
Jang et al. (2014), Lee & Yu (2011), Marques & Berg (2011), Meng et al. (2011), 
Park et al. (2013), Wibowo & Mohamed (2010) 
Education da Cruz & Marques (2012), Demirag & Khadaroo (2010), Jefferies & McGeorge 
(2009), Liu & Wilkinson (2014b), Nisar (2013), Petersen (2010), Reeves & Ryan 
(2007), Van Gestel et al. (2014), Wang (2014) 
Housing Abdul-Aziz (2012), Norris & Coates (2010), Trangkanont & Charoenngam 
(2014), Wang et al. (2014), Yuan et al. (2012a) 
Defense & 
security 
Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), Massey & Shidlo (2010), Ortiz (2010) 
Energy Chowdhury & Charoenngam (2009), Rebeiz (2012), Sobhiyah et al. (2009) 
Waste 
management 
Kleiss & Imura (2006), Zheng & Tiong (2010) 
Table 2.1 Sector of interest in PPP papers 
2.2.3 Stakeholder perspective 
Yuan et al. (2009) define five stakeholder relationships in the PPP deal. These 
have received attention in varying degrees (Table 2.2). The public angle of the PPP 
involvement has been extensively studied. Topics include for instance the question 
whether it is interesting to execute a particular project as a PPP. Moreover, the 
drivers for the public sector have been investigated from an international 
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perspective. Also the contracting mechanism needs to be carefully designed and 
one should be able to handle potential governance issues. Section 2.2.5.2 goes 
more into detail on these topics that aim to align the private sector objectives with 
the public and social needs.  
Evidently, the second stakeholder concerns the private sector. However, there are 
significantly less studies that solely focus on the private side of the agreement. 
This might be a consequence of the fact that private empirical data are scarce and 
the SPVs are often reluctant to share information about their strategies. 
Nevertheless, the public-private relationship, which is also considered as a 
stakeholder relationship, is a well-studied perspective. This is due to the fact that 
PPPs involve specific public-private challenges like the risk allocation mechanism. 
Furthermore, financiers also have an important stake as a third party stakeholder. 
Finally, Yuan et al. (2009) appointed the subcontractors as a fifth important group 
of stakeholders. However, most research on infrastructure subcontracting will also 
be applicable in the PPP context. Moreover, the pre-formed SPVs that enter the 
PPP tender already integrate different subcontractors.  
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Public 
sector 
Abdul-Aziz (2012), Acerete et al. (2009), Acerete et al. (2012), Ahmadjian & Collura 
(2012), Algarni et al. (2007), Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Aziz (2007a,b), Badu et al. 
(2013), Bailey et al. (2009), Boin & Smith (2006), Chan et al. (2009, 2010a, 2010b), Charles 
et al. (2008), Cheung & Chan (2011), Cheung et al. (2010), Cruz & Marques (2014), da Cruz 
& Marques (2012, 2014), Daube et al. (2008), De Marco & Mangano (2013), De Marco & 
Mangano (2013), De Marco et al. (2012), Demirag & Khadaroo (2010), Doloi (2009), 
Garvin (2010), Girmscheid (2009), Hellowell & Pollock (2007), Henjewele et al. (2011), 
Jupe (2007), Kleiss & Imura (2006), Koch & Buser (2006), Kumaraswamy et al. (2007), Liu 
& Wilkinson (2014a,b), Mahalingam (2010), McMurray (2007), McQuaid & Scherrer (2010), 
Meduri & Annamalai (2013), Meng et al. (2011), Ng & Wong (2007), Norris & Coates 
(2010), Ortiz (2010), Papajohn et al. (2011), Petersen (2010), Pollock & Price (2008), 
Pollock et al. (2007), Raisbeck et al. (2010), Reeves & Ryan (2007), Shaoul (2006), Shaoul 
et al. (2008, 2011), Soliño & Vassallo (2009), Tamayo et al. (2014), Tang et al. (2013), Tang 
& Shen (2013), Tawiah & Russell (2008), Vecchi et al. (2010), Vives et al. (2010), Wang 
(2014), Weihe (2008), Weisheng et al. (2013), Wibowo & Kochendoerfer (2011), Xie & Ng 
(2013), Xiong & Zhang (2014), Yuan et al. (2012a) 
Private 
sector 
Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Chang (2013c), Chiang et al. (2010), Chiara & Garvin (2008), 
Doloi (2013), El-Diraby & Gill (2006), Gruneberg et al. (2007), Iyer & Sagheer (2012), 
Jones & Noble (2008), Kokkaew & Chiara (2010), McCowan & Mohamed (2007), Ng et al. 
(2010), Park & Chang (2013), Raisbeck & Tang (2013), Rebeiz (2012), Swaffield & 
McDonald (2008), Thomas et al. (2006), Wibowo & Alfen (2013), Xu et al. (2012), Zhang 
(2009) 
Public-
private  
Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Ashuri et al. (2012), Aziz (2007b), Baeza & Vassallo (2010), 
Barretta et al. (2008), Boudet et al. (2011), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), Carbonara et al. 
(2014a,b), Carpintero & Petersen (2014), Carrillo et al. (2006, 2008), Chan et al. (2011), 
Chang (2013a,b), Cheah & Liu (2006), Chen (2009), Chen & Doloi (2008), Choi et al. 
(2010), Chowdhury et al. (2011), Clifton & Duffield (2006), Cruz & Marques (2013a), Cruz 
& Marques (2013b), Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010), De Schepper et al. (2014), Devapriya 
(2006), Dulaimi et al. (2010), El-Gohary et al. (2006), Fischer et al. (2006), Gurgun & 
Touran (2014), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Hassanein & Khalifa (2007), Henisz (2006), 
Henjewele et al. (2014), Ho (2006), Ho & Hsu (2014), Holmes et al. (2006), Huang & Chou 
(2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Hwang et al. (2012), Iyer & Sagheer (2010, 2011), Javed 
et al. (2014), Jefferies (2006), Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), Jin (2010, 2011), Jin & Doloi 
(2008), Jin & Zhang (2011), Ke et al. (2009), Ke et al. (2010), Ke et al. (2011), Khazaeni et 
al. (2012), Kong et al. (2008), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), Lee & Yu (2011), Lee & 
Schaufelberger (2014), Leiringer (2006), Lenferink et al. (2013), Li & Zou (2011), Liou & 
Huang (2008), Liou et al. (2011), Liu & Cheah (2009), Liu et al. (2014), Ng & Loosemore 
(2007), Marques & Berg (2011), Massey & Shidlo (2010), Medda (2007), Ng & Wong 
(2006), Ng et al. (2007a), Nisar (2013), Park et al. (2013), Raisbeck (2008), Rajan et al. 
(2014), Rangel & Galende (2010), Regan et al. (2011), Robinson & Scott (2009), Rose & 
Manley (2012), Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos (2008), Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014), 
Ruuska & Teigland (2009), Salman et al. (2007), Shan et al. (2010), Shen et al. (2007), Shen 
et al. (2006), Singh & Kalidindi (2006), Smyth (2008), Smyth & Edkins (2007), Sobhiyah et 
al. (2009), Subprasom & Chen (2006), Tang et al. (2010), Trangkanont & Charoenngam 
(2014), Tserng et al. (2012), Van Gestel et al. (2014), van Gestel et al. (2008), van 
Marrewijk et al. (2008), Vassallo et al. (2012), Walker & Jacobsson (2014), Wang et al. 
(2014), Wibowo (2006), Wibowo & Alfen (2014), Wibowo & Mohamed (2010), Wibowo et 
al. (2012), Xu & Moon (2014), Xu et al. (2010), Yang et al. (2010), Ye & Liu (2008), Yuan 
et al. (2009), Yuan et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2012b), Zhang (2006a,b), Zheng & Tiong 
(2010), Zou et al. (2014) 
Third 
party 
Chiang & Cheng (2009), Laishram & Kalidindi (2009), Liou et al. (2011), Park & Chang 
(2013) 
Table 2.2 Stakeholder perspective of the investigated papers 
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2.2.4 Type of the research 
Before heading to the topic-specific classification, the contemporary PPP research 
from the selected construction journals may be classified with respect to the type 
of study (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). Empirical PPP papers study the as-is status of 
the market or guide towards a to-be situation based on a consultation of industry 
experts. Since more PPP projects reach financial close or are even already nearly at 
the end of their concession period, the ex post evaluation literature is proliferating. 
Especially the number of county- or sector-specific case studies, classified under 
qualitative empirical research, is on the rise.  
The quantitative empirical research is not case-specific but typically collects data 
through surveys and interviews or from secondary data sources. The breakdown of 
the data sources in Table 2.5 emphasizes the important reliance on expert data. 
Recently, more and more studies gather secondary data sources, but this fraction is 
still significantly lower than for the subjective data sources. This is caused by a 
lack of quantitative and consistent project data. That is a drawback for many 
studies, especially because a low response rate and a lack of detailed knowledge 
are often encountered problems, disturbing the validity of the survey findings. The 
discussion of the mostly common methodologies that process these data is 
postponed to the subject-specific discussion of Section 2.2.5. 
While PMM is merely an outlet for case studies, the other journals accommodate 
both qualitative as well as quantitative papers. JCEM, CME and, to a smaller 
extent, IJPM also invite theoretical papers. The papers that carry the theoretical 
heading are very diverse though, ranging from studies that propose theoretical or 
conceptual frameworks to analytical and experimental studies of PPP determinants 
like risk allocation mechanisms, pricing attributes or bidding models. 
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Empirical – 
quantitative 
Acerete et al. (2009), Algarni et al. (2007), Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Badu et al. 
(2013), Boudet et al. (2011), Carrillo et al. (2008), Chan et al. (2009, 2010a,b), Chan 
et al. (2011), Chen & Doloi (2008), Cheung & Chan (2011), Cheung et al. (2010), 
Chiang & Cheng (2009), Choi et al. (2010), Cruz & Marques (2013a), De Marco & 
Mangano (2013), De Marco et al. (2012), Demirag & Khadaroo (2010), Doloi (2009, 
2013), Hassanein & Khalifa (2007), Hellowell & Pollock (2007), Henjewele et al. 
(2011, 2014), Hwang et al. (2012), Javed et al. (2014), Jin (2010, 2011), Jin & Doloi 
(2008), Jin & Zhang (2011), Ke et al. (2010), Ke et al. (2011), Meduri & Annamalai 
(2013), Ng & Wong (2006, 2007), Raisbeck (2008), Raisbeck et al. (2010), Raisbeck 
& Tang (2013), Rajan et al. (2014), Rangel & Galende (2010), Roumboutsos &  
Anagnostopoulos (2008), Salman et al. (2007), Smyth (2008), Smyth & Edkins 
(2007), Swaffield & McDonald (2008), Tang et al. (2013), Tang & Shen (2013), 
Vecchi et al. (2010), Wang (2014), Wibowo & Alfen (2014), Wibowo & Mohamed 
(2010), Xu et al. (2010), Yang et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2009), Yuan et al. (2012a), 
Yuan et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2012b), Zhang (2006a,b), Zou et al. (2014) 
Empirical - 
qualitative 
Abdul-Aziz (2012), Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Acerete et al. (2012), Aziz 
(2007a,b), Baeza & Vassallo (2010), Bailey et al. (2009), Barretta et al. (2008), Boin 
& Smith (2006), Carpintero & Petersen (2014), Carrillo et al. (2006), Charles et al. 
(2008), Chen (2009), Chowdhury & Charoenngam (2009), Chowdhury et al. (2011), 
Clifton & Duffield (2006), Cruz & Marques (2013b), Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010), da 
Cruz & Marques (2012, 2014), Daube et al. (2008), De Schepper et al. (2014), 
Devapriya (2006), Dulaimi et al. (2010), El-Diraby & Gill (2006), Fischer et al. 
(2006), Garvin (2010), Gruneberg et al. (2007), Gurgun & Touran (2014), Henjewele 
et al. (2014), Holmes et al. (2006), Jang et al. (2014), Jefferies (2006), Jefferies & 
McGeorge (2009), Jones & Noble (2008), Jupe (2007), Kleiss & Imura (2006), Koch 
& Buser (2006), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), Lee & Yu (2011), Lee & Schaufelberger 
(2014), Leiringer (2006), Lenferink et al. (2013), Liu & Wilkinson (2014a,b), 
Mahalingam (2010), Marques & Berg (2011), Massey & Shidlo (2010), McMurray 
(2007), McQuaid & Scherrer (2010), Meng et al. (2011), Nisar (2013), Norris & 
Coates (2010), Ortiz (2010), Papajohn et al. (2011), Park & Chang (2013), Petersen 
(2010), Pollock & Price (2008), Pollock et al. (2007), Rebeiz (2012), Reeves & Ryan 
(2007), Regan et al. (2011), Robinson & Scott (2009), Rose & Manley (2012), 
Ruuska & Teigland (2009), Shaoul (2006), Shaoul et al. (2008, 2011), Shen et al. 
(2006), Singh & Kalidindi (2006), Sobhiyah et al. (2009), Soliño & Vassallo (2009), 
Trangkanont & Charoenngam (2014), Tserng et al. (2012), Van Gestel et al. (2014), 
van Gestel et al. (2008), van Marrewijk et al. (2008), Vassallo et al. (2012), Walker 
& Jacobsson (2014), Wang et al. (2014), Weihe (2008), Weisheng et al. (2013), Ye 
& Liu (2008), Zheng & Tiong (2010) 
Table 2.3 Type of research in the investigated papers 
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Theoretical Ahmadjian & Collura (2012), Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Ashuri et al. (2012), 
Brandao & Saraiva (2008), Carbonara et al. (2014a,b), Chang (2013b,c), Cheah & Liu 
(2006), Chiang et al. (2010), Chiara & Garvin (2008), Cruz & Marques (2012, 2014), 
El-Gohary et al. (2006), Girmscheid (2009), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Ho (2006), 
Ho & Hsu (2014), Huang & Chou (2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Iyer & Sagheer 
(2010, 2011), Javed et al. (2014), Khazaeni et al. (2012), Kokkaew & Chiara (2010), 
Kong et al. (2008), Kumaraswamy et al. (2007), Li & Zou (2011), Liou & Huang 
(2008), Liou et al. (2011), Liu & Cheah (2009), Liu et al. (2014), Ng & Loosemore 
(2007), McCowan & Mohamed (2007), Medda (2007), Ng et al. (2007a), Ng et al. 
(2010), Park et al. (2013), Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014), Shan et al. (2010), Shen et 
al. (2007), Subprasom & Chen (2006), Tawiah & Russell (2008), Thomas et al. (2006), 
Tserng et al. (2012), Vives et al. (2010), Wibowo (2006), Wibowo & Alfen (2013), 
Wibowo & Kochendoerfer (2011), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xie & Ng (2013), Xiong & 
Zhang (2014), Xu & Moon (2014), Xu et al. (2012), Zhang (2009) 
Table 2.4 Type of research in the investigated papers (ctd.) 
 
Secondary 
data 
Acerete et al. (2009), Acerete et al. (2012), Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Aziz (2007a), 
Baeza & Vassallo (2010), Cruz & Marques (2013a), Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010), Daube 
et al. (2008), De Marco & Mangano (2013), De Marco et al. (2012), De Schepper et al. 
(2014), Hassanein & Khalifa (2007), Hellowell & Pollock (2007), Henjewele et al. 
(2014), Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), Jones & Noble (2008), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), 
Leiringer (2006), Lenferink et al. (2013), Mahalingam (2010), Meduri & Annamalai 
(2013), Norris & Coates (2010), Park & Chang (2013), Pollock & Price (2008), Pollock et 
al. (2007), Raisbeck et al. (2010), Rajan et al. (2014), Reeves & Ryan (2007), Shaoul 
(2006), Shaoul et al. (2008), van Gestel et al. (2008), Vassallo et al. (2012), Vecchi et al. 
(2010), Weisheng et al. (2013), Zheng & Tiong (2010) 
Interview Abdul-Aziz (2012), Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Badu et al. (2013), Barretta et al. 
(2008), Carrillo et al. (2006), Charles et al. (2008), Dulaimi et al. (2010), El-Diraby & 
Gill (2006), Gruneberg et al. (2007), Holmes et al. (2006), Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), 
Jin (2011), Jones & Noble (2008), Leiringer (2006), Lenferink et al. (2013), Liu & 
Wilkinson (2014a,b), Mahalingam (2010), Ng & Wong (2006), Norris & Coates (2010), 
Reeves & Ryan (2007), Robinson & Scott (2009), Rose & Manley (2012), Ruuska & 
Teigland (2009), Sobhiyah et al. (2009), Swaffield & McDonald (2008), Tang & Shen 
(2013), van Gestel et al. (2008), Weisheng et al. (2013), Xu et al. (2010), Zhang (2006b) 
Survey Abdul-Aziz (2012), Algarni et al. (2007), Badu et al. (2013), Carrillo et al. (2006, 2008), 
Chan et al. (2009, 2010a,b), Chan et al. (2011), Chen & Doloi (2008), Cheung & Chan 
(2011), Cheung et al. (2010), Chiang & Cheng (2009), Clifton & Duffield (2006), 
Demirag & Khadaroo (2010), Doloi (2009), Henjewele et al. (2014), Hwang et al. (2012), 
Jin (2010, 2011), Jin & Doloi (2008), Jin & Zhang (2011), Ke et al. (2010), Ke et al. 
(2011), Khazaeni et al. (2012), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), Kumaraswamy et al. (2007), Ng 
& Wong (2006), Papajohn et al. (2011), Raisbeck (2008), Raisbeck & Tang (2013), 
Rangel & Galende (2010), Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos (2008), Salman et al. 
(2007), Smyth (2008), Smyth & Edkins (2007), Swaffield & McDonald (2008), Tang & 
Shen (2013), Wibowo & Alfen (2014), Wibowo & Mohamed (2010), Xu et al. (2010), 
Yang et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2009), Yuan et al. (2012a), Yuan et al. (2010), Yuan et al. 
(2012b), Zhang (2006a,b), Zou et al. (2014) 
Table 2.5 Data sources of the investigated papers 
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2.2.5 Subject of study: A process classification 
The PPP contracting format is complex. The longevity and complexity cause major 
extra risks and the need for planning is invaluable (Grimsey and Lewis 2002, Ng 
and Loosemore 2007, Zwikael and Sadeh 2007). This planning appears in multiple 
stages of the PPP contract and the sequel of this section offers an overview of the 
state-of-the-art from a process perspective. The framework of Yuan et al. (2009) is 
slightly simplified in order to easily decompose the investigated papers and 
allocate them to the appropriate heading. 
The proposed classification scheme follows the essential steps of the PPP decision 
process (Table 2.6). Once an initial project concept is launched at the public side, 
the government needs to decide, often assisted by advisory institutions, on the 
appropriate procurement method. The PPP/Non-PPP literature studies these 
driving and inhibiting factors that influence the PPP decision. Once the PPP tender 
document is launched, we assume the procurement stage has started (Table 2.7). 
The public and private stakeholders have different challenges to face. The 
tendering governmental institution develops an appropriate contract mechanism. 
Moreover, the public entity decides on the prequalification parameters in order to 
determine which consortia move to the final bidding stages and on the decision 
mechanism to select the preferred bidder. The private sector consortia need to 
assess the feasibility of the project and invest in pre-tender research to improve the 
accuracy and the quality of the bid proposal. Contractor bidding refers to setting an 
appropriate price for the project. The risk identification and assessment and the 
risk allocation steps have both public as well as private repercussions. Once the 
preferred bidder is selected, the governance literature aids in managing and 
controlling the contract. Last but not least, an important stretch of research draws 
conclusions from ex post investigations of past projects resulting in essential key 
performance indicators. The major research questions for each category, together 
with the prominent methodologies that are specific for the PPP research context, 
are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
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PPP/Non- 
PPP 
Acerete et al. (2009), Acerete et al. (2012), Algarni et al. (2007), Badu et al. (2013), 
Bailey et al. (2009), Chan et al. (2009), Cheung & Chan (2011), Cruz & Marques 
(2014), da Cruz & Marques (2014), Girmscheid (2009), Henjewele et al. (2011), 
Laishram & Kalidindi (2009), Lenferink et al. (2013), McQuaid & Scherrer (2010), 
Rose & Manley (2012), Salman et al. (2007), Vives et al. (2010), Weisheng et al. 
(2013), Xie & Ng (2013), Yuan et al. (2012a) 
Procurement Table 2.7 
Governance Abdul-Aziz (2012), Barretta et al. (2008), Boudet et al. (2011), Chang (2013b,c), 
Charles et al. (2008), Chowdhury et al. (2011), Cruz & Marques (2013b), da Cruz & 
Marques (2012, 2014), De Schepper et al. (2014), Devapriya (2006), El-Diraby & Gill 
(2006), El-Gohary et al. (2006), Fischer et al. (2006), Henisz (2006), Javed et al. 
(2014), Jones & Noble (2008), Koch & Buser (2006), Kraft & Molenaar (2014), Ng & 
Wong (2007), Nisar (2013), Robinson & Scott (2009), Smyth (2008), Smyth & Edkins 
(2007), Tang et al. (2013), Tserng et al. (2012), Van Gestel et al. (2014), van Gestel et 
al. (2008), van Marrewijk et al. (2008), Walker & Jacobsson (2014), Wang et al. 
(2014), Ye & Liu (2008), Yuan et al. (2009), Yuan et al. (2010), Zou et al. (2014) 
Ex post 
evaluation 
Ahmadjian & Collura (2012), Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Carpintero & Petersen 
(2014), Chen (2009), Chen & Doloi (2008), Chowdhury & Charoenngam (2009), 
Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010), da Cruz & Marques (2012), Demirag & Khadaroo (2010), 
Dulaimi et al. (2010), Gurgun & Touran (2014), Hassanein & Khalifa (2007), 
Hellowell & Pollock (2007), Henjewele et al. (2014), Holmes et al. (2006), Hwang et 
al. (2012), Jang et al. (2014), Jefferies (2006), Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), Jupe 
(2007), Kleiss & Imura (2006), Koch & Buser (2006), Lee & Yu (2011), Leiringer 
(2006), Liu & Wilkinson (2014a,b), Mahalingam (2010), Massey & Shidlo (2010), 
McMurray (2007), Meduri & Annamalai (2013), Ng & Wong (2006), Norris & Coates 
(2010), Ortiz (2010), Papajohn et al. (2011), Park & Chang (2013), Petersen (2010), 
Pollock & Price (2008), Pollock et al. (2007), Raisbeck et al. (2010), Rajan et al. 
(2014), Reeves & Ryan (2007), Rose & Manley (2012), Shaoul (2006), Shaoul et al. 
(2008, 2011), Trangkanont & Charoenngam (2014), van Marrewijk et al. (2008), 
Vecchi et al. (2010), Walker & Jacobsson (2014), Wang (2014), Wang et al. (2014), 
Weihe (2008), Yang et al. (2010), Zheng & Tiong (2010) 
Key success 
factors 
Aziz (2007b), Carrillo et al. (2006), Chan et al. (2009, 2010a,b), Chowdhury & 
Charoenngam (2009), Doloi (2013), Dulaimi et al. (2010), Garvin (2010), Gurgun & 
Touran (2014), Hwang et al. (2012), Jefferies (2006), Meng et al. (2011), Ruuska & 
Teigland (2009), Tang et al. (2013), Wibowo & Alfen (2014), Yuan et al. (2009), Yuan 
et al. (2012a), Yuan et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2012b) 
Table 2.6 Subject of study of the investigated papers 
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Mechanism & 
contracting 
Abdul-Aziz (2012), Aziz (2007a), Carrillo et al. (2008), Cruz & Marques (2012), 
Cruz & Marques (2013a), Daube et al. (2008), De Marco & Mangano (2013), De 
Marco et al. (2012), Garvin (2010), Ho (2006), Ho & Hsu (2014), Javed et al. 
(2014), Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014), Soliño & Vassallo (2009), Subprasom & 
Chen (2006), Tamayo et al. (2014), Tang et al. (2013), Tang & Shen (2013), 
Xiong & Zhang (2014) 
Prequalification Doloi (2009), Kumaraswamy et al. (2007) 
Preferred bidder Baeza & Vassallo (2010), Zhang (2006a,b) 
Pre-tender 
research 
Carrillo et al. (2008), Chiara & Garvin (2008), Ho (2006), Ho & Hsu (2014), 
Jefferies & McGeorge (2009), McCowan & Mohamed (2007), Raisbeck & Tang 
(2013), Rangel & Galende (2010), Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014), Zhang 
(2006a,b) 
Contractor 
bidding 
Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Ashuri et al. (2012), Baeza & Vassallo (2010), 
Carbonara et al. (2014a), Cheah & Liu (2006), Chiang et al. (2010), Cruz & 
Marques (2013a), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Ho (2006), Ho & Hsu (2014), 
Huang & Chou (2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Iyer & Sagheer (2011, 2012), 
Liou & Huang (2008), Liou et al. (2011), Liu & Cheah (2009), Liu et al. (2014), 
Ng et al. (2007a), Ng et al. (2010), Park et al. (2013), Shan et al. (2010), Shen et 
al. (2007), Subprasom & Chen (2006), Swaffield & McDonald (2008), Wibowo 
(2006), Wibowo & Alfen (2013), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xu & Moon (2014), Xu 
et al. (2012), Zhang (2009) 
Risk 
identification & 
assessment 
Ashuri et al. (2012), Boin & Smith (2006), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), Carbonara 
et al. (2014b), Chan et al. (2011), Chang (2013b,c), Cheah & Liu (2006), Chiara & 
Garvin (2008), Choi et al. (2010), Cruz & Marques (2012), Gruneberg et al. 
(2007), Huang & Chou (2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Hwang et al. (2012), 
Iyer & Sagheer (2010, 2011), Ke et al. (2011), Kokkaew & Chiara (2010), Kong 
et al. (2008), Lee & Schaufelberger (2014), Li & Zou (2011), Liou & Huang 
(2008), Liu & Cheah (2009), Liu et al. (2014), Marques & Berg (2011), Park et al. 
(2013), Raisbeck (2008), Rebeiz (2012), Regan et al. (2011), Roumboutsos &  
Anagnostopoulos (2008), Shan et al. (2010), Thomas et al. (2006), Vassallo et al. 
(2012), Wibowo (2006), Wibowo & Alfen (2013), Wibowo & Kochendoerfer 
(2011), Wibowo & Mohamed (2010), Xiong & Zhang (2014), Xu & Moon (2014) 
Risk allocation Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Ashuri et al. (2012), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), 
Carbonara et al. (2014a), Carbonara et al. (2014b), Chan et al. (2011), Chang 
(2013b,c), Cheah & Liu (2006), Gruneberg et al. (2007), Huang & Chou (2006), 
Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Hwang et al. (2012), Iyer & Sagheer (2011), Javed et 
al. (2014), Jin (2010, 2011), Jin & Doloi (2008), Jin & Zhang (2011), Ke et al. 
(2010), Khazaeni et al. (2012), Lee & Yu (2011), Liu & Cheah (2009), Liu et al. 
(2014), Ng & Loosemore (2007), Marques & Berg (2011), Medda (2007), Park et 
al. (2013), Raisbeck (2008), Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos (2008), Shan et al. 
(2010), Shen et al. (2006), Singh & Kalidindi (2006), Sobhiyah et al. (2009), 
Vassallo et al. (2012), Wibowo (2006), Wibowo & Kochendoerfer (2011), 
Wibowo & Mohamed (2010), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xu & Moon (2014), Xu et al. 
(2010) 
Table 2.7 Subject of study of investigated papers: procurement-related topics 
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Financial analysis Acerete et al. (2009), Ahmadjian & Collura (2012), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), 
Carbonara et al. (2014a), Cheah & Liu (2006), Chiang et al. (2010), Cruz & 
Marques (2012), Girmscheid (2009), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Hassanein & 
Khalifa (2007), Huang & Chou (2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Iyer & 
Sagheer (2012), Kong et al. (2008), Liou & Huang (2008), Liu & Cheah (2009), 
McCowan & Mohamed (2007), Ng et al. (2007), Ng et al. (2010), Park & Chang 
(2013), Shen et al. (2007), Vecchi et al. (2010), Wibowo (2006), Wibowo & 
Alfen (2013), Wibowo & Kochendoerfer (2011), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xiong 
& Zhang (2014), Zhang (2009) 
Real options Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Ahuri et al. (2012), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), 
Carbonara et al. (2014b), Cheah & Liu (2006), Cruz & Marques (2012), Huang 
& Chou (2006), Huang & Pi (2009, 2014), Iyer & Sagheer (2011), Liu & Cheah 
(2009), Liu et al. (2014), Park et al. (2013), Shan et al. (2010) 
Economic theories Chang (2013a), Jin (2010, 2011), Jin & Doloi (2008), Jin & Zhang (2011), 
Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014), Tserng et al. (2012) 
Game theory Chang (2013b), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Ho (2006, 2014), Javed et al. 
(2014), Medda (2007), Shen et al. (2007), Tserng et al. (2012) 
Statistical 
hypotheses testing 
Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Chan et al. (2009, 2010b), Chan et al. (2011), 
Cheung & Chan (2011), Cheung et al. (2010), Chiang & Cheng (2009), Choi et 
al. (2010), Doloi (2013), Henjewele et al. (2011), Hwang et al. (2012), Ke et al. 
(2010), Ke et al. (2011), Meduri & Annamalai (2013), Ng & Wong (2006, 
2007), Raisbeck (2008), Rajan et al. (2014), Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos 
(2008), Swaffield & McDonald (2008), Tang et al. (2013), Tang & Shen (2013), 
Wang (2014), Wibowo & Mohamed (2010), Yang et al. (2010), Yuan et al. 
(2009), Yuan et al. (2012b), Zhang (2006a,b) 
Regression Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Cruz & Marques (2013a), De Marco & Mangano 
(2013), De Marco et al. (2012), Doloi (2009, 2013), Jin (2010), Jin & Doloi 
(2008), Liou & Huang (2008), Meduri & Annamalai (2013), Rajan et al. (2014), 
Rangel & Galende (2010) 
Factor analysis Badu et al. (2013), Chan (2010a), Doloi (2009, 2013), Rangel & Galende 
(2010), Tang & Shen (2013), Yuan et al. (2012b), Zhang (2006a) 
Analytical 
hierarchy process 
Khazaeni et al. (2012), Li & Zou (2011), Raisbeck & Tang (2013), Salman et al. 
(2007), Yuan et al. (2012a) 
Fuzzy techniques Jin (2011), Khazaeni et al. (2012), Laishram & Kalidindi (2009), Li & Zou 
(2011), Thomas et al. (2006), Xu et al. (2010), Yuan et al. (2010) 
Probability models Girmscheid (2009), Kong et al. (2008), Thomas et al. (2006), Wibowo (2006), 
Xie & Ng (2013), Xu & Moon (2014) 
Binomial models Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Ahuri et al. (2012), Iyer & Sagheer (2011), 
Wibowo et al. (2012) 
Networks and 
structural models 
Chowdhury et al. (2011), Iyer & Sagheer (2010), Jin (2011), Jin & Zhang 
(2011), Xu et al. (2012) 
Simulation models Arboleda & Abraham (2006), Ahuri et al. (2012), Brandao & Saraiva (2008), 
Carbonara et al. (2014a), Carbonara et al. (2014b), Cheah & Liu (2006), Cruz & 
Marques (2012), Girmscheid (2009), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), Iyer & 
Sagheer (2011), Kokkaew & Chiara (2010), Liou & Huang (2008), Liou et al. 
(2011), Liu & Cheah (2009), Ng et al. (2007), Ng et al. (2010), Park et al. 
(2013), Shan et al. (2010), Wibowo & Alfen (2013), Wibowo et al. (2012), Xu 
& Moon (2014), Zhang (2009) 
Programming and 
algorithms 
Iyer & Sagheer (2012), Liou et al. (2011), Subprasom & Chen (2006), Wibowo 
& Kochendoerfer (2011) 
Table 2.8 Most important established and emerging methodologies in PPP research 
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2.2.5.1 PPP or non-PPP? 
Why are governments engaging in PPP projects? The main drivers are country-
dependent, but there is agreement about two general classes of motives: financially 
driven or macroeconomic drivers and efficiency driven or microeconomic drivers 
(Kumaraswamy et al. 2007, Chan et al. 2009, McQuaid and Scherrer 2010). The 
value for money paradigm is the variable that determines the attractiveness of a 
PPP project in comparison to a public sector comparator (Grimsey and Lewis 
2002). 
The papers that are classified under this PPP/non-PPP heading discuss methods 
and frameworks that trade-off the PPP option and an alternative investment 
procedure (e.g., Girmscheid 2009, Cheung and Chan 2011). The methodologies 
range from weighted assessments of positive and negative factors (Cheung & Chan 
2011) to an economic net present value analysis that accounts for economic 
welfare (Girmscheid 2009). This category also entails survey-based and ex-post 
studies that discuss the skepticism for PPP agreements on the public side (e.g., 
Algarni et al. 2007, Henjewele et al. 2011). Consequently, the field is diverse and 
both positive as well as negative opinions color the research arena. But in general, 
one agrees that the possible success of the PPP as a contracting mechanism needs 
to be seen within a country-, a sector- and a project-specific context.  
2.2.5.2 Procurement mechanism and contracting 
The procuring entity needs to be well aware of the implications that result from the 
tendering documents. Evenhuis and Vickerman (2010) recommend the government 
to set up an appropriate tendering procedure so that the integration of tasks, the 
allocation of risks and adequate incentives achieve a balance between the interest 
of both parties. In our opinion, it is the ultimate goal of the contracting mechanism 
to select the most suitable and best-prepared contractor. Therefore, governments 
ought to take efforts to demolish barriers to entry (Carrillo et al. 2008). 
Government guarantees, discussed in Section 2.2.5.5, are also worth mentioning in 
this respect. From this stage onwards, the public sector also needs to be aware 
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about the aftermaths of the contract, since asymmetric information and 
opportunistic bidding may cover perverse incentives of the consortia (Ho and Liu 
2004, Evenhuis and Vickerman 2010). Hence, at the contracting and briefing stage, 
not only the stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities but also the governance 
mechanisms need to be clearly defined. 
A first topic that deserves attention in this respect is the determination of the 
appropriate payment mechanism (Aziz 2007
a
). A second aspect concerns the 
regulation versus the flexibility dimension. Subprasom and Chen (2006) discuss 
the impact of capacity regulation in toll road PPP contracts. These government-led 
requirements cap the flexibility for the contractor. Cruz and Marques (2012) claim 
that flexibility in contracts is necessary to cope with risk. Nevertheless, contractors 
might interpret this as an open door for renegotiations when particular risks or 
costs are overseen. Therefore, the output specifications, together with the 
renegotiation range and mechanism should be rigidly defined upfront (Javed et al. 
2014, Xion and Zhang 2014).  
A final aspect of the mechanism design, and that is a focal point of study in this 
dissertation, relates to the compensation of bid preparation efforts. Ho (2008) and 
Ho and Hsu (2014) game-theoretically study whether or not governments should 
provide a reimbursement for the SPVs that enter the tender and might spend a lot 
of money for the bid preparation, but that could lose the contract. The objective of 
the government is to incentivize the bidders to be willing to spend more on bid 
preparation. In a homogeneous setting in which all the features of the bidders are 
identical, Ho (2008) advises against compensation but this view is nuanced in the 
later study of Ho and Hsu (2014) that accounts for a heterogeneous bidding setting. 
2.2.5.3 Prequalification and preferred bidder selection 
Not every contractor that has shown interest in a particular PPP project will be 
allowed to enter the final bidding stage. The public party will perform a 
prequalification. Academic coverage of the prequalification question is scarce 
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though. Doloi’s (2009) survey and the subsequent linear regression and principal 
component analysis bring seven determinants for prequalification at the surface. 
Apparently, lowest price is not an indication for success, but the soundness of the 
business and workforce are more common. Additionally, Kumaraswamy et al. 
(2007) presume relationally integrated teams as a predictor for project success. 
But, shouldn’t it be questioned then that it is hard to get into the market given the 
reliance on past performance and organizational capabilities? Russell (1996) 
acknowledges this issue and believes that the inexperienced candidates or these 
without good financial records should be screened instead of throwing their 
proposals in the trash can.  
Also the literature on selecting the preferred bidder in the final bidding stage has 
been rather limited. Zhang (2006
a,b
) performed a questionnaire survey to 
understand how a public entity selects the winning bidder. 21 value contributing 
factors are found through factor analysis. In prior work, Zhang (2004) summarizes 
methods that have been proposed for contractor selection ranging from simple 
scoring, over NPV calculations, to the more dedicated Kepner-Tregoe method 
based on decision matrices.  
2.2.5.4 Pre-tender research by the contractor 
Contractors need to carefully prepare the bid proposal by looking into innovations 
and by making accurate cost estimations. While the risk identification and 
assessment issues are well-discussed in the literature, academics stay rather vague 
when it comes to the amount of pre-tender investment efforts that is necessary. 
Aibinu and Pasco (2008) empirically conclude that, in a general construction 
context, the accuracy of the bids is often determined by the project size. Smaller 
projects seem to have a larger bias in relative terms. Unfortunately, they add to this 
observation that the accuracy has not changed over time. Not only the financial 
aspects are important to determine the viability, but typically a multi-criteria 
assessment is required (McCowan and Mohamed 2007). 
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Looking at the innovation efforts, Rangel and Galende (2010) found in a study of 
the Spanish PPP market that innovations are not an intrinsic characteristic of PPPs. 
Roumboutsos and Saussier (2014), on the other hand, conclude that contractors 
have an incentive to invest in low-risk innovations that possibly affect cost savings 
during construction and operation. 
These pre-tender research efforts come at a cost and could become an important 
barrier to entry, tempering the competition in the market (Carrillo et al. 2008). Zou 
et al. (2008) identified the lack of competition as one of the important reasons for 
failure. McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Zitron (2006) support this idea and 
argue that a lack of bidders could disrupt the value for money concept. However, 
the authors add that a large number of bidders might force strong bidders to be 
reluctant to bid due to the reduced probability of winning with a high sunk cost of 
the consultancy and tendering expenses. This drives the contribution of this 
dissertation and the paper of Ho and Hsu (2014) claiming that bid cost 
reimbursements might be beneficial. 
2.2.5.5 Contractor bidding 
Pricing a PPP contract is a challenge, because a regular price list is not sufficient in 
this environment. Contractual peculiarities like the risk allocation, the government 
guarantees and the length of the concession receive particular interest in the 
construction literature. Only a restricted number of quantitative techniques have 
been used by researchers in construction projects like simulations (e.g., Zhang 
2009), regression models (e.g., Ngee et al. 1997), fuzzy logic (e.g., Ng et al. 
2007
b
), social marginal cost pricing (e.g., Evenhuis and Vickerman 2010, Macário 
2010) and financial methods (e.g., Shen et al. 2002, Cheng and Tiong 2005). The 
fact that a financial analysis based on the internal rate of return (IRR) or the net 
present value (NPV) is not really straightforward, is shown by Chiang et al. 
(2010). The long term aspect and the cash flow profile of PPP projects demand 
NPV-consistent IRR methods. A completely different approach is the one of Xu et 
al. (2012) that relies on information of the past to set the price by means of a 
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system dynamics model that considers the complicated and interrelated structure of 
the pricing parameters.  
Governmental interventions and their implications on the risk and pricing structure 
continue to receive a lot of attention in the academic literature. Fishbein and 
Babbar (1996) classify governmental support systems in eight categories. The 
government will install these support systems in order to provoke larger interest in 
a risky project. Such governmental support systems need to be reflected in the bid 
and accordingly need valuation. Uncertainty about future traffic revenues has been 
acknowledged as one of the most crucial risks in transportation PPPs. The 
minimum revenue guarantee is a common way to put a cap on the risk that has to 
be accepted by the private entity, but calculating the value of this guarantee is not 
possible with the traditional NPV approach (Liu and Cheah, 2009). Several authors 
rely on the theory of real options to attach an added value to these governmental 
policies (e.g., Cheah and Liu 2006, Wibowo et al. 2012, Carbonara et al. 2014). 
Liu and Cheah (2009) and Iyer and Sagheer (2011) classify the proposed methods 
in different categories: for discrete time, the multinomial lattice approach is used 
and for continuous time situations, one can develop closed form equations (to a 
limited extent), stochastic differential equations and simulation models. Brandao 
and Saraiva (2008) claim that the minimum revenue guarantee should only be 
included in high-risk projects. They assume a geometric Brownian motion (i.e., 
revenue is always positive and volatility is constant over time) and a series of 
European options with maturities between one year and the end-of-life time. Cheah 
and Liu (2006) also consider the other end of the spectrum. If traffic demand 
would exceed an agreed level, the government should come into play by increasing 
taxes or another way of pruning away excessive revenues. In short, the guarantee 
adds value, so the maximum transfer price should increase or the upfront price 
decrease and the cap structure involves savings for the government leading to the 
acceptance of a lower transfer price or a higher upfront price.  
CHAPTER 2.  Literature review on project management in PPPs 
 
 
27 
Other peculiarities or flexibilities to be taken into account are for instance the 
valuation of the option to expand or to abandon a project (Huang and Chou 2006, 
Huang and Pi 2009) and of the managerial flexibility to adapt the operational 
strategy or the facility given the contemporary condition of the infrastructure under 
study (Arboleda and Abraham 2006). A Markov chain stochastic process is used to 
model the deterioration process of infrastructures. When the condition of an 
infrastructure system is worse than expected, one should allocate more resources to 
the maintenance.  
When the government intervenes with a regulation policy by putting a floor on the 
capacity of the road or a cap on the toll charges, the effect should be carefully 
investigated (Yang and Meng 2000, Chen et al. 2006). Subprasom and Chen 
(2006) developed a genetic algorithm and conclude that a combination of toll 
charge and road capacity regulations positively influences social welfare, but that 
the government should look after the financial viability of the project. 
Additionally, these governmental support systems have an impact for the 
financiers. Relying on the Capital Asset Pricing Model analysis, the cost of debt is 
proven to decrease through the use of a guarantee, while a direct cash subsidy 
increases the cost of equity because of the decline of depreciation tax shields 
(Wibowo 2006).  
The concession period (i.e., the construction duration plus the operation duration) 
is a particular determinant upon which the government can also base its preferred 
bidder qualification, because this could increase efficiency (Zhang 2009). The 
length of the concession period is also a kind of risk management mechanism. 
Both the public as well as the private party have opposite aims: the contractor or 
concessionaire wants a reasonable return and the government wants to avoid 
excessive returns and hopes to reclaim the infrastructure at a suitable point in time 
(Ng et al. 2007
b
, Zhang 2009). Zhang (2009) adds the incentive compatibility 
constraint that the concessionaire should act in the interest of the government and 
he makes the length of operation fixed, while the length of construction is variable. 
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Different methodologies are used to strive for a win-win situation: Ng et al. 
(2007
b
), Zhang (2009) and Carbonara et al. (2014) apply a Monte Carlo 
simulation-based approach, while Shen et al. (2007) rely on bargaining game 
theory. 
The last determinant, and maybe the most important one from a contractor’s point 
of view, is the mark-up. The literature has not extensively covered this problem in 
a PPP context. Iyer and Sagheer (2012) recently studied Indian BOT projects and 
identified two decisions to be made: the identification of the appropriate grant (i.e., 
the bid price) and the debt-equity mix. A genetic algorithm derives a Pareto 
optimal set for a bi-objective optimization model that maximizes the profitability 
and the bid winning potential. Disregarding some exceptions (e.g., Ho 2006, Iyer 
and Sagheer 2012, Xu et al. 2012, Ho and Hsu 2014), the vast majority of the 
investigated PPP studies does not take competition into account in the price 
determination. Also the contractors’ heterogeneity is often overlooked, while 
experimental studies preach against the homogeneity assumption in the 
construction field (Oo et al. 2010).  
2.2.5.6 Risk identification, assessment and allocation 
Another procurement step that has already proven its exigency is risk management. 
Al-Bahar and Crandall (1990) define risk as “the exposure to the chance of 
occurrences of events adversely or favorably affecting project objectives as a 
consequence of uncertainty”. Consequently, risk is a function of the uncertainty of 
an event and the potential loss or gain resulting from the event. Gruneberg et al. 
(2007) attribute the origin of risk in PPPs mainly to the longer term commitment. 
Grimsey and Lewis (2002) underline that the risk in a PPP project is mainly due to 
the complexity of the arrangement itself.  
The study of Zwikael and Sadeh (2007) reveals that the quality of risk 
management planning has a positive impact on success measures like customer’s 
satisfaction and technical performance. Planning involves several steps that can be 
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summarized as follows: risk identification, risk analysis and evaluation, risk 
response management and risk system administration (Al-Bahar and Crandall 
1990). Therefore, risks are not only to be considered upon negotiation of the 
contract, but risks should be monitored during the life cycle of the project, so that 
risk devolution from the private to the public party is prevented (Zou et al. 2008, 
Monteiro 2010). Fischer et al. (2010) propose an integrated risk management 
system for PPP projects in order to obtain this. 
Value for money is a common identifier for analyzing PPPs. The cost of a PPP to 
the government is compared to that of a hypothetical counterfactual, the so-called 
public sector comparator. There is a lack of accurate information about the present 
conditions, the future and the implied social cost of the project. Moral hazard and 
adverse selection troubles are even harder to identify. The competitive tendering 
procedure is already a way to circumvent cost uncertainty, but prudence is in order. 
The risk of contracting has been discussed earlier, but also the nice sounding 
adagio “allocate the risk to the party that is most capable to deal with it” is not 
always a bed of roses. Monteiro (2010) reports that incentive schemes that align 
the private interest with the public interest can bring solace. These may also 
overcome problems of quality dilapidation of the infrastructure that would fall at 
the government’s expense due the so-called lock-in effect. Since the risk transfer is 
the greatest value for money driver (Jin 2010), an improper risk allocation may 
lead to the harmful value-deteriorating renegotiations of the contract (Marques and 
Berg 2011, Chang 2013
b
, Cruz and Marques 2013
a
).  
Both empirical as well as non-empirical research about risks in PPPs have been 
performed. Case studies give management insights into which risks to take into 
account and how certain risks influenced the success of a project. These case 
studies have the opportunity to show positive (e.g., Abednego and Ogunlana 2006) 
and negative (e.g., Sobhiyah et al. 2009, Chang 2013
b
) experiences in the 
allocation of risk. The results of these case studies, interviews and surveys often 
generate a risk allocation matrix (e.g., Ke et al. 2010). These matrices offer 
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guidelines to project managers and governments to set up a risk allocation method 
in this particular case. Unfortunately, the qualitative empirical studies often lack 
the possibility of generalization to other PPPs. Hence, a careful analysis of the 
peculiarities of a certain PPP project is essential. 
Researchers published risk classification schemes and all-encompassing lists of 
possible risks. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) define global and elemental risks. Other 
authors and institutions apply classification schemes depending on the features of 
the contract (e.g., Loosemore 2007, Monteiro 2010). Li et al. (2005) classify risks 
in three levels: the macro level with exogenous risks occurring outside the project 
(e.g., terrorism, studied by Boin and Smith (2006) or the recent financial crisis, 
studied by Regan et al. (2011)), the meso level for risks occurring within the 
boundaries of the project and the micro level risks due to inherent differences 
between the public and private entity. Chiara and Garvin (2008) talk about aleatory 
risk that is inherently present and that cannot be reduced and epistemic uncertainty 
that can be reduced as more relevant information gets collected. Jin (2010) applies 
a process point of view. He sets up a risk breakdown structure with three super-
categories: risks mainly occurring in the development phase, risks in the operation 
and transfer phase and lifetime risks. Iyer and Sagheer (2010) look at the 
interactions among risks and determine the (in)dependency of certain risk factors. 
Nonetheless, whatever classification scheme is applied, a whole-life-cycle 
assessment needs to be made and risks of the project itself as well as exogenous 
risks should be identified. Of course, one only deals with perceived risk from a 
certain point of view, because every stakeholder will have its own interpretation 
and estimation of the risk (Jin and Doloi 2007, Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos 
2008, Wibowo and Mohamed 2010). That is another motivation to focus on an 
integrated system and a continuous monitoring of the project risks.  
After the identification of the PPP project risks, one needs to analyze the impact of 
the risk. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) list the distinct methodologies for the different 
stakeholders in the project. The procurer of the project will look at net present 
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value calculations and he should perform the necessary sensitivity analysis. The 
sponsor will evaluate the impact of a certain risk on his return. The downside and 
upside of the different variables are analyzed, simulation exercises can be 
performed and the impact on the internal rate of return is estimated. More recently, 
Chiara and Garvin (2008) implemented the evolution of risk over time, since for 
some risks (i.e., epistemic uncertainty), it can be possible to learn over time. Some 
researchers rank the risks in a particular order, which is somewhat in between 
identification and assessment. An example is the research by Li and Zou (2011) 
that uses fuzzy AHP procedures to compare risks based on expert judgments.  
Some authors only study the assessment of one particular risk. Kong et al. (2008) 
evaluate credit risk for project financing. Kokkaew and Chiara (2010) focus on 
completion risk where activities are correlated and they extend the stochastic 
critical path method with the envelope method in order to model managerial 
corrective actions. Raisbeck (2008) studies the design risk that should be borne by 
the contractor. Design risk deals with the question whether the design can be 
constructed on time and whether it will meet design requirements. The traffic 
revenue risk mitigation in real option theory terms has been discussed in Section 
2.2.5.5, but a quantification is also proposed by an annuity model in Singh and 
Kalidindi (2006).  
Risks do not occur in isolation and could be correlated. Iyer and Sagheer (2010) 
have acknowledged this and try to model the hierarchical structure of risks based 
on a reachability matrix that structures the interdependencies of the risks. 
Similarly, Thomas et al. (2006) use fault tree analysis and causal relationships with 
fuzzy possibility theory in order to structure the risks that might lead to the failure 
of a project. Ng et al. (2010) model the aggregate risk impact on the equity return 
in concessions by means of simulation.  
The theory generally prescribes to allocate the risk to the party that is best able to 
manage it. Medda (2007) developed a theoretical allocation model of risks in 
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transport PPPs. The author relies on game theory and considers the settlement 
between the public and private partner as a bargaining game or final offer 
arbitration game in which two agents compete to achieve the most reasonable 
offer. Lam et al. (2007) use a quantitative approach in a general construction 
context. The goal of risk management is seen as the minimization of the total cost 
of a project’s risks. The authors use fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy logic is applied to 
transform linguistic variables into fuzzy subsets in order to execute fuzzy 
mathematical operations. Afterwards, the fuzzy outcomes are translated into 
understandable linguistic decisions. Xu et al. (2010) developed a similar technique 
in a Chinese context. A number of authors rely consistently on economic theory to 
explain the efficient risk allocation principles in PPP contracts on a cost-benefit 
basis: transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view (RBV) (Jin 
and Doloi 2008, Jin 2010, 2011, Jin and Zhang 2011). Transaction costs are the 
costs of running the economic system and TCE assumes that agents are not entirely 
rational but often act with self-interest. This opportunistic behavior comes at a 
cost. RBV, on the other hand, explains the heterogeneity among bidders. Every 
competitor has organizational capabilities that cannot be substituted nor imitated. 
These capabilities should influence the allocation of risks among parties. Five 
characteristics can be identified: a private partner’s risk management routines, the 
cooperation history, risk management commitment, environmental uncertainty and 
the risk management mechanism.  
Other risk allocation principles are often qualitative and rely on expert judgment. 
An easy practically applicable tool are the risk matrices. In a risk matrix, the role 
of each stakeholder in the mitigation of the risk is defined. Ng and Loosemore 
(2007) list the necessary conditions in order to allocate the risk to a certain party. 
Li et al. (2005) propose a clear allocation: the public sector should carry site 
availability and political risks and the private sector should take care of the 
majority of project risks, while relationship risks, force majeure risks and the risk 
of legislation changes should be shared. Chan et al. (2011) allocate most 
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systematic risks (i.e., legal, political and social risk) to the public side, project and 
economic risks to the private side, while sharing the environment risk. So a clear 
consensus is not really present. Ng and Loosemore (2007) underpin a major 
limitation of such straightforward policies: risks must be identified, managed and 
monitored on a project-by-project basis.  
Despite the theories, the adagio of attributing the risk to the party best able to 
manage it, often fails. In the end, the risks are often transferred to the government 
(i.e., the taxpayer) or the customer (Baeza and Vassallo 2010, Marques and Berg 
2011, Vassallo et al. 2012). De Palma et al. (2009) additionally claim that the 
principal-agent problem and the asymmetry of information leaves room for 
opportunistic behavior that makes the risk allocation exercise even harder. 
The next issue is the risk valuation in monetary terms, because taking extra risks 
mostly implies extra compensations (Gruneberg et al. 2007). How should a private 
party determine the value of the appropriate risk premium? Eriksen and Jensen 
(2010) warn for the fact that asymmetric information is a threat for the acceptable 
risk premium, leading to an excessive contractor compensation. They use the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model to calculate the risk premium, where the total return is 
composed of the risk free rate plus a premium. The discussion of the valuation of 
the government’s guarantees and flexibility measures, that are in fact a mechanism 
to reduce the risk of revenue-based PPP schemes and that are inherently an 
intelligent way to properly allocate the risk, have been discussed in Section 2.2.5.5. 
Further risk compensation calculations in the particular PPP context are lacking. 
2.2.5.7 Governance 
After the deal is signed and all contractual responsibilities are divided, the contract 
needs to be governed in order to guarantee the efficient and viable execution. The 
majority of ex post studies bring governance structures at the surface that 
contributed to the success or failure of PPP projects (Section 2.2.5.8). The PPP 
governance process entails two subheadings: governance of the project execution 
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which is merely borne by the private sector and the governance of relationships 
(i.e., contractual and stakeholder management).  
The PPP-specific literature about the project execution is narrow which could 
mean that the theories from the project management environment might be 
extended to PPP projects. Kokkaew and Chiara (2010) apply a stochastic critical 
path envelope method on a build-operate-transfer project. Yuan et al. (2010) 
consider the execution phase and how to control the interacting variables taking 
into account the numerous stakeholders. The practical execution or planning of 
operations seems to be a minor issue than governing the contract and stakeholder 
management. 
In this vein, Robinson and Scott (2009) make a summary of what it involves to set 
up a good governance structure from the public perspective. A clear output 
specification and cancelling out subjectivity is the start, but is often the most 
difficult task. A transparent performance monitoring system is the second element. 
Thirdly, one should think about a well-suited payment mechanism. A partnership 
environment should be established (Robinson and Scott 2009) that moves towards 
relationship management with care for each other’s culture, system and procedures 
(Smyth 2008).  
Contract governance evidently intertwines with the initial contract structure and 
procurement mechanism of Section 2.2.5.2. Abdul-Aziz (2012) identifies three 
types of governance structures. First of all, market governance is a loose form that 
is output-oriented. Competitive bidding hopes to create suitable incentives. Of 
course, these output and performance specifications should be mutually accepted, 
as well as the incentive or punishment mechanisms (Ng and Wong, 2007). 
Secondly, bureaucracy governance is rather strict, as specified norms and standards 
are the key characteristics. Anything in between is a kind of hybrid form often 
materialized under a flexible contracting form. Although informal relationships are 
sometimes seen as more effective than formal contracts (Jones and Noble 2008), 
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empirical results in Malaysia for instance show that the hybrid form and the 
bureaucratic form are apparent (Abdul-Aziz 2012). 
Relationship management between the government and the SPV, but also within 
the SPV is a key concern in PPPs. Barretta et al. (2008) claim that the success of a 
project depends on the established trust. The researchers note four levels of trust: 
trust in the system, contractual trust, trust in competences and goodwill. Smyth and 
Edkins (2007) keep it at two types of trust: self-interested trust (i.e., a win-win type 
of trust) and socially oriented trust.  
Taking care of all your stakeholder relationships is a daunting task and experiences 
are mixed (De Schepper et al. 2014). The first step is to determine who your most 
important stakeholders are. Chowdhury et al. (2011) offer network theory as an aid 
to structure the PPP project’s stakeholders and how the agreements between the 
different parties are settled. A second aspect of stakeholder management is a clear 
communication and a common understanding by sharing the same semantics (El-
Diraby and Gill 2006). All stakeholders have different values. Bringing these 
values together and governing that everybody remains pleased is a challenge. Yuan 
et al. (2010) try to integrate the stakeholders’ perspectives by means of two 
methodologies: fuzzy information entropy and an enhanced TOPSIS (i.e., 
technique for order preference by similarity to ideal situation) method. The former 
is based on the stability of a solution and the weight of each stakeholder group. 
The latter tries to set up a performance level that everybody can accept and that is 
as close as possible to the ideal situation and as far as possible from the negative 
ideal situation.  
The problems of opportunistic behavior have implications on the governance 
structure. Financial renegotiations can often not be circumvented. The government 
will decide whether or not to rescue the contractor. Ho (2006) developed a game-
theoretic claim decision model. He starts with the observation that contracts are 
being renegotiated and by modelling this dynamically the option to renegotiate will 
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return to opportunistic bidding behavior. The literature on renegotiation issues is 
receiving more attention which could mean that hold-up problems and lock-in 
issues are surging (e.g., Chang 2013
b
, Cruz and Marques 2013
a
, Javed et al. 2014, 
Xiong and Zhang 2014). 
2.2.5.8 Ex post analysis and key performance indicators 
The papers that are categorized in this class are different in nature. Ex post studies 
concern experiences from past projects or from recent region-specific experiences. 
Papers that handle key success factors go beyond an evaluation and state clear 
generalizations of the case studies or summarize quantitative practitioners’ survey 
studies.  
PPP projects are relatively recent phenomena and qualitative research efforts are 
necessary to build a knowledge database with good and bad practices. Several case 
studies emphasize the positive experiences that could become prototypes for future 
projects: e.g., Smith et al. (2004), Jefferies (2006), Chen (2009), Raisbeck et al. 
(2010), Zheng and Tiong (2010), Papajohn et al. (2011). PPPs can offer an 
integrated solution and can rely on the expertise from the private sector, but 
evidently, for some countries the attractiveness factors will be different than in 
other countries. 
Negative encounters that often result from challenges that have been discussed in 
earlier sections are also reported: renegotiation problems, lock-in effects, 
inappropriate risk allocations or obstructions due to political disinterest.  
A set of ex post evaluations critically looks into the key value for money drivers. 
Innovation and an increase in efficiency are key drivers for PPP contracting. 
Unfortunately, Leiringer (2006) and Rose and Manley (2012) warn for impeding 
factors that have prevented contractors to be innovative and Pollock et al. (2007) 
argue that there is no evidence base to conclude that PPP contracting has reduced 
cost and time overruns. Another key driver is the risk transfer. Pollock and Price 
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(2008) question the evidence base upon which it was decided that risk transfer has 
led to value for money.  
While the majority of studies considers transportation infrastructure projects, it is 
often discussed that PPPs are even harder and more costly to implement for social 
infrastructure projects, like healthcare projects (Shaoul et al. 2008, Vecchi et al. 
2010, Cruz and Marques 2013
b
), schools (Reeves and Ryan 2007) or prisons 
(Jefferies and McGeorge 2009). A better training for assessing the value of the 
projects and the included risks might be convenient (Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2010).  
The next step is to translate the good and bad practices into key success factors. A 
classic list can be found in Jefferies (2006). In a more recent study, Yuan et al. 
(2012
a
) develop 41 performance indicators that contribute to the success of PPPs. 
These are obtained by means of surveys and a confirmatory factor analysis. 
Among some specific issues, transparency and an appropriate legal framework are 
regularly reoccurring. Also external factors contribute to project success. Tserng et 
al. (2012), for instance, evaluate the positive effect of an external PPP unit to 
promote and help implementing PPP units. Of course, external factors are not 
evident to monitor. A stable macroeconomic environment but also a nationally 
stable political situation contribute to removing the inhibitors of PPP agreements 
(Chan et al. 2010
a
, Wibowo and Alfen 2014). Moreover, force majeure risks like 
terrorism (Boin and Smith 2006) or the financial crisis risk (Regan et al. 2011) are 
also beyond control and raised needs for new governance and policy measures. 
2.3 Takeaways from the literature on bidding for infrastructure 
projects 
The PPP construction literature offers some important insights into contractor 
bidding, but a lot of competitive aspects are overlooked. The emphasis is mainly 
on the one-to-one negotiation between the public and the private entity, while 
general bidding models like the one of Ho (2008) or the one in this dissertation are 
scarce.  
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This section concisely constructs a bridge with bidding models in the traditional 
infrastructure construction literature. The study of the aforementioned construction 
journals proposes a three-dimensional classification to map the characteristics of 
the bidding models: 
- Homogeneous versus heterogeneous bidders; 
- Once-only versus repetitive projects; 
- Selection based on price versus based on a multi-criteria approach. 
While most PPP studies look at contractor bidding aspects from a homogeneous 
perspective (e.g., Ho 2008, Shen et al. 2007, Tserng et al. 2012), other approaches 
fundamentally take heterogeneity into account (e.g., the risk allocation studies of 
Jin (2011) by means of the resource based view). Oo et al. (2010) experimentally 
concluded that bidders are essentially heterogeneous. In the non-PPP literature, 
this heterogeneity aspect found resonance in the bid/no bid decision setting of 
Bageis and Fortune (2009) or the empirical competitor analysis approaches of Tan 
et al. (2010) and Yuan (2012) that rely on past bidding data. 
The analysis of past bidding behavior is of course only possible in a rather 
repetitive setting, while megaprojects, like PPPs, are often once-in-a-career 
decisions (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009). Nevertheless, most bidding studies in the 
construction literature assume repetitive behavior (e.g., Skitmore and Runeson 
2006, Christodoulou 2010, Kim and Reinschmidt 2011). The initiators of the 
competitive bidding literature are Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967), but the 
literature dispersed and different methodologies are introduced to deal with more 
complex bidding environments. These methodologies range from simulations (e.g., 
Cagno et al. 2001), over multi-criteria optimization models (e.g., Iyer and Sagheer 
2012) to exotic entropy-based methods (Christodoulou 2010). 
The bidding strategy of the contractors is naturally dependent on the decision 
mechanism of the contracting authority. PPPs typically require multi-criteria 
decision making, since this is a perilous choice for the government in the case of 
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contract durations of over thirty years. In traditional contracts, the lowest bid 
usually wins the tender. However, there are also price-based alternatives like the 
below average method in which the bidder that bids just below the average bid is 
awarded the contract (Ioannou and Awwad 2010). The multi-criteria assessments 
all fall under the umbrella of most advantageous tendering (e.g., Perng et al. 2006, 
Tzeng et al. 2006) and a plethora of methodologies exists: multiple regression, data 
envelopment analysis, multi-attribute utility theory, cluster analysis, fuzzy theory, 
and analytical hierarchy process are only some of the methodologies in the 
landscape (Darvish et al. 2009). Zhang (2006
a,b
) lists the methodologies in the PPP 
context. Sometimes the selection is in several stages: typically first a 
prequalification stage is based on the quality of the contractor and afterwards the 
lowest bid gets priority (Abudayyeh et al. 2007).  
Nonetheless, these scoring mechanisms and the decision mechanism itself is of 
utmost importance. It is especially necessary to mitigate the risk of opportunistic 
bidding behavior. Bidders can bid too low in order to stay in the market. Also 
misinterpreting flexibility options or renegotiation opportunities could be harmful 
as they lead to beyond contractual rewards that might inflate opportunistic bidding 
behavior (Lo et al. 2007, Mohamed et al. 2011) or unbalanced bidding (Wang et al. 
2006, Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009). Transparency should overcome most of the 
principal-agent issues and the government should minimize the variability among 
contractors through clear information provision and communication (Müller and 
Turner 2005, Skitmore 2008, Flyvbjerg et al. 2009). 
Consequently, the general infrastructure bidding literature shapes a broad view on 
different bidding settings. Nevertheless, the peculiar characteristics of the complex 
PPP environment were repeatedly underlined, which means that one should beware 
of blindly transferring a methodology or setting to the PPP context. As a result, 
this dissertation claims a spot in the field by focusing on a heterogeneous setting in 
a limitedly repetitive environment. While PPPs actually require a multi-criteria 
approach, the model in this dissertation accounts for the lowest price mechanism 
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under the assumption that prequalification has been performed in an earlier stage. 
However, the model does allow for a monetary correction of the bid price given 
the quality of the bidder and the proposal (Section 3.2).  
2.4 Conclusion 
The PPP literature has been extending since the introduction of PPP projects in the 
early nineties. The country- and sector-specific nature of the project is key so 
prudence is in order before generalizing findings and experiences. Nevertheless, 
this chapter gave a general overview of the contemporary topics. The focus of the 
dissertation is on the procurement stage of the PPP process. These negotiations 
often take a very long time. The engagement in this long-term commitment is 
daunting and risky. As a result, the importance of the tendering procedure cannot 
be overestimated as the project might develop as a rollercoaster after the contract is 
signed and both parties might be locked in and might become the victim of 
uncertainty and of their own relationship. A divorce without huge opportunity 
costs in PPP contracts is often not possible, so planning and managing the 
marriage is vital.  
A lot of the challenges draw back to the asymmetry of information. The incentives 
that are offered by the government can incur perverse incentives at the private side. 
Every policy measure therefore needs detailed and critical analysis. Opportunistic 
bidding behavior and excessive renegotiations are harmful. In the current literature, 
this holistic view is often overlooked. In several analytical approaches, only the 
private or the public entity is considered which renders the whole picture 
incomplete. Much effort should be put in this holistic view, especially in PPPs that 
move beyond a platonic execution of a project but that attain high value to 
partnership and efficiency.  
The concept of risk management is known and is recognized by scholars and 
business people alike, but the active application of continuous risk management 
policies is not widespread. A wide range of methodologies have been developed, 
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but it should be investigated how these methods can be implemented 
comprehensively. Perhaps neither the public party nor the private party wants to 
rely on simulations or possibly the quantitative models do not capture reality very 
well. Some quantitative methods exist, but a straightforward and easily 
implementable approach can still be developed, especially in how to incorporate 
positive and negative risks in a bid. Quantitative bidding models are scarce and the 
assumptions of the traditional construction literature are often not transferable to 
PPPs. 
In conclusion, this dissertation adds to the PPP literature in the sense that it offers 
theoretical guidance in the procurement phase. The model studies the public-
private relationship, but also considers the competition among contractors in a 
high-risk environment. Therefore, in terms of Table 2.7 and from the public angle, 
the dissertation is classified under the mechanism and contracting heading. From 
the private angle, the focus is on pre-tender research and contractor bidding. 
Moreover, since risk plays an important role in the PPP model, the results also add 
to the theoretical risk assessment literature. Consequently, due to its multi-faceted 
dimensions, we believe this dissertation’s strength lies in the holistic view on high-
risk projects between governments and private sector consortia. 
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Chapter 3 Model and assumptions 
 
This chapter introduces the model and assumptions that have been taken along the 
research project. The model results from a revision of the contemporary academic 
PPP literature, in order to grasp the main characteristics of the PPP procurement 
process. However, assumptions are necessary to reduce the level of complexity. 
Nevertheless, a collaboration with industry practitioners (e.g., contractors, 
investment companies, advisory firms and public institutions) has been installed 
with the purpose of guaranteeing that the simplifications would not downgrade the 
value of the model. Section 3.1 describes the general procurement framework. The 
general modelling assumptions that are consistent for all remaining chapters and 
that inherently drive the contribution of this dissertation are discussed in Section 
3.2 and lead to the decision variables of Section 3.3. These essential determinants 
of the model are subsequently translated from a general level into an abstract 
analytical level. The overall theoretical model is described in Section 3.4 and the 
dissertation’s implementation characteristics in Section 3.5.  
3.1 The PPP procurement model 
Disregarding some sector- and country-specific features, the PPP procurement 
process generally has two stages. After the public communication, consortia or 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that consist of designers, construction contractors, 
subcontractors, suppliers and maintenance companies can express their interest for 
the project. In the remainder of the text, we make abstraction of the internal 
structure of the consortia to which we refer as “a contractor or bidder”. A 
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prequalification mechanism shortlists a by the government defined number of 
contractors that are invited for tender. In practice, this number varies between two 
and four and in a rare case five bidders, depending on the jurisdiction, the interest 
and the complexity of the project. In the second stage, which our model represents, 
the shortlisted contractors independently develop a project proposal that includes 
among other things the design details as well as process, management and financial 
information and that meets the government requirements. Due to the long-term 
time span, the magnitude and the entailed risk of PPPs, a lot of effort needs to be 
put into these proposals. In order to develop a competitive yet profitable project 
proposal, each contractor may engage in research studies and legal advisory 
activities. These pre-tender research and development exertions come at a cost, but 
contribute to the quality of the proposal. Moreover, each contractor determines the 
required mark-up that accounts for the requested profit and the monetary 
mitigation of risk. The project information and the bidding environment 
information that consists of the number of bidders and their respective competitive 
positions affect these decisions. After the proposals have been received, the 
government grants the project to the economically most advantageous bidder based 
on the assessment of the cost and the quality of the submitted proposals. 
3.2 General assumptions 
The study of the academic literature together with the consultation of practitioners 
has led to a set of model characteristics and assumptions that differentiate the 
dissertation from the former (procurement) auction literature.  
Contractors that are involved in the research project have confirmed that their 
bidding strategy is influenced by the consortium’s risk attitude, its maturity in the 
market and the bidding environment (i.e., the number of competitors and their 
respective experience levels). Consequently, the PPP market is in general observed 
to be heterogeneous. Practitioners from both the public as well as the private angle 
distinguish inexperienced entrants from mature, well-established incumbent 
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consortia. In an academic vein, Oo et al. (2010) experimentally conclude that 
bidders’ bidding behavior is diverse. Therefore, a continuous experience scale has 
been introduced. A player 𝑝 has an experience level 𝑒𝑝 ∈ [0,10] which is an ex 
ante assessment (i.e., without taking investment into account) of how familiar a 
certain contractor is with a particular market and which could in practice easily be 
observed by the number of past projects within this specific field and within this 
particular jurisdiction. Sometimes, the country-specific nature of a project is of 
paramount importance so that project-specific knowledge does not suffice and the 
familiarity with a country, the credibility status or the available resources (e.g., a 
specialized drilling machine) could add to the experience level. As a consequence, 
consortia that have a mature position in a European market, might be perceived as 
an immature entrant in a Canadian market, due to the legal requirements or the 
lack of credibility. Including these asymmetries complicates the model, but is a 
major contribution to the existing bidding literature, that usually assumes 
symmetric players. 
Assumption 1: The bidding environment information that consists of the number of 
shortlisted bidders and their respective experience levels is common knowledge. 
Project costs can be represented by probability distributions that are defined by its 
parameters that are related to its expected value and its level of variability. 
Uncertainty in the project outcome and the project risks are aggregated and 
translated into a single measure: the variance of the expected project cost together 
with the associated bid probability density for each player. Complex or risky 
projects like toll roads or hospitals have wider distributions than social housing 
projects for instance. These distributions are dependent on the experience level of 
the bidder and the amount of money the bidder has invested in research.  
The experience level of a player contributes in a two-fold way. First of all, more 
experience results in a direct cost impact because of economies of scale, efficiency 
gains and the familiarity with the market. Model-wise, one might say that the 
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expected value of the cost probability density of a more experienced contractor is 
lower than that of his less experienced counterparts. Secondly, experience has a 
knowledge impact in terms of the accuracy of the estimated project cost.  
Equivalently to the impact of the experience and in line with recent R&D research 
(Martzoukous and Zacharias 2013) and project management research (Lippman et 
al. 2013), a contractor’s pre-tender investment contributes in two ways to the 
transformation of the cost curve. Pre-tender investment shifts the cost curve to the 
left due to innovative disclosures and efficiency gains, which results in a lower 
expected cost. Besides, the variance of the cost distribution decreases as 
investment leads to more accurate cost estimates. The variance of the cost 
probability distribution reflects the complexity or the risk of the project. For 
reasons of simplicity, risk is categorized in two types: an uncontrollable part that is 
the same for all contractors (e.g., force majeure risk, risk of contract renegotiation 
by the government or macroeconomic risk) and a controllable part (e.g., demand 
risk, project risk) that can be reduced or mitigated through the appropriation of 
experience or the performance of research investments. If a project has a fairly 
repetitive nature, experience is the main contributor to the uncertainty reduction, 
while if it is highly innovative, the investment is of paramount importance. In 
summary, this results in three assumptions. 
Assumption 2: The complexity or risk of a project is translated into the variance of 
the cost probability density and consists of a controllable part and an 
uncontrollable part. 
Assumption 3: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has 
invested in pre-tender research, the lower the variance of the cost probability 
density (knowledge impact assumption). 
Assumption 4: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has 
invested in research, the lower the expected project cost (direct cost impact 
assumption). 
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The quantitative impact of assumption 3 for player 𝑝 is given by a fraction 𝜎𝑝
2 and 
for assumption 4 by 𝑔𝑝. Assumption 5 relates to the belief that both contractors as 
well as the government are able to assess the degree of complexity of a project, 
based on for instance the available project information and similar previous 
experiences.  
Assumption 5: All participants know the general structure of the game and the 
distributional characteristics related to assumptions 2 to 4. 
In the modelling procedure, the government selects the lowest-bidding contractor. 
This might seem in contrast with the cost/quality trade-off that governments claim 
to make when assessing the proposals. Nevertheless, with a slightly different 
implementation, assumption 4 inherently also reflects the cost/quality trade-off: if 
the government would put a greater emphasis on quality and experience, the 
contractor’s cost distribution shift would be more significant if he invests more in 
research or has more experience. That means that we inherently assume that the 
investment effort is a good proxy for the quality of the proposal. This relates to the 
cost adjustment implementation of Kostamis et al. (2009). In this vein, assumption 
4 puts a monetary value on the preference for more qualitative bids or for more 
experienced contractors by rewarding them with a discounted bid. In the current 
model, assumption 4 reduces the expected project cost of the probability 
distribution, while the alternative interpretation would modify the bid probability 
distribution. Nevertheless, we believe that the bidding outcome is equivalent, so 
that this flexible approach validates the fact that the model’s decision maker selects 
the lowest bidding contractor as the preferred bidder. Assumption 6 summarizes 
the government decision mechanism and accounts for the possibility that the 
government reimburses the losing bidders for their research efforts. 
Assumption 6: The government selects the lowest bidding contractor. If the 
government installs a percentage-wise bidding cost reimbursement policy, bid 
compensations are equally credited to all losing bidders.  
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Last but not least, contractors are assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize their 
expected pay-off. 
Assumption 7: Contractors maximize their expected pay-off. 
The ex ante strategy model and the sequential strategy model of Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 respectively requires the introduction of three additional assumptions 
with respect to the multi-project setting. The pipeline concept is defined in more 
detail in Section 5.1.  
First of all, we acknowledge the synergetic effects that result from executing 
multiple projects of a similar type. Basically, a contractor who wins a project 
moves towards a higher level on the experience scale, regardless of whether this 
project has been profitable or loss-making. Consequently, we assume that winning 
a contract may result in a knowledge and cost advantage in later tenders. 
Assumption 8: Winning a contract results in an experience level increase. 
An important assumption for the strategic model is related to the exogeneity of the 
bidding environment. In the entire project pipeline, no new players enter the game 
and the same set of players is considered for each project. In practice and in future 
models, randomly arriving contractors could be introduced. Nevertheless, the 
consortia within most PPP jurisdiction have a stable structure and the number of 
(sub-)contractors that is able to participate is low. Moreover, also the finite 
pipeline of projects is assumed to be common knowledge and, without taking 
experience and investment into account, all projects have a stochastically 
equivalent nature. This means that the common cost probability distribution 
parameters that are the same for all players are stable along the pipeline. Hence, 
the projects in the pipeline have the same type (e.g., all projects concern prison 
projects).   
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Assumption 9: The project pipeline is commonly known and each project has the 
same risk and cost structure. The same set of bidders is considered for the entire 
project pipeline. 
A final assumption that is related to the dynamic modelling and that offers 
opportunities for extensions, concerns the budgetary and resource requirements. In 
practice, contractors claim that it is infeasible to simultaneously engage in a 
multitude of projects simultaneously because of the magnitude and the risk 
exposure. Nonetheless, because this dissertation only considers project pipelines of 
a limited finite nature, we allow bidders to execute all projects of the pipeline and 
therefore do not include capacity constraints. 
Assumption 10: Each player is assumed to be capable of performing all projects in 
the pipeline and has sufficient resources at his disposal. 
3.3 The decision variables 
The setting is considered as a bi-level programming model. At the lower level, 
contractors are bidding against each other and simultaneously optimize their 
expected pay-off (assumption 7). A bidder’s expected pay-off is dependent on the 
competitors’ actions, which suggests a game-theoretic approach. In this vein, under 
the traditional rationality assumptions of game theory, the bidders arrive at a 
strategy equilibrium. This strategy equilibrium is dependent on the project 
characteristics and on the market structure. To a certain extent, the government 
controls the tendering procedure and may install policies that modify the resulting 
bidding equilibrium. As a result, the government acts as the decision maker at the 
upper level of the bi-level model.  
3.3.1 Decision variables of the contractors (lower level) 
The definition of the strategy depends on the model that we consider. 
Nevertheless, in essence, the decision variables are comparable for each of the 
settings. Basically, each shortlisted contractor makes two decisions for a particular 
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project. On the one hand, the bidder determines the level of pre-tender research. 
This is the monetary effort that the consortium is willing to put into developing the 
project proposal and could consist for instance of consultancy costs, lobbying costs 
and design costs. It could also entail the cost to insure particular risks with a third 
party insurance provider. On the other hand, the contractor determines a mark-up 
percentage that is applied to the estimated project cost. The mark-up is a way to 
mitigate the remaining risk by setting a risk premium, together with a preferred 
profit margin. Since the contractor is never certain about the actual government 
cost, but only receives a signal to which he applies the mark-up, one might 
consider the investment and mark-up decision making for a particular project as a 
synchronized action, so that they are combined into a single partial strategy. As an 
example, consider the action 1% investment and 20% mark-up. The investment 
decision refers to 1% of a pre-set reference base (e.g., € 1,000,000), while the 20% 
mark-up is added to the estimated project cost. 
A strategy in game-theoretical terms is more than combining these decision 
variables. A strategy prescribes the actions to take at each decision point of the 
game tree, or more correctly, at each information set of the game tree. The notion 
of information sets reflects the fact that a player might not know everything that 
happened “previously” in the game. “Previously” does not necessarily have a 
temporal meaning. In our setting, each player makes a decision for a particular 
project simultaneously. Consequently, a player does not know the strategy of the 
opponents and is therefore uncertain about the exact decision point he arrived at. 
An information set groups all these possible decision nodes. Nevertheless, a player 
does know at which information set he is. The combination of decisions at the 
different information sets determines a strategy. As a consequence, the 
interpretation of a strategy is different for the different subsequent chapters. In 
brief, Chapter 4 makes a single investment and mark-up decision, Chapter 5 makes 
an investment and mark-up decision in each stage of the game and Chapter 6 in 
each state of the game (see Section 3.3.1.1 to Section 3.3.1.3).  
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Disregarding the specific content of a strategy, we can represent a strategy for 
player 𝑝 as 𝑠𝑝. The vector that combines the strategies of the 𝑃 players is called a 
strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃). Each player optimizes his expected pay-off 
(that is explained in Section 3.4) and that is dependent on the strategies of the 
competitors. We represent the strategy profile of the opponents as 𝑠−𝑝. We define a 
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium strategy profile 𝑠∗ = (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠𝑃
∗) as the optimal 
strategy vector. For this combination of optimal strategies, none of the bidders has 
an incentive to deviate from his current strategy choice 𝑠𝑝
∗ , given the strategy 
combination of the opponents 𝑠−𝑝
∗ . With 𝜋𝑝(. ) the total expected pay-off function 
for player 𝑝, this is mathematically expressed as: 
∀𝑝, 𝑠𝑝 ∈ 𝑆𝑝: 𝜋𝑝(𝑠𝑝
∗ , 𝑠−𝑝
∗ ) ≥ 𝜋𝑝(𝑠𝑝 , 𝑠−𝑝
∗ )     (3.1)  
3.3.1.1 Single-project model 
The game tree of Figure 3.1 is the representation of the assumed single-project 
PPP setting. According to assumption 1, the number of shortlisted bidders and 
their experience level is common knowledge for all players. We represent the 
experience level of player 𝑝 as 𝑒𝑝 with 𝑒𝑝 a value along the predefined experience 
scale with 𝑒𝑢 the number of experience intervals. The combination of experience 
levels is an experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) with 𝑃 the number of players in 
the tender. As this is common knowledge, we may define this experience vector as 
a proper subgame of the game tree. A subgame is referred to as a game within a 
game up to a particular point where the players know exactly where they are in the 
tree. Assume that a discrete number of experience levels on a scale from zero (i.e., 
no experience) to ten (i.e., maximum experience) is set up. A game with 𝑃 players 
and 𝐸 (= 𝑒𝑢 + 1) levels of experience would lead to 𝐺 =
(𝑃+𝐸−1)!
𝑃!(𝐸−1)!
 subgames or 
bidding environments. The value 𝐺 results from the notion of a “combination with 
repetition”. A strategy of this game would prescribe the decisions for each of the 
subgames. The experience vector is determined at the beginning of the game (in 
Figure 3.1 modeled by the node 𝑁 that stands for nature) and that is common 
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knowledge for all players. Then players 1 and 2 make their combined investment 
decision and mark-up decision simultaneously. We assume that they can select 
these percentages from a continuous range of possibilities, which would result into 
an infinite number of choices, indicated by the arc between the two branches of the 
players’ decision nodes. None of the players knows the decisions of the opponent, 
which is represented by the dotted line between the two nodes of player 2 in Figure 
3.1 and which means that these two nodes are part of the same information set.  
Therefore, we rely on the notion of subgame perfectness (Gibbons 1992). A 
subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement concept that limits the number of 
possible strategies that could be considered. A subgame perfect equilibrium 
prescribes the optimal behavior for each proper subgame of the game tree, i.e. for 
each possible experience vector. All contractors 𝑝 determine their optimal partial 
strategy 𝑠𝑝
∗  for each subgame. The partial strategy 𝑠𝑝 is a combination of which 
percentage 𝑖(𝑠𝑝) with respect to an initial cost base 𝜇  is invested in pre-tender 
research and which mark-up percentage 𝑚(𝑠𝑝) is applied to the estimated cost. 
The combination of all these optimal partial strategies is the optimal strategy for 
the entire game. In the remainder of the text, we prefer the use of the term strategy 
to refer to a partial strategy, because we will always optimize the decisions for a 
given vector 𝑒 of experience levels (i.e., a subgame). 
3.3.1.2 Ex ante model 
In the ex ante model that is dealt with in Chapter 5, a (partial) strategy consists of a 
larger number of decisions or actions, because this chapter introduces the concept 
of a project pipeline. Often governments have a project agenda, so that the 
contractor’s decision making process is not just related to a single-project decision. 
The government initiates and communicates the project pipeline. We assume that 
this pipeline is trustworthy, that its projects are stochastically equivalent and that it 
is not subjected to considerable changes. The tendering processes are often long or 
overlapping and sometimes contractors need to make investments for future 
projects. Therefore, in this ex ante framework, there is no immediate information 
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revelation so that contractors cannot change their strategy along the line. 
Consequently, each bidder makes the investment and mark-up decisions upfront 
which makes it a simultaneous game. A graphical representation of the ex ante 
game looks equivalent to Figure 3.1. This also means that the ex ante strategy is 
based on the expected beliefs whether one will win or lose a project before moving 
to the next project in the pipeline. Alternatively, the fully sequential model of 
Chapter 6 builds a strategy pattern that prescribes the strategic behavior first for 
the initial project and would then determine the strategy for the second project for 
each possible outcome (i.e., for each possible winner) of the first project.  
 
It is assumed that the number of bidders is expected to be the same over the course 
of the projects (assumption 9). Consequently, the initial experience levels of the 
shortlisted bidders are common knowledge. A subgame is again represented by an 
experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃). In subgame 𝑒, contractor 𝑝 determines the 
optimal strategy 𝑠𝑝
∗  for the entire project pipeline with 𝑍  projects. An ex ante 
...
Sub-game
N
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
...
Figure 3.1 Game tree for a two-player game 
Subgame 
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strategy 𝑠𝑝 is composed of two decisions for each project 𝑧 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑍} in the 
pipeline: an investment decision 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑧), that is expressed as a percentage of an 
initially set project cost base, and a mark-up decision 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑧), that is expressed as a 
percentage value and that is applied to the estimated project cost. In this vein, 𝑠𝑝
𝑧 
refers to the decisions (or actions) within strategy 𝑠𝑝 that are related to stage 𝑧. The 
full strategy 𝑠𝑝 for player 𝑝  is thus represented by a vector 
𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1), 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
2),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
2),… , 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑍),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑍)).  
3.3.1.3 Sequential model 
The sequential model allows for a modification of the actions along the pipeline. 
Hence, a strategy in this model has a more complex structure and the notation in 
Chapter 6 diverges from its preceding chapters. Given is a commonly known 
project sequence 𝒵 ≔ {1,2,… , 𝑍}. We want to identify the strategy equilibrium of 
the subgame 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) that defines the initial experience setting of the 
players of the game. This setting is a stochastic game, as has been introduced by 
Shapley (1953). A stochastic game is a finite or infinite dynamic game that is 
played by one or more players with probabilistic transitions between a finite 
number of states. In this setting, the players are assumed to be long-lived and have 
unlimited capacity to perform all the projects of the pipeline. In each stage of the 
sequential game, the contractors want to optimize their expected pay-off which 
consists of the instantaneous pay-off of the current stage and an expected 
continuation value of the pay-offs in future stages. We are looking at Markov 
strategies and identify a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) as presented by 
Maskin and Tirole (2001). This is justified under the assumption that the current 
play is only influenced by the expected pay-offs of future projects on the one hand 
and the state variable on the other hand. For a given project or stage 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵 from 
the sequence, we determine the current state 𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧 as the combination of the 
current experience levels and the number of remaining projects in the sequence 
𝑍 − 𝑧 or 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒, 𝑍 − 𝑧). The history ℎ𝑧 at stage 𝑧 is summarized into this state 
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variable. Consequently, we assume that past investment and mark-up decisions 
solely impact the current behavior by having won or lost the tender. For a given 
state, a set of actions 𝒜𝑝
𝑧 = 𝒜𝑝
𝑧(𝜃𝑧) is available for each player. We assume that 
the set of available actions is the same in every state of the game, so that we can 
refer to the set of actions as 𝒜𝑝. An action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧 in a state 𝜃𝑧 is composed of two 
elements: the amount of pre-tender investment 𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) a player 𝑝 is willing to 
adopt and which is expressed as a percentage of an initial cost base equal to 1 and 
the mark-up 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) defined as a percentage that is applied to the estimated 
project cost. Consequently, a strategy 𝑠𝑝 for player 𝑝 prescribes which actions to 
take in each of the possible states of Θ𝑧 for all 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵 that could occur in the game.  
3.3.2 Decision variables of the government (upper level) 
Moving the scope to the public sector, the government has the ability to decide on 
particular dimensions of the bidding process. The government is the principal in 
shaping the bidding environment and is in fact able to influence the equilibrium 
bidding behavior described as equation (3.1). Firstly, the government determines 
the number of candidate concessionaires 𝑃 who are up for the final bidding stage. 
Secondly, the public sector can control some of the parameters related to 
assumptions 3 and 4 to a certain extent. On the one hand, the public institution 
oversees the decision mechanism for the selection of the preferred bidder and 
could therefore opt for a lowest cost perspective, a maximum quality perspective 
or a trade-off between monetary and qualitative aspects. On the other hand, 
governments initially determine a proposal that concerns the risk allocation 
between the public and private sector. The type and the amount of risk that is 
transferred to the private sector has corollaries on the bidding behavior. Thirdly, a 
topic of major concern is the fact whether the government should reimburse a 
fraction of the pre-tender research cost to any of the losing bidders so as to 
increase the investment incentives of the candidate contractors. Last but not least, 
the concept of the project pipeline is introduced. The government could launch 
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several projects so that bidders believe that the tender is not a single-shot game, 
but that there are future opportunities available.  
The final objective of the government may have multiple dimensions. First of all, 
from a purely monetary perspective, the public sector could want to minimize the 
total public expenditures. From a more qualitative perspective, they might be 
favoring a levelled playing field that maximizes the competition in the market. 
That could be beneficial if the government wants to cement a competitive market 
with a sufficient number of players in the long run. Another objective might be to 
reduce the probability of default or renegotiation by the preferred bidder. As it is a 
daunting task to gather all these dimensions within a quantitative objective 
function, we prefer a Pareto approach to discuss the impact of the available 
intervention policies on the public objectives. The decision variables that the 
government is able to tune do not always point towards a dominant decision in the 
sense that it positively influences all government’s objectives. Hence, it is in our 
goals to come up with non-dominated policies that, together, form an efficient 
frontier. The government thus still needs to define the weight they attribute to each 
objective and trade off the proposed policies. 
3.4 Theoretical foundation for the expected pay-off 
Theoretically, the pay-off calculations for the subsequent chapters all rely on the 
same theoretical philosophy. This section analytically describes how to arrive at 
the pay-off for a particular project, further called the instantaneous expected pay-
off. Basically, we make abstraction of the possibility of a pipeline, so that we only 
consider a single project and do not account for future values. However, the future 
value is in fact a linear combination of instantaneous pay-offs. In order to avoid 
confusion and to generalize the approach for all subsequent chapters, we use a 
slightly different notation: ?̅? = (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅)  for the intermediate experience 
levels at this particular stage and ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅) referring to these decisions of 
the strategies that relate to this particular stage or state of the game. Moreover, 
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𝑠?̅? = (𝑖(𝑠?̅?),𝑚(𝑠?̅?)) states the investment and mark-up decision for the project 
under study.  
For a given experience vector ?̅?  and a strategy profile ?̅?,  we derive the 
instantaneous expected pay-off vector 𝜌 = (𝜌1(?̅?|?̅?), 𝜌2(?̅?|?̅?), … , 𝜌𝑃(?̅?|?̅?)). Figure 
3.2 serves as a guidance for the case with Gaussian distributions. Initially, a 
contractor 𝑝 has a cost probability distribution function 𝑐𝑝
0 that is a function of his 
experience level 𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅. According to assumptions 3 and 4 and without considering 
any investment, a player with more experience has an initial cost distribution 𝑐𝑝
0 
with both a smaller expected value as well as a smaller variance. Relying on 
assumption 2, the uncontrollable risk 𝜎²  is the same for all players while the 
controllable part is experience and strategy dependent. The controllable risk can be 
accounted for through experience which explains why a more experienced player 
already has a knowledge advantage that is translated into a smaller variance of the 
density 𝑐𝑝
0.  
  
Figure 3.2 Illustration of the theoretical distributions. 𝑐1
0  and 𝑐2
0  are the cost 
probability densities for two players, where player 2 has more experience than 
player 1. Player 1 applies a high investment choice and player 2 made a low 
investment choice and arrives in 𝑐2 . The players apply their preferred mark-up 
choice (a low mark-up for player 1 and a high mark-up for player 2) arriving in the 
respective bidding probability densities 𝑏1 and 𝑏2. 
Investing in research also reduces the controllable risk. For the construction of a 
toll road, a contractor engages in market studies in order to grasp the demand for 
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the toll road and he may consequently align the findings with the capacity of the 
road. Eventually, 𝜎𝑝
2 is calculated for a given investment percentage and a given 
experience level and is expressed as a percentage value of the initial actual cost. 
Besides, according to assumption 4, the investment effort also results in a leftward 
shift of the cost probability density. The resulting cost probability density for 
player 𝑝 is 𝑐𝑝. The second element of the strategy is the mark-up which is applied 
to the cost estimate that is generated from the probability distribution 𝑐𝑝 . 
Consequently, 𝑏𝑝 represents the bid probability density for player 𝑝.  
Assume the vector ?̅? = (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅) and the strategy profile ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅). 
Given the bid probability density 𝑏𝑝 for player 𝑝 and the associated cumulative 
probability distribution 𝐵𝑝, the probability of winning the contract for player 𝑝 is 
𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?) and is calculated as: 
 𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?) = ∫ 𝑏𝑝(𝑥𝑝) [∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘(𝑥𝑝))
𝑃
𝑘=1, 𝑝≠𝑘
] 𝑑𝑥𝑝
+∞
−∞
   (3.2) 
A player’s instantaneous pay-off for this particular project is dependent on the fact 
whether the player has won or lost the tender. When a player wins, he receives the 
money that he requested according to the submitted proposal and the actual project 
cost is subtracted, together with the investment in research. In the case of a loss, 
the investment in research will be partly incurred, conditional on whether or not 
the government reimburses a fraction 𝑑 ∈ [0,1] of the research cost. It is assumed 
that each player wants to optimize his total expected pay-off (assumption 7). In the 
case of a pipeline, this total expected pay-off consists of multiple instantaneous 
expected pay-off values. The instantaneous expected pay-off 𝜌𝑝  for player 𝑝, is 
given by equation (3.3).  
𝜌𝑝(?̅?|?̅?) = 𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?)(𝐸[𝐵?̃?|player 𝑝 has won] − 𝐴𝑝(𝑠?̅?|𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅) − 𝑖(𝑠?̅?)𝜇) −
(1 − 𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?)) (1 − 𝑑)𝑖(𝑠?̅?)𝜇    (3.3) 
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The instantaneous expected pay-off function consists of the following building 
blocks: 
- 𝑠?̅? or the strategy for a player 𝑝 which is associated with an investment choice 
𝑖(𝑠?̅?) and a mark-up choice 𝑚(𝑠?̅?);  
- 𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?) or the probability that player 𝑝 wins the tender with ?̅? the vector of 
strategies (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅) and ?̅? the vector of experience levels (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅) 
(equation (3.2)); 
- 𝐴𝑝(𝑠?̅?|𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅) or the actual cost, taking into account that player 𝑝 has won. It 
equals the expected value of the cost probability density 𝑐𝑝 that belongs to the 
winning contractor 𝑝. If 𝑔: ℝ² → ℝ is the function that reflects the fractional 
direct cost impact (assumption 4) that results from player 𝑝’s experience level 
𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅ and the investment percentage 𝑖(𝑠?̅?) related to strategy 𝑠?̅?, then we have 
𝐴𝑝 = 𝜇 (1 + 𝑔(𝑠?̅?, 𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅));  
- 𝑑 is the fraction of the investment cost that is reimbursed by the government 
to each losing bidder;  
- 𝜇 is a scaling factor that is equal to the a priori expected actual cost and that is 
common for all bidders; 
- the term 𝐸[𝐵?̃?|player 𝑝 has won] refers to the expected proposal that is made 
by player 𝑝 on the condition that he has won the tender with 𝐵?̃?  a random 
variable from the bidding probability distribution 𝑏𝑝.  
The latter building block is calculated as a conditional expectation as we know that 
a bidder has won the tender (according to assumption 5). Therefore, that gives 
analytically:  
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𝐸[𝐵?̃?|𝐵?̃? < 𝐵?̃? ,  ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑝] =  ∫ 𝑥𝑝
+∞
−∞
𝑏𝑝(𝑥𝑝)∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘(𝑥𝑝))
𝑃
𝑘=1,𝑝≠𝑘
𝑞𝑝(?̅?|?̅?)
𝑑𝑥𝑝 
        (3.4) 
This is obtained in line with the general idea behind the conditional expectation of 
a random variable 𝑋 given an event 𝑌, or 𝐸[𝑋|𝑌] = ∫ 𝑥
𝑓𝑋𝑌(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑓𝑌(𝑦)
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑥. 
In the single-project environment of Chapter 4, the players simultaneously 
optimize equation (3.3). In the multi-project setting, an expected valuation of 
future projects needs to be added to the instantaneous pay-off. The aforementioned 
analysis made abstraction of the presumed distributions, while Section 3.5 
discusses the actual implementation of the setting in this dissertation. 
3.5 Implementation 
In order to gain insights into the bidding dynamics, the assumptions of Section 3.2 
are translated into sound analytical formulas that rely on a parametrization that 
leaves room for a thorough sensitivity analysis. As stated earlier, the general risk 
structure of the project under study is the same for all the players in the pipeline. 
That means that, without considering experience and pre-tender investment, the a 
priori cost probability density and its parameters are equivalent for each state of 
the game and for each player in the game. The experience and the current 
investment level may change the shape of the cost probability distribution. All 
models of the research project deal with Gaussian distributions that are defined by 
a mean value and a variance. The inputs to calculate the probability distributions 
consist of the (intermediate) experience vector ?̅? = (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅) and the (state-
specific) strategy profile ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅). Recall that the strategy 𝑠?̅? consists of 
the investment and mark-up choices for the project under study. These are 
expressed as percentages: 𝑖(𝑠?̅?)% for the investment and 𝑚(𝑠?̅?)% for the mark-
up. The exact implementation of the distributions is slightly different between the 
simulation approach of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 on the one hand and the exact 
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expected pay-off approach of Chapter 6 on the other hand, but the general rationale 
is the same. 
In line with the reasoning of dealing with the total variance as the sum of the 
partial variances (i.e., omitting the covariance) and with the philosophy of 
diminishing scale effects, the knowledge impact assumption (assumption 3) that 
relates to the variance of the contractor’s distributions is implemented as follows: 
𝜎𝑝
2 = 𝜎𝑝
2 (𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅, 𝑖(𝑠?̅?)) = 𝜇² (𝜎
2 + (𝛾𝑖𝑒
−𝜆𝑖(100𝑖(𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅)))
2
+ (𝛾𝑒𝑒
−𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅)
2
) 
         (3.5) 
This formula introduces the risk parameters or the project complexity parameters. 
Initially, the variance has a maximum value, but investment and experience reduce 
the variance of the model. 𝛾𝑖 is the maximum impact of a lack of project-specific 
investment. The larger this parameter, the greater the importance of investment on 
the accuracy of the cost estimate. This parameter is the key variable to model a 
low-risk or high-risk project. Social housing projects or sports infrastructure 
projects are traditionally seen as low-risk projects that have a rather predictive 
nature, so with a low 𝛾𝑖. This is in contrast to toll roads or hospital projects that are 
much more risky due to the substantial demand risk or the significant number of 
stakeholders, resulting in a high 𝛾𝑖 . Equivalently, 𝛾𝑒  is the maximum variance 
contribution of a lack of experience and quantifies the knowledge advantage of 
being experienced. It represents the degree of repeatability. 𝜆𝑖  and 𝜆𝑒  are the 
respective associated rate parameters that reflect the pace at which an increase of 
investment and experience lead to a smaller variance. Finally, 𝜎  refers to the 
uncontrollable project risk or the risk share that cannot be accounted for and 𝜇 is a 
scaling parameter. The implementation of the direct cost impact assumption or the 
cost adjustment equivalently relies on diminishing scale effects and is given by:  
𝑔𝑝 = 𝑔𝑝 (𝑒𝑝, 𝑖(𝑠?̅?)) = 𝛽𝑖𝑒
−𝜇𝑖(100𝑖(𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅)) + 𝛽𝑒𝑒
−𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑝̅̅ ̅  (3.6)  
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with 𝛽𝑖  the innovation parameter related to the investment efforts and 𝛽𝑒  the 
efficiency parameter related to the experience. The value of 𝑔𝑝 is a fraction that 
acts as a cost increase to represent the inefficiency of the players and we claim that 
the actual cost of performing the project equals (1 + 𝑔𝑝)𝜇. Without investment 
and without any experience, 𝑔𝑝  obtains the maximum value. Investment can 
reduce the cost disadvantage because of the adoption of cost decreasing 
innovations. Besides, experience may result in a cost benefit because of efficiency 
gains and scale effects. Referring to the alternative interpretation of assumption 4 
(i.e., the cost adjustment), an increase in both parameters could also be interpreted 
as a government that favours experience and investment or quality more than 
purely the requested price and then expresses the monetary bid price adjustment 
for experience and quality. 
As an example, assume that 𝑒𝑢 = 5, which means that there are five experience 
intervals on the [0,10] scale and assume that 𝜎 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑒 = 0.1, 
𝜆𝑒 = 𝜇𝑒 = 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 = 0.25  and scaling parameter 𝜇 = € 1,000,000 . A player 
without experience (𝑒1 = 0) and a 1% investment choice thus obtains 𝑔𝑝 equal to 
0.17789 and 𝜎𝑝 equal to € 136,255 and for a player with experience level 4 and a 
2% investment choice, we get 𝑔𝑝 equal to 0.08679 and 𝜎𝑝 equal to € 86,787. 
3.6 Overview 
Before digging into the various models, an overview of the different modelling 
characteristics is given in Table 3.1. The table could serve as a guide for the 
subsequent chapters.  
  
 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Model setting Single-project 
Multi-project with overlapping 
tenders 
Multi-project with strictly 
sequential tenders 
Subject of study 
Assessment of the impact of 
the number of bidders, the 
project complexity and the 
government reimbursement 
policy on the bidding 
equilibrium 
Assessment of the impact of a 
project pipeline (with and 
without investment spillover 
effects) on the findings of 
Chapter 4 
Assessment of the impact of a 
project pipeline (without 
investment spillover effects) 
on the findings of Chapter 4 
Decision variables for each 
player in subgame 𝑒 
One investment and one mark-
up percentage 
Investment and mark-up 
percentage for each project in 
the pipeline (stage) 
Investment and mark-up for 
each state that could occur in 
the pipeline 
Number of strategies 
Discrete investment and mark-
up levels 
Discrete investment and mark-
up levels 
Continuous investment and 
mark-up scale 
Expected pay-off 
determination method 
Simulation Simulation 
Exact for Gaussian cost 
probability densities 
Model assumptions taken 
in this chapter (Section 3.2) 
Assumptions 1 to 7 Assumptions 1 to 10 Assumptions 1 to 10 
Solution concept Bayesian Nash equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium 
Equilibrium approximation 
algorithm 
Nash equilibrium method 
(complete enumeration) + 
strategy game algorithm  
(a best response based 
algorithm) 
Strategy game algorithm 
(a best response based 
algorithm) 
Best response algorithm 
Table 3.1 Overview of the model characteristics  
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Chapter 4 Single-project environment 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a theoretical approach in order to determine the bidding 
equilibrium of our proposed tender model. We are mainly interested in how the 
bidding equilibrium changes with respect to the model parameters: 
- What is the impact of the number of players and their respective experience 
levels on the bidding equilibrium? 
- What is the impact of introducing more uncertainty in the model?  
- What is the impact of a government compensation on the bidding equilibrium? 
This chapter only considers a single-project environment. This means that the 
government has solely communicated the current project and that future 
opportunities are uncertain. Nevertheless, each bidder is still characterized by an 
experience level that reflects the qualitative aspects of his competitive position: the 
familiarity with the project type, the familiarity with the market, the geographic 
location or the financial strength of the consortium. 
The contribution of this chapter to the academic literature is two-fold. On the one 
hand, we contribute to the academic PPP literature by building an abstract auction 
model that rationally addresses the pre-tender investment and mark-up questions. 
More particularly, the dynamic impact of project complexity and the competitive 
market environment on the bidding behavior are underlined and we assess the 
effectiveness of common governmental policies like the reimbursement of bidding 
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costs. On the other hand, this study contributes to the auction theory by delivering 
an innovative procurement environment and the algorithmic, game-theoretical 
simulation approach succeeds in combining diverse stretches of auction and 
procurement research. We study the strategic behavior within a context with costly 
bid preparation and uncertainty in the project outcome. Moreover, we include the 
option of incentive creation.  
Last but not least, this chapter has an important managerial contribution. Firstly, it 
endeavors to investigate in what sense the complexity of a project reveals the 
experiential discrepancies of contractors. Secondly, it gives guidance in the 
unsolved discussion among public institutions about how many bidders to invite. 
It shows that although a three-player setting for a low-risk project guarantees 
cheaper procurement than a two-player setting, a three-player situation might 
become unsustainable for a high-risk project. Thirdly, albeit partly acknowledged 
by practitioners, the single-project setting provides a theoretical argument that a 
government reimbursement of the bidding cost might relief a fraction of these first 
two issues.  
The theoretical results of this chapter are taken further to a discussion in Section 
7.2 in which the theoretical findings are triangulated with views from practitioners 
in the field, in order to derive founded implementable policy guidelines. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The position within the PPP literature 
Based on the review in Chapter 2 and the reviews of Al-Sharif and Kaka (2004), 
Ke et al. (2009), Tang et al. (2010) and De Clerck et al. (2012), PPPs have gained 
increasing attention within the academic construction literature. Concerning the 
procurement process itself, the focus has mainly been on the risk identification and 
its allocation between the government and the contractor. This is proven by the 
number of empirical (e.g., Li et al. 2005, Jin 2010, Chan et al. 2011) and, to a 
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lesser extent, theoretical studies (e.g., Medda 2007, Scandizzo and Ventura 2010, 
Khazaeni et al. 2012, Carbonara et al. 2014
a
) that have appeared in the PPP and the 
concession literature. Bidding models that focus on the PPP competitive dialogue 
are scarce and the operations research literature has not yet explicitly studied this 
procurement format.  
From a theoretical stretch, mainly pricing peculiarities of PPPs have been 
considered:  
- The pricing of governmental support interventions to guarantee a minimum 
revenue in the course of the operation (e.g., Cheah and Liu 2006, Brandao and 
Saraiva 2008, Liu et al. 2014);  
- The impact of governmental capacity regulations (Subprasom and Chen, 
2006);  
- The determination of the concession period (e.g., Ng et al. 2007, Shen et al. 
2007, Zhang 2009);  
- A multi-interest analysis of the financial, the social and the corporate stakes 
(Liou et al. 2011).  
These studies do not explicitly take the competition aspect into account. This is in 
contrast to Iyer and Sagheer (2012) who consider the bid winning potential of a 
mark-up and Xu et al. (2012) who have built a system dynamics model based on 
past experiences for pricing the concession. The bidding model presented in this 
dissertation makes abstraction of the elements that determine the final price and 
represents the mark-up as a single figure for the consortium as a whole. On the 
other hand, the added complexity lies in the introduction of a competitive 
environment and the bidding costs for mitigating project contingencies. An 
attempt to combine the risk a winner faces and the current competitive mark-up 
determination in a non-PPP context was performed by Chao and Liou (2007) and 
Islam and Mohamed (2009). The PPP model additionally takes the investment 
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option into account that reduces the long-term project risk and results in a higher 
quality bid. 
Empirically, it is acknowledged that bidding for PPPs is expensive (Carrillo et al. 
2008, Chen and Doloi 2008, De Schepper et al. 2015). Moreover, the government 
as a buyer prefers quality suppliers and aims to limit uncertainty (Riedl et al. 
2013). The possible renegotiation of the contract can come along with high 
transaction costs, which might be avoided by creating proper incentives in the 
contract design (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Ho (2008) questions game-theoretically 
whether the quality of bidding would increase if the government reimburses the 
second-best bidder for the bidding costs. Ho (2008) argues against the 
reimbursement but considers homogeneous bidders, which deviates from 
empirical findings of Oo et al. (2010). In a later study, Ho and Hsu (2014) allow 
for a heterogeneous bidding environment. The authors introduce two types of 
bidders: strong and regular bidders. In line with Ho (2008), a bidder can choose 
among two levels of investment effort: an average investment or a high investment 
for which the latter comes with an additional cost. In this setting, the authors do 
conclude that government reimbursements may be beneficial in heterogeneous 
environments with more than two bidders. Nonetheless, Ho and Hsu (2014) 
disregard contingencies, because they only attribute a specific deterministic profit 
to the winner. Our model not only introduces heterogeneity among contractors and 
allows for multiple experience levels and multiple investment levels, but it also 
adheres to the uncertainty of the project outcome.  
4.2.2 Position within the auction theory literature 
Even though PPP procurement has not received particular attention within the 
operations research literature, this study is highly intertwined with auction theory 
and the competitive bidding literature that was initiated by Friedman (1956). In a 
first instance, this particular bidding setting introduces uncertainty in the cost 
estimates, which originates from the studies by Curtis and Maines (1973) and 
Naert and Weverbergh (1978). These models only consider the mark-up decisions, 
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while the PPP model of this dissertation also examines a pre-tender investment 
choice as described in Chapter 3.  
Another related stream of research within the auction theory field studies a format 
in which investments lead to distributional upgrades of the cost distributions. Tan 
(1992) is the initiator considering ex-ante symmetric firms. Persico (2000), 
Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) and Shi (2012) studied the optimal auction design 
with endogenous information acquisition. These studies deviate from our setting 
that they do not apply the mark-up approach and assume the ex ante symmetric 
nature of bidders while more recent auction studies consider the heterogeneity 
among bid proposals and bidders (e.g., Maskin and Riley 2000, Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. 2007, Skitmore 2008, Kostamis et al. 2009, Lorentziadis 2012). 
Moreover, the investment decision in the PPP model does not necessarily lead to a 
distributional upgrade, because an investment could also mean that the bidder 
realizes the project is more expensive than initially anticipated.  
Subsequently, the heterogeneity might lead to the introduction of subsidies for 
investments towards inefficient bidders (i.e., bidders with a cost disadvantage) in 
procurement auctions. Arozamena and Cantillon (2002) study the investments for 
cost reductions and conclude that incentives actually have an inhibiting effect on 
investment due to the expectation of fiercer competition. The PPP model of this 
chapter acknowledges that compensations may result in fiercer competition, but 
this does not necessarily mean that players reduce their investment efforts. 
Rothkopf et al. (2003) are more in favor of subsidies and show that it lowers the 
expected procurement cost, while the PPP model requires some necessary 
differentiations and recognizes that incentives may raise the governmental 
expenditures.  
An equivalent investment question is raised in the R&D literature in which 
investment does not necessarily lead to winning the contract (e.g., Canbolat et al. 
2012). A similar type of incentive creation in the R&D procurement literature is 
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studied by Zhang et al. (2013) who elaborate on the competitive investment 
equilibrium. Through a sharing rate of the investment between the contractor and 
the principal, investment incentives are created. In the PPP model, the 
compensation is introduced in the market for fairness purposes and is not only 
attributed to a specific inefficient bidder or minority, but every ex-post losing 
bidder possibly gets compensated.  
In conclusion, to the best of our knowledge there is no theoretical research that 
combines pre-tender investment, cost uncertainty and incentive creation within a 
single auction framework. In order to be able to analytically characterize the 
equilibrium, traditional auction theory often assumes homogeneous bidders and 
studies symmetric equilibria. The PPP experiment does not take these 
simplifications into account which trades off against the manageability of the 
analytical model so that sub-optimal approximation methods are required.  
4.3 Methodology 
This chapter follows the model description, assumptions and decision variables 
that are discussed in Chapter 3 and looks at the single-project model.  
4.3.1 Analytical philosophy 
A strategy 𝑠𝑝 for player 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑃} in a particular subgame that is given by the 
experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃)  is two-dimensional and consists of an 
investment choice 𝑖(𝑠𝑝) or the willingness to engage in pre-tender research and a 
mark-up choice 𝑚(𝑠𝑝)  that is applied to the estimated project cost and that 
typically accounts for the risk premium and the profit requirement. The experience 
level is a particular value on the experience scale that ranges from 0 (i.e., no 
experience) to 10 (i.e., maximum experience) and 𝑒𝑢 the number of intervals on 
this scale. 
Equation (3.3) calculates player 𝑝’s expected instantaneous pay-off 𝜌𝑝(?̅?|?̅?) for the 
project under study for a given experience vector ?̅? and strategy profile ?̅?. The 
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translation of this general setting into the single-project setting is obvious and we 
can consider ?̅? = (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅) = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) = 𝑒  and ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅) =
(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃) = 𝑠. Moreover, since there is only a single project, we can say that 
the total expected pay-off 𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) equals the instantaneous pay-off in this setting: 
𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) = 𝜌𝑝(𝑠|𝑒)       (4.1) 
The contractors simultaneously optimize their expected pay-off so that a system of 
2𝑃 equations needs to be solved which consists of the partial derivatives for each 
player’s pay-off with respect to both his investment level as well as his mark-up 
level:  
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)
𝜕𝑖(𝑠𝑝
∗)⁄ = 0
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)
𝜕𝑚(𝑠𝑝
∗)⁄ = 0
         ∀𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑃}   (4.2) 
As claimed in Section 3.3, the model is a bi-level programming model and the 
competition among the contractors occurs at the lower level. At the upper level, the 
government is responsible for setting the bidding context. The government might 
for instance prefer to set a compensation level that minimizes the total expected 
payment, which would be translated into the objective function:  
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑  ∑ 𝑞𝑝(𝑠|𝑒)(𝐸[𝐵?̃?|𝐵?̃? < 𝐵?̃? , ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑝] + ∑ 𝑑𝑖(𝑠𝑘)𝜇
𝑃
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑝
)
𝑃
𝑝=1
 
         (4.3) 
Other governmental policies that have an influence on the lower level equilibrium 
are the determination of the number of players allowed to send a proposal or the 
cost/quality objective of the government and the number of projects in the pipeline. 
The qualitative objectives are hard to translate into monetary terms and we opt to 
list advantages and disadvantages of the policy mechanisms, so that a qualitative 
assessment is still required.  
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Albeit feasible, it is computationally intensive to calculate the expected pay-off of 
a strategy profile. Therefore, Section 4.3.2 elaborates on a simulation model that 
translates the analytical background into a simulation environment. Besides, 
analytically solving the system of differential equations to find a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium is acknowledged to be a hard problem, which is proven by the 
complexity studies of Conitzer and Sandholm (2003) and Daskalakis et al. (2006). 
The heuristic approaches of Section 4.3.3 approximate the equilibrium. 
4.3.2 Simulation 
With the aim of attaining analytical results, stringent assumptions simplify the 
often complex bidding contexts. A relaxation of these assumptions makes the 
analysis very hard. King and Mercer (1988) acknowledge this issue in their review 
paper and claim that probabilistic strategies are hard to study. Simulations highly 
contribute to the study of a complex environment and simultaneously allow for 
flexibility, which also benefits managerial decision makers. Mehlenbacher (2007) 
shows the increasing interest of multi-agent technology to study interactions 
among agents and strategies in complex environments. Recent applications of 
numerical simulations have proven to gain insights into complex auction and 
procurement formats (Cai and Wurman 2005, Farnia et al. 2013, Takano et al. 
2014). 
A simulation experiment is the favored methodology for the study of the dynamics 
of a contractor’s bidding behavior. Firstly, the simulation of bids avoids the 
computationally intensive analytical calculations. Secondly, the Monte Carlo 
simulations go beyond the expected value of the pay-offs, but also give insight into 
its distribution. Thirdly, although no closed-form expressions are possible, the 
simulation approach allows for considerable flexibility as different distributions 
can be easily tested.  
Recall that the knowledge impact assumption and the cost impact assumption are 
given by equations (3.5) and (3.6) respectively. For the commonly known 
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experience vector 𝑒 , each player determines his strategy 𝑠𝑝  which refers to an 
investment percentage 𝑖(𝑠𝑝)% and a mark-up percentage 𝑚(𝑠𝑝)%. The strategy 
profile 𝑠 is then the combination of the strategies of all 𝑃 players and given by a 
vector (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃). These elements are the inputs for the simulation of the final 
pay-offs. The output of the procedure is a pay-off distribution for each player. The 
average pay-offs for a particular strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑝) are given by 
the pay-off vector 𝑓 = (𝑓1(𝑠|𝑒), 𝑓2(𝑠|𝑒), … , 𝑓𝑃(𝑠|𝑒)) which we assume is then an 
estimation of the expected pay-off vector 𝜋(𝑠|𝑒) = (𝜋1(𝑠|𝑒), 𝜋2(𝑠|𝑒), … , 𝜋𝑃(𝑠|𝑒)) 
with 𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) as defined in equation (4.1).  
Consider Gaussian cost and bidding probability densities. In a single iteration, an 
actual cost and a bid for each player are generated. The reference actual cost Ã is a 
random variable that is drawn from the distribution 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2). Parameter 𝜇  is a 
scaling factor and in this chapter we set 𝜇 = € 1,000,000 and 𝜎𝑢
2 = (𝜇𝜎)2. This a 
priori distribution is the same for all players. The final actual cost could be 
different, because it is related to the particular cost distribution of the winner of the 
tender. The actual project cost for a particular player 𝑝 results from the linear 
transformation Ã𝑝 = Ã(1 + 𝑔𝑝), which is set to the mean of the cost probability 
density 𝑐𝑝  for player 𝑝 and which is unknown to the contractor at the time of 
bidding. Hence, 𝑐𝑝 is a nested distribution (El Otmani and Maul 2009) of the form 
𝑐𝑝~𝑁(𝜇(1 + 𝑔𝑝), (1 + 𝑔𝑝)
2
(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑝
2)) . The contractor’s estimated cost 𝐶?̃?  is 
randomly selected from 𝑐𝑝 and eventually, a contractor applies the mark-up level 
𝑚(𝑠𝑝), resulting in the bid: 𝐵?̃? = (1 +𝑚(𝑠𝑝))𝐶?̃?. In summary, the form of the 
bidding probability density 𝑏𝑝  in this procurement simulation is 𝑏𝑝~𝑁(𝜇(1 +
𝑚(𝑠𝑝))(1 + 𝑔𝑝), (1 + 𝑚(𝑠𝑝))
2
(1 + 𝑔𝑝)
2
(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑝
2)) . The minimum of these 
simulated bids is the winning proposal and its pay-off is determined, where the 
actual bid is ?̃?𝑤 for winner 𝑤. The losers’ pay-offs equal the fraction of the pre-
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tender investments that are not reimbursed by the government. As soon as a 
predefined number of replications 𝜁  has been reached, the simulation algorithm 
stops and a pay-off distribution for each player can be determined. 
4.3.3 Equilibrium approximation algorithms 
Another simplification of the analytical model lies in the discretization of the 
problem. Instead of allowing an infinite number of strategies, discrete numbers of 
integer investment and mark-up percentages are studied. If 𝐼 investment choices 
and 𝑀 mark-up choices for each player are considered, the set of strategies for a 
player 𝑝 is 𝑆𝑝 and consists of 𝐼𝑀 strategies. This results in (𝐼𝑀)
𝑃 strategy profiles, 
which will be referred to as 𝑆 = 𝑆1 × 𝑆2 × …× 𝑆𝑃 . In order to approximate the 
equilibrium, two algorithms have been developed. 
4.3.3.1 Algorithm A: Nash equilibrium algorithm 
A first heuristic calculates the pay-off distribution for each strategy profile 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. 
For an experience vector 𝑒, each combination of strategies is sent to the simulation 
procedure explained in Section 4.3.2. The output is an average pay-off vector 𝑓 
and the variance of the pay-offs. Afterwards, the algorithm identifies the pure 
strategy Nash equilibria. In accordance with equation (3.1), the Nash equilibrium 
𝑠∗ = (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠𝑃
∗) satisfies ∀𝑝, 𝑠𝑝 ∈ 𝑆𝑝: 𝑓𝑝(𝑠𝑝
∗|𝑒, 𝑠−𝑝
∗ ) ≥ 𝑓𝑝(𝑠𝑝|𝑒, 𝑠−𝑝
∗ ). Moreover, 
we account for the variance of the pay-off distribution, so we add an additional 
constraint: the two-sample t-statistic needs to prove that the expected pay-off is 
significantly greater than the pay-off of a differing strategy.  
4.3.3.2 Algorithm B: Strategy game algorithm 
The second algorithm approximates the Nash equilibrium by determining a best 
response for a player 𝑝  after first restricting the strategy space 𝑆−𝑝  for the 
competitors. Given the experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃), we want to determine 
the best response for player 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑃}  with experience level 𝑒𝑝 . The 
algorithm does a prequalification of the strategies for all the 𝑃 − 1 competitors of 
player 𝑝. Initially, every competitor 𝑦 has a set of strategies 𝑆𝑦 and the heuristic 
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reduces this set to a set of shortlisted strategies 𝑅𝑦  with 𝑛  elements. The 
prequalification is done in two stages: a homogeneous stage to grasp the project 
characteristics in the shortlisted strategies and a heterogeneous stage to emphasize 
the competition aspect. After the prequalification, the strategy game algorithm is 
executed. A detailed overview of the algorithms is given in Appendix B. 
Homogeneous stage 
Player 𝑦 with experience level 𝑒𝑦 has a set of strategies 𝑆𝑦 at his possession. The 
homogeneous stage resembles a knock-out tournament. A predefined number of 
rounds 𝑟 is set and the experience levels are set equal to 𝑦’s experience level 𝑒𝑦 for 
all players. In the first round, 𝑃𝑟 strategies are randomly selected and divided in 
𝑃𝑟−1 groups of 𝑃 strategies. For each group of strategies, the average pay-offs are 
calculated and the best performing strategy continues to the next round where only 
𝑃𝑟−1 strategies are outstanding. The procedure continues until 𝑃 strategies remain 
and these are transferred to the set of shortlisted strategies 𝑅𝑦. 
Heterogeneous stage 
In this second stage, we keep the original experience vector 𝑒  and for each 
competitor 𝑦 , an intermediate game is played in which all his strategies are 
assessed against random strategies for his opponents. In every iteration of the 
algorithm, random strategies from the complete set of strategies are selected for the 
competitors of player 𝑦. This results in the vector 𝑠−𝑦 which represents the strategy 
profile for the opponents of player 𝑦. Next, the expected pay-off and its variance 
are calculated for all the possible strategies from the set 𝑆𝑦  given the strategy 
profile 𝑠−𝑦 for his competitors and the experience vector 𝑒. In the next iteration, 
new strategies are randomly selected for player 𝑦’s competitors. After a user-
defined number of iterations 𝑘1, the pay-off distribution for each strategy of player 
𝑦 is derived and the best strategies are selected to be part of the shortlisted strategy 
list 𝑅𝑦. 
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Strategy game algorithm 
After the shortlisting is performed for each competitor 𝑦 of player 𝑝, the final 
assessment stage starts. For each iteration of the algorithm, strategies are selected 
for the competitors of player 𝑝 . For each competitor 𝑦 , these strategies are 
generated from the respective shortlisted sets 𝑅𝑦 , resulting in a strategy profile 
𝑠−𝑝. Player 𝑝 will now calculate the pay-off for each of the strategies of his set 𝑆𝑝. 
In the next iteration, new strategies are selected for the opponents of player 𝑝 and 
the pay-offs for this iteration are calculated. After 𝑘2 iterations, the average pay-
off over all executed runs is calculated for each of the strategies from the set 𝑆𝑝 
and the overall best performing strategy for player 𝑝 is assumed to be a good proxy 
for the equilibrium strategy for this player. 
4.3.4 Experimental setting 
Both algorithms have been implemented in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. Tables 
4.1-4.3 recapitulate the explanation of the parameter values that define the 
scenarios, the tested strategies and the algorithm specifications. For each scenario, 
the equilibrium strategies have been calculated and based on an ANOVA analysis, 
we check how the equilibrium is modified according to changes in the parameters. 
The output of the Nash equilibrium algorithm is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
strategy profile, while the strategy game algorithm output reports the approximate 
equilibrium strategy for a single player.   
Parameter Interpretation Values 
𝜎 Uncontrollable project risk 0.05,0.10,0.15 
𝛾𝑒 Maximum risk impact of a lack of experience 0.05,0.10 
𝛾𝑖  Maximum risk impact of a lack of investment 0.05,0.10,0.20 
𝜆𝑒 Experiential learning rate 0.25,0.50 
𝜆𝑖 Investment learning rate 0.25,0.50 
𝛽𝑒 Experiential cost disadvantage 0.05,0.10 
𝛽𝑖 Investment cost disadvantage 0,0.05 
𝜇𝑒 Experiential cost decrease rate 0.25,0.50 
𝜇𝑖  Investment cost decrease rate 0.25,0.50 
𝑑 Government compensation level 0,0.5,0.8,0.9 
Table 4.1 Parameter values used in the strategy game model 
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 Nash equilibrium game Strategy game 
Experience levels 0,5,10 0,2,4,6,8,10 
Investment levels 0%,2%,4%,…,10% 0%,1%,2%,…,20% 
Mark-up levels 0%,8%,16%,…,40% 0%,1%,2%,…,50% 
Number of strategies 36 1,071 
Table 4.2 Values for situation factors and the possible choices for the investment 
percentages and the mark-up percentages 
Parameter Interpretation Value 
𝜇 Initial mean project cost 1,000,000 
𝜁 Number of simulation runs for pay-off calculation 1,000 
𝑛 Number of elements in strategy database 𝑅𝑞 10 
𝑘1 Number of iterations in the strategy game method 100 
𝑘2 Number of iterations in the heterogeneous game 1,000 
𝑟 Number of rounds in the homogeneous game 6 
Table 4.3 Used values in the experiments for the different heuristics 
4.4 Experimental results 
Two algorithms are implemented in order to study the bidding dynamics. Section 
4.4.1 starts with comparing both algorithms from a computational perspective. The 
subsequent sections quantitatively discuss the results from the experiments. 
4.4.1 Performance of the algorithms 
The Nash equilibrium heuristic has the advantage that it considers the entire search 
space and calculates the average pay-offs for each strategy profile. Consequently, 
the computation times skyrocket when more strategies are taken into account. As 
the heuristic only looks into unique Nash equilibria, sometimes no equilibrium is 
reported within the pre-set time limit (which occurred in 32.4% of the cases if 
𝜁 = 1,000). If multiple equilibria are found, a pay-off dominance mechanism 
selects the highest pay-off generating equilibrium. Equilibrium examples for the 
Nash equilibrium heuristic are shown in Table 4.4. The strategy game heuristic 
reduces computation times if the number of strategies increases, but has the 
disadvantage that it limits the search space, so that one might end up in a local 
optimum. Additionally, it only looks at a single player’s best response and does not 
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look into the full equilibrium. This means that the algorithm is not able to reveal 
the asymmetric strategy equilibrium of equally experienced players for instance. 
Since both algorithms are developed for a different set of problems, it is still of a 
major interest to assess and compare the performance. In brief, three questions 
could be asked: 
1) How does the strategy game algorithm perform against the full 
enumeration of the Nash equilibrium method with respect to the 
computation times? 
2) What is the fraction of scenarios for which no unique equilibrium can be 
identified for a given number of simulation runs in the Nash equilibrium 
method? 
3) For the scenarios in which the Nash equilibrium method defines an 
equilibrium within a pre-set time frame: how close is this equilibrium to 
the best response that is suggested by the strategy game algorithm? 
In order to be able to compare the algorithms, the number of strategies needs to be 
reduced. This is due to the limitations of the Nash equilibrium algorithm for which 
a large set of strategies would result in very extensive computation times (because 
of the explicit enumeration) and in a greater probability that a unique equilibrium 
could not be identified within the specified time frame. On the other hand, the best 
response heuristic is developed for problems with a large set of strategies, because 
it works with a prequalification of strategies (so a reduction of the set of strategies 
for the opponents). In the original setup (Section 4.3.4), the prequalification stage 
selects ten out of the 1,071 strategies for the opponents. With a limited set of 
strategies, prequalifying a large fraction of the possible strategies could result in 
misleading solutions. Therefore, in a slightly adapted version of the algorithm, 
only three strategies are prequalified. 
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 Model parameters 
Sub-
game 
Nash equilibrium 
Investment/mark-up 
(simulated pay-off) 
Gvt.  
cost 
Ex. 𝜎 𝛾𝑒 𝛾𝑖 𝜆𝑒 𝜆𝑖 𝛽𝑒 𝛽𝑖  𝜇𝑒 𝜇𝑖 𝑑 𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 𝑠1
∗ 𝑠2
∗ 𝑠3
∗ 
 
4.4.3 Project risk (uncontrollable) 
1
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/8% 
(4,309) 
0%/8% 
(23,526) 
0%/8% 
(31,549) 
1,083,146 
2
 
0.1 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(15,633) 
0%/16% 
(37,007) 
0%/16% 
(44,449) 
1,116,535 
3
 
0.15 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/24% 
(24,330) 
0%/24% 
(44,591) 
0%/24% 
(55,404) 
1,144,562 
4.4.3 Project risk (controllable) 
4 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(14,303) 
0%/16% 
(37,453) 
0%/16% 
(40,291) 
1,117,603 
5 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/40% 
(9,002) 
2%/24% 
(40,795) 
2%/24% 
(48,844) 
1,161,433 
4.4.4 Government intervention 
6
a 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.6 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(10,599) 
2%/16% 
(29,101) 
2%/16% 
(39,000) 
1,143,690 
7
a,e 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
2%/16% 
(11,240) 
2%/16% 
(34,030) 
2%/16% 
(40,862) 
1,170,817 
8
b,f 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 5 5 5 
2%/16% 
(26,565) 
2%/16% 
(27,179) 
2%/16% 
(28,116) 
1,162,372 
9
b 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.6 5 5 5 
4%/16% 
(5,026) 
4%/16% 
(7,624) 
4%/16% 
(6,493) 
1,159,656 
10
c 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.4 0 5 10 
0%/40% 
(-4,407) 
4%/16% 
(17,071) 
4%/16% 
(23,158) 
1,135,921 
11
c 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
4%/24% 
(-2,669) 
4%/16% 
(20,353) 
4%/16% 
(31,608) 
1,189,107 
12
d 
0.05 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
2%/16% 
(12,188) 
2%/16% 
(31,526) 
2%/16% 
(40,268) 
1,167,906 
13
d 
0.05 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(3,240) 
2%/16% 
(35,817) 
2%/16% 
(53,504) 
1,169,270 
4.4.5 Other findings 
14
d 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(1,087) 
0%/8% 
(29,101) 
0%/8% 
(50,710) 
1,107,749 
15
e 
0.05 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
0%/24% 
(3,634) 
2%/16% 
(33,093) 
2%/16% 
(54,650) 
1,152,327 
16
f 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.4 5 5 5 
0%/16% 
(4,689) 
2%/8% 
(10,865) 
2%/8% 
(11,738) 
1,087,805 
Table 4.4 Equilibria examples from the Nash equilibrium algorithm (𝜁 = 1,000) 
  
a  Players react differently to compensation according to experience levels  
b Higher innovation parameter is incentive to invest sooner 
c  Compensation helps to open up the market 
d The efficiency parameter affects investment and mark-up behavior of inexperienced players 
e The experiential knowledge requirement affects the inexperienced player’s strategy 
f The learning rates affect the speed of the compensation effect 
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The comparison test focused on the three-player setting and the following 
parameter settings that define the scenarios: 
- 𝛾𝑖 with values 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 
- 𝛾𝑒 with values 0.05 and 0.1 
- Experience levels 0, 5 and 10 
- The other parameters remain constant: 𝛽𝑖 = 0.5; 𝛽𝑒 = 0.1; 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑒 =
𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇𝑒 = 0.25; 𝑑 = 0;  𝜇 = € 1,000,000 
Both algorithms have been executed for the case with 𝐼 equal to 6 (0%, 2%, …, 
10%) or 11 (0%,1%,…,10%) and 𝑀 equal to 6 (0%,8%,…,40%) or 11 
(0%,4%,…,40%). Both algorithms also rely on the number of repetitions 𝜁 for the 
pay-off calculation in the simulation (Section 4.3.2). This parameter is important in 
order to investigate how many runs are needed in order to arrive at a distinct 
equilibrium in the Nash equilibrium method. If this parameter is too low, the 
variance of the pay-off will be too large, meaning that there might not be a 
significant difference in the expected pay-off of two neighboring strategies. This 
would result in a situation for which the Nash equilibrium method is not able to 
find a unique equilibrium. Table 4.5 answers questions (1) and (2) and summarizes 
the computation times for the two methods. The percentage of cases for which an 
equilibrium is found in the Nash equilibrium method is also reported (while the 
strategy game algorithm always reports an optimal best response). 
The table shows that computation times rise sharply when more simulation runs or 
more strategies are involved. Moreover, the number of runs greatly impacts the 
fraction of scenarios for which an equilibrium is identified. It is clear that the Nash 
equilibrium algorithm requires a lot of simulation runs before an equilibrium can 
be reported for these scenarios. Of course, we need to point to the fact that it could 
be possible that no equilibrium in unique strategies exists for a particular scenario. 
Table 4.6 studies the convergence attribute of the strategy game algorithm. The 
strategy game always reports a best response as a proxy for the player’s optimal 
bidding behavior. With the parameter values as mentioned earlier, there are 108 
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scenarios. For each of these, we looked at the convergence capability for 6 and 11 
investment levels together with 6 or 11 mark-up levels. For the results in the paper, 
𝜁 is set to 1,000 as that number gave satisfactory convergence results. The table 
reports the fraction of scenarios for which the strategy change was larger than a 
move to a neighboring strategy. A neighboring strategy is defined as a strategy for 
which the investment and/or mark-up is one level higher or lower than the current 
level. 
For the test set, high-risk scenarios (i.e., 𝛾𝑖 = 0.2) require more runs to obtain 
convergence. This is also the result of the fact that there is not a symmetric optimal 
strategy for players with the same experience level. In a high-risk setting with 
experience vector (0,0,5) for instance, one of the two inexperienced players should 
actually not participate. As the strategy game algorithm only reports a single best 
response, it will, depending on the progress of the simulation, sometimes return the 
no-participation strategy and in other cases a participation strategy. This is why in 
these cases we still need some insights from the Nash equilibrium algorithm. 
Therefore, it is rather daunting to compare the two methodologies. Nevertheless, as 
a final step, the best response output of the strategy game is compared with the 
equilibrium outcome of the Nash equilibrium method in this particular setting 
when 𝜁 = 3,000. As a result, 23.6% of the scenarios gave exactly the same result. 
If we allow the strategies to be neighboring strategies as defined earlier, 88.4% of 
the scenarios resulted in the same solution in both algorithms. Especially in the 
scenarios for which we only allowed 36 strategies (i.e., 6 investment levels and 6 
mark-up levels), the strategy game often reports a mark-up that is one level higher. 
This can be attributed to the fact that the strategy game is mainly developed to deal 
with a large number of strategies. In the prequalification stage, the algorithm 
selects promising strategies for the opponents, but when there are only a limited 
number of strategies with large gaps inbetween (like mark-up gaps of 8%), this 
might involve that also some “bad” strategies are selected for the opponents, 
allowing the contractor to inflate the mark-ups. 
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𝐼 𝑀 𝜁 % of scenarios 
for which 
solution was 
found 
Computation time 
Nash equilibrium 
method per 
scenario (sec.) 
Computation time 
strategy game 
method per scenario 
(sec.) 
6 6 50 28.3% 1.11 17.33 
6 6 100 33.3% 2.69 34.55 
6 6 500 66.7% 5.99 172.93 
6 6 1000 75.0% 13.4 350.46 
6 6 2000 80.0% 19.97 715.31 
6 6 3000 76.7% 33.53 1046.9 
6 11 50 3.3% 6.23 33.54 
6 11 100 3.3% 13.21 66.38 
6 11 500 21.7% 64.41 331.3 
6 11 1000 41.7% 133.18 645.51 
6 11 2000 58.3% 215.63 1305.06 
6 11 3000 58.3% 315.27 1935.34 
11 6 50 20.0% 5.99 31.83 
11 6 100 25.0% 10.36 63.71 
11 6 500 63.3% 55.38 317.98 
11 6 1000 70.0% 125.25 636.88 
11 6 2000 88.3% 215.53 1279.23 
11 6 3000 91.7% 351.33 1908.93 
11 11 50 3.3% 87.22 58.25 
11 11 100 6.7% 131.93 116.57 
11 11 500 23.3% 737.13 583.84 
11 11 1000 31.7% 1337.92 1168.01 
11 11 2000 63.3% 2712.81 2334.61 
11 11 3000 73.3% 4600.22 3429.29 
Table 4.5 Results of the comparative study 
 𝜁: 50100 𝜁:100500 𝜁:5001000 𝜁:10002000 𝜁:20003000 
𝐼 =  6 
𝑀 = 6 
5.6% 
(1.4%) 
5.6% 
(1.4%) 
3.7% 
(0.0%) 
3.7% 
(0.0%) 
0.9% 
(0.0%) 
𝐼 = 6,  
𝑀 = 11 
12.0% 
(6.9%) 
10.2% 
(6.9%) 
13.0% 
(6.9%) 
8.3% 
(4.2%) 
7.4% 
(0.0%) 
𝐼 = 11 
 𝑀 = 6 
11.1% 
(5.6%) 
4.6% 
(0.0%) 
3.7% 
(1.4%) 
2.8% 
(0.0%) 
0% 
(0.0%) 
𝐼 = 11 
𝑀 = 11 
17.6% 
(8.3%) 
11.1% 
(8.3%) 
7.4% 
(4.2%) 
9.3% 
(2.8%) 
5.6% 
(2.8%) 
Table 4.6 Results of the convergence study for the strategy game algorithm. The 
percentages represent the fraction of scenarios for which a change larger than a 
move to a neighboring strategy occurs for an increase in 𝜁. The fractions between 
brackets give the results of the scenarios for which 𝛾𝑖 ≠ 0.2. 
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4.4.2 Bidding environment 
The bidding environment refers to the number of competitors and their respective 
experience levels. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 contain the output of the two 
sensitivity studies of a strategy game with three players and report the equilibrium 
response for a reference contractor with the experience level 𝑒1 tabulated in the 
upper left corner of each matrix and the competitors’ experience levels on the 
horizontal and vertical axes. Each strategy consists of an investment level (i.e., 
elements below the diagonal) and a mark-up level (i.e., elements above the 
diagonal). A glance at both figures confirms the significant interaction of a 
player’s experience relative to the maturity of the two opponents. Ceteris paribus, 
two general dynamics are apparent:  
1. The more experienced a player is, the lower will be the mark-up and 
the higher the investment percentage; 
2. The smaller the competitive disadvantage for a given experience level 
compared to the level of the opponents, the lower the mark-up and the 
higher the investment percentage.  
Even for small experience gaps, the least experienced player is not or only 
limitedly motivated to perform the risky upfront investment. The latter effect is 
more outspoken in the lower experience cases, but flattens out as soon as 𝑒1 ≥ 4. 
The interaction plot of Figure 4.3 additionally reveals that an incumbent player 
exploits his knowledge and cost advantage over newcomers by increasing the 
mark-ups.  
The behavioral dynamics differ according to the experience-related parameters. In 
case of an increase of the cost disadvantage parameter 𝛽𝑒, inexperienced players 
loose competitiveness and respond with higher mark-up levels. This is the result of 
a larger shift of the cost curves that gives rise to higher winning probabilities for 
experienced players. If governments attribute more attention to past experience, 
inexperienced players will be reticent to come up with a competitive proposal, 
4.4. Experimental results 
 
 
84 
leading to a possible saturation of the market. A similar competition inhibiting 
effect is related to the knowledge requirement parameter 𝛾𝑒  when a project’s 
complexity necessitates more experience. The margin rockets and puts a break on 
the investment of inexperienced players, thus limiting competition. Consequently, 
attributing more attention to experience does not necessarily invoke lower 
government expenditures (Figure 4.4).  
An important characterization of the bidding environment is the number of players. 
The cumulative distributions of Figure 4.5 illustrate the consequences of inviting a 
fourth bidder. The optimal investment response and the average pay-offs in 
equilibrium are clearly lower than in the three player-environment. Less 
experienced players are much more reluctant to invest because of the decreased 
probability of winning. In the four-player case, the experiment shows that players 
stay out of the market more often, which is proven by the increased frequency of 
the maximum mark-up choice from 5.1% of the responses in the three-player case 
to 10.7% of the responses in the four-player scenarios. At the experienced side of 
the spectrum though, mature bidders might decrease their mark-ups because of the 
increased competition. According to the experiment, government incentives are 
less effective in a four-player setting, especially for the incentive creation of 
inexperienced players. 
Two-player results look more promising from a competition perspective (Figure 
4.6): there is a more levelled behavior of the players. Inexperienced players tend to 
be aware of their reasonable probability of winning and the combination of 
competitive forces and the avoidance of the winner’s curse actually keeps them in 
the market. Nevertheless, the mark-ups soar, so that a higher government cost 
might be expected. 
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Figure 4.1 Impact of the controllable uncertainty on the bidding behavior in a 
3-player game (𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = 0.25, 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖 = 0.05, 𝜎 = 0.05, 𝑑 = 
0) with innovation parameter 𝛾𝑖 (from left to right) 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2  
𝑒1 
𝑒2 
𝑒3 
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Figure 4.2 Impact of the compensation on the bidding behavior in a 3-player game 
(𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = 0.25, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑖 = 0.20, 𝛽𝑒 = 0.10, 𝛽𝑖 = 0.05, 𝜎 = 0.05) with 
government compensation level 𝑑 (from left to right) 0%, 50%, 80% and 90% 
  
Figure 4.3 [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between 𝑒1 and the bidding situation (𝑒2, 𝑒3) in relationship with the investment 
level, the mark-up level and the pay-off for the scenarios in which 𝜎=5% 
 
   
   
Figure 4.4 [Nash equilibrium algorithm] Interaction plots of the model parameters with respect to the government procurement cost for all 
the scenarios with 𝜎 = 5% 
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Figure 4.6 Impact of the controllable uncertainty on the bidding behavior in a 2-
player setting with the optimal mark-up in the upper panes and optimal investment 
in the lower pane (𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = 0.25, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05, 𝛽𝑒 = 0.05, 𝛽𝑖 = 0.05, 𝜎 = 
0.05, 𝑑 = 0) and with 𝛾𝑖 (from left to right) 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 
4.4.3 Project characteristics 
The model accounts for complexity and (controllable and uncontrollable) 
uncertainty in the form of the variance of the contractor’s cost probability density. 
Concerning the controllable risk share, the influence of the innovation parameter 𝛾𝑖 
deserves particular attention. 𝛾𝑖  is project-specific and the associated variability 
can be accounted for by performing pre-tender research (e.g., surveys, feasibility 
   
Figure 4.5 [strategy game algorithm] Cumulative distribution of the aggregated 
scenario outcomes for 𝜎 = 5% 
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studies, R&D) and is not reduced by past project experience. 𝛾𝑖 attains relatively 
higher values for highly complex transportation projects than for social housing 
projects. The parameter has a mark-up impact and an investment impact regardless 
of the experience level (Figure 4.7), but the scale of the impact differs conditioning 
on the experience level (Figure 4.1). Experienced players move towards a high 
mark-up together with a higher investment if 𝛾𝑖 increases. Inexperienced players 
(𝑒1 = 0) with a competitive disadvantage move towards the cap mark-up value of 
50% without investment which means that they do not participate. This is 
accelerated when also the experiential cost disadvantage parameter 𝛽𝑒  or the 
uncertainty due to a lack of experience 𝛾𝑒  increases. In fact, this implies that 
inviting three bidders to bid on a project is unsustainable in subgames with less 
experienced players. Government incentive creation mechanisms could especially 
be interesting in these scenarios.  
The uncontrollable risk is related to force majeure risk, permits risk or an 
unaccountable part of the demand risk for instance and has an exponential impact 
on the preferred mark-up. The uncontrollable project risk is an inhibitor for 
investment behavior. The players safeguard against the downside risk of exuberant 
costs, resulting in larger government expenditures and contractors’ pay-offs 
(Figure 4.7). Interestingly, as the share of the uncontrollable project risk gets 
larger, ceteris paribus, the heterogeneity among players and the disadvantage of the 
inexperienced player is dissolving and the players’ behavior converges. As it 
comes at a large expense, the public entity should beware of transferring 
uncontrollable risk. Albeit a different setting, this finding is related to the linkage 
principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982
b
) and studied in an asymmetric context by 
Campbell and Levin (2000) and Quint (2010). These authors claim that sharing 
publicly available information results in a homogeneous market and more 
competition, which subsequently leads to a larger value for the seller. In our 
context, transferring uncontrollable risk results in a more homogeneous market but 
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also involves more uncertainty, leading to an increase in the government 
procurement cost.  
4.4.4 Government reimbursement 
In Chapter 3, we have introduced a percentage-wise compensation 𝑑  to all the 
losing bidders. In line with the expectations, a surge in the government 
compensation level leads to a significant increase in the average investment level, 
but the effect’s magnitude and the threshold 𝑑 that shifts the equilibrium interacts 
with other parameters that define whether and when a reimbursement is justified. 
As shown in the three-player setting of Figure 4.2, a less experienced player 
demands a higher compensation contribution. Moreover, the movement towards an 
investment initially manifests itself in situations where the competitor has a 
competitive strength, i.e., a subgame in which at least one opponent has an 
experience level that does not surpass that of the contractor. The threshold 
compensation level that makes the equilibrium shift towards higher investment 
levels is inversely related to the innovation parameter 𝛾𝑖. In the complex and high-
risk scenarios (𝛾𝑖=0.2), the introduction of a reimbursement beyond the threshold 
levels the playing field and prevents players from staying out of the market. Figure 
4.2 suggests that a compensation of 50% of the investment cost can convince 
players with experience level 𝑒1 = 4  to actively participate, regardless of the 
competitive position of its opponents. According to the algorithm output, 
compensations of 80% trigger participation for players with 𝑒1 = 2 regardless of 
the competition and 𝑒1 = 0 if the knowledge gap is within bounds. According to 
Figure 4.2 and the interaction plots of Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, there is an overall 
investment jump and a large drop in the mark-up. In the case with a small 
controllable uncertainty, there is a lesser need to attribute compensations, but they 
may stimulate innovation and research to prevent renegotiation issues. In that case, 
the compensation levels should be even higher (i.e., 90%) compared to high-risk 
projects, which comes at a considerable cost. From a practical point of view 
though, the government may only install a single compensation policy and it is not 
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allowed to favor particular players over others, which is in contrast to the study of 
Rothkopf et al. (2003) that offers incentives to the inefficient bidders. 
As a conclusion, a percentage-wise compensation policy by the government 
succeeds in diminishing the heterogeneity among players. According to the 
experiments, the best responses get a more stable feature. The pay-offs for the 
players still differ based on the experience level, but the probabilities of winning 
converge. Despite the long-term societal value of the compensation, it comes at a 
cost for the government that could be partly offset by the diminished mark-ups, but 
a trade-off should be made concerning to what extent they want to increase 
competition in the PPP market. 
Extending our view towards a four-player bidding environment, the 
reimbursements do not succeed in incentivizing all inexperienced players to enter 
the market with a reasonable investment. The two-player case suggests lower 
reimbursement percentages in low-risk projects and Figure 4.6 indicates that the 
competitive forces deliver enough incentives for reasonable pre-tender investments 
for all players which makes the introduction of reimbursements to equalize the 
market obsolete and it would only inflate government expenses. 
 
  
 
   
   
Figure 4.7 [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between the innovation parameter 𝛾𝑖 and the government compensation level 𝑑 
with the investment level, the mark-up level and the pay-off for the scenarios in which 𝜎=5% (upper pane) 𝜎=15% (lower pane) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between the experience level 𝑒1 and the government compensation level 𝑑 with 
respect to the investment level, the mark-up level and the pay-off for the scenarios in which 𝜎=5% 
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4.4.5 Other findings and robustness tests 
With respect to the simulation experiments, the effects of an increase of the 
efficiency parameter 𝛽𝑒 and the uncertainty due to an experiential lack 𝛾𝑒 mainly 
affect less experienced players and amplify the divergence in the strategic 
behavior. A ceteris paribus surge in the learning rate parameters 𝜆𝑒 and 𝜆𝑖 makes 
players more eager to invest faster, but reaching an investment ceiling that is lower 
(Table 4.4).  
The assumptions are in line with industrial tendencies and the extensive sensitivity 
analysis contributes to the robustness of our findings. Nevertheless, in order to 
capture the possible asymmetry of the project cost, a gamma distribution has been 
implemented for which the shape parameters were calculated in line with the set-
up of Section 3.5. No significant differences in the dynamics were found. The 
major difference lies in the higher equilibrium mark-ups and greater expected pay-
offs. Secondly, contractors could have risk averse behavior and prefer another 
strategy on the efficient frontier that guarantees a smaller expected pay-off but 
with a smaller standard error. If all contractors have equal preferences, the 
conclusions remain valid. A different discretization of strategies in the algorithms 
only modifies the results in the sense of the magnitude of the impact, while the 
general dynamics are consistent. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter executed the first computer experiments on the proposed PPP 
tendering procedure that has been translated into an auction format in which a 
contractor, who is characterized by a level of experience, determines the amount of 
money to invest in research and which mark-up is applicable. This chapter 
considers a single-project setting. Monte Carlo simulations simulate the bidding 
outcome and the resulting pay-off functions while approximation algorithms are 
developed to identify the Nash equilibrium.  
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The heterogeneity of the contractors has an important impact on the bidding 
equilibrium. Especially new entrants have difficulties to enter an already mature 
market if the project has a high degree of complexity and risk. The theoretical 
model advises governments to limit the number of players that are invited for the 
tender. On the other hand, a two-player environment can result in oligopolistic 
behavior. Instead, a three-player environment seems to work well. The theoretical 
model supports that a reimbursement of bidding costs, if properly designed, can 
help in opening up the market in the long run. The models suggest compensation 
levels of 80% which is a high fraction, but not uncommon in French and Canadian 
jurisdictions (KPMG 2010). Nevertheless, compensations create the largest added 
value in high-risk three-player environments. This compensation seems to be less 
necessary in low-risk projects and it could even lead to opportunistic bidding 
behavior. Three concise policy recommendations summarize this chapter:  
- The government should control the competition in heterogeneous markets 
through an appropriate funneling strategy. 
- A reduction of the complexity results in more incentivized bidders and lower 
costs and attempts to reduce bid costs and to standardize processes could 
therefore pay off. 
- In complex projects, bidding cost reimbursements succeed in leveling the 
playing field and increasing competition. 
The findings and recommendations stated in this chapter mainly relate to public 
policy decision-making. Nevertheless, moving the scope towards the contractors, 
the optimal strategies themselves prescribe how to behave within a particular 
market. In an attempt to concisely list some recommendations for the private 
sector, we could claim: 
- Due to the winner’s curse, high-risk projects are dangerous territory for 
inexperienced contractors. Especially, when two other and more experienced 
contractors are prequalified, it might be beneficial to refrain from participating 
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when no bid compensations are attributed. Consequently, it might be safer to 
enter a new jurisdiction via low-risk tenders. 
- For a consortium, it is important to assess the competitive position in the 
bidding field as this determines the bidding behavior. With a competitive 
advantage, it is beneficial to engage in larger investment efforts and lower 
mark-ups.  
- Also the effect of the compensation needs to be nuanced. High investment 
efforts are only recommended when the compensations are sufficiently high. 
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Chapter 5 An ex ante strategy model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
According to a consultancy report and supported by empirical evidence in Canada 
for instance, a pipeline of projects would contribute to a PPP market’s 
attractiveness (KPMG 2010). In this dissertation, a pipeline is defined as follows: 
A PPP project pipeline is a sequence of similar projects that the government 
ensures to tender in the near future. It may concern totally independent projects or 
sub-projects that serve a larger purpose. 
This pipeline, also referred to as the project agenda, reduces the consortium’s risk 
of being unsuccessful, because instead of putting all one’s eggs into one basket, a 
consortium can spread out its investments across different projects and it can offset 
former losses in future tenders. A contractor or consortium might be more willing 
to enter a market in which there is a certainty for future projects. Moreover, 
winning a project in this jurisdiction could result in increased experience and a 
better credibility status which might lead to a competitive advantage in future 
tenders. However, due to the high cost and the extensive time frame of PPPs, the 
project pipeline usually has only a limited nature. Governments change and long-
term public budgets are difficult to predict. 
This chapter extends the model of Chapter 4 by including a pipeline of projects 
into a theoretical multi-project procurement model. The pipeline of projects is 
assumed to be publicly communicated and confirmed. Referring to assumption 9 
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of Section 3.2, the PPP projects that are considered by the contractors have a 
similar nature in the sense that they have equivalent cost and risk characteristics. 
For instance, we could say that these projects are all toll road infrastructure 
projects or all social housing projects within the same jurisdiction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine an ex ante strategy for the contractors 
or consortia in this bidding setting. The ex ante strategy is going to prescribe for a 
given project pipeline, how to spread out the bidding efforts over these projects, 
under the assumption that we cannot change our behavior once the preferred bidder 
has been selected for one of the projects. While Chapter 6 does consider the 
possibility to modify the actions based on the fact whether you have won or lost 
previous tenders, the framework of this chapter does not reveal this information 
along the pipeline.  
This ex ante setting is useful for two reasons. Firstly, the tendering procedure is 
often time-consuming and therefore, contractors often need to undertake bid 
preparations for several projects at the same time. Figure 5.1 presents an example 
of a setting in which the tendering procedures of three projects are overlapping. 
The expression of interest stage (EOI) and the bid preparation stages overlap for 
the different projects. A second reason relates to the fact that organizing a 
consortium involves fixed costs that may be depreciated across multiple projects. 
In this vein, an ex ante strategy for a bidder is defined by a budgeted bid 
preparation effort (i.e., the investment decision) and a budgeted mark-up 
percentage (i.e., the mark-up decision). 
Under the assumptions of the model, we address the following questions: 
- How does the optimal bidding strategy change when there are several project 
opportunities? 
- How do these dynamics interplay with the project characteristics and the 
bidding environment? 
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- How could these dynamics be translated into policy measures for the 
government? 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Example of a project pipeline timeline 
This discussion not only contributes to the academic PPP procurement literature in 
which these multi-project settings have hardly been discussed, but also relates to 
the procurement auction literature. The model combines heterogeneity among the 
bidders and uncertainty in the project outcome with a multi-unit auction format 
without information revelation.   
From a managerial perspective, we give a theoretical argument that supports the 
practitioner’s expectation of cheaper contracts in case of a project pipeline. This 
chapter adds the new finding that the length of the pipeline does not need to be 
extensive, but cementing a short-term pipeline enhances the competitive forces 
from a pricing perspective. The impact on the expected investment efforts is shown 
to be not straightforward. However, standardization that could lead to transferable 
investments might incentivize consortia to incur larger investments earlier in the 
pipeline.  
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5.2 Literature review 
Since Section 4.2.2 discussed the peculiarities of the PPP bidding model with 
respect to the academic auction literature, this heading focuses on the dynamic 
aspects of the ex ante model that is presented in this chapter. The multi-unit 
auction theory is particularly intertwined with the study of the competitive PPP 
procurement model with a pipeline of projects.  
It is important to denote the difference between competitive bidding and auctions. 
The former setting mainly refers to procurement and focuses on the lowest bids or 
the most advantageous tenders in a multi-criteria decision process, while the latter 
usually refers to selling objects to the highest bidders.  
On the one hand, within an auction setting, multiple units might be auctioned 
simultaneously, so that bidders could bid on different packages of objects. This 
setting is referred to as a combinatorial auction. Next to applications in electricity 
markets (Triki et al. 2005) and procurement markets (e.g., Chilean school meals in 
Catalán et al. 2009) on the public side, also the transportation (Triki et al. 2014) 
and retail industry (Aissaoui et al. 2007) could rely on the combinatorial auction 
mechanism. Supported by the growth of online auctions, this combinatorial auction 
design has received considerable attention within the operations research 
community (e.g., de Vries and Vohra 2003, Pekeč and Rothkopf 2003, Olivares et 
al. 2012).  
On the other hand, auctioning might be organized in a strictly sequential fashion. 
The ex ante model does account for the sequential nature of the tendering 
procedures but includes the notion that the tendering processes are overlapping or 
that project outcomes are still uncertain at the time of budgeting. Within the 
sequential auction field, an important question relates to the price trend of the 
objects in the sequence. Although Weber (1983) proved that bids follow a 
Martingale in the case of an uncertain common value, the majority of studies 
claims that bid prices are declining. Examples include von der Fehr (1994) who 
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studies auctions with a participation cost, Jeitschko (1999) for the case where the 
second auction only occurs with an exogenous probability and Kannan (2010) in a 
setting with complete bid revelation. Branco (1997) supports the price decline in 
the case of complementarities between identical objects, which is nuanced by 
Sørensen (2006) in the case of a large number of stochastically equivalent objects 
or when probabilities to draw a large value are high. The declining price effect is 
usually attributed to the decreased competition in later stages due to capacity 
constraints. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), however, relates the cost trend to the 
cost distribution of the stochastically equivalent objects. As long as the sequence 
progresses and given that the participants only request a single unit, competition 
reduces, but the author introduces a second effect that is related to the number of 
remaining chances to win and meet the one-unit demand. Additionally, Menezes 
and Monteiro (2004) claim that the trend depends on the synergies of the objects. 
Although we do not account for capacity constraints in this dissertation, our setting 
supports these findings from a procurement perspective. The players’ ex ante 
strategies consist of lower mark-ups for earlier projects in the pipeline, thus 
resulting in more aggressive bidding in early stages. Finally, the laboratory 
experiment of Soo and Oo (2014) renders that the bidding behavior in the 
construction industry is dependent on the market trend with more aggressive 
bidding in times of recession than in an environment with a booming number of 
contract opportunities. 
In general, sequential auction studies could be categorized according to dimensions 
related to the objects’ and bidders’ characteristics. In order to guarantee the 
analytical manageability, a lot of studies limit themselves to a two-stage model 
(e.g., Branco 1997, Elmaghraby 2003, De Silva et al. 2005, Zeithammer 2009, 
Reiβ and Schöndube 2010, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2014), while other 
formats look at Markov strategies in more extensive finite sequences (e.g., 
Katehakis and Puranam 2012, Takano et al. 2014) or account for an infinite time 
frame (e.g., Oren and Rothkopf 1975, Zeithammer 2007, Hörner and Jamison 
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2008, Said 2011). In line with experience from practice, the PPP pipeline has a 
finite nature. This is due to the magnitude of the projects and the fact that 
government budgets have a limited time horizon. Another object-related dimension 
concerns the relationship between the auctioned objects. The objects can have a 
homogeneous nature in the sense that they are perfect substitutes (Katzman 1999, 
Zeithammer 2009) or stochastically equivalent (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994, Reiβ 
and Schöndube 2010, Said 2011). Alternatively, synergies or the complementary 
feature of objects has proven to significantly influence strategic behavior (Branco 
1997, Benoit and Krishna 2001, Menezes and Monteiro 2004, De Silva et al. 
2005). The PPP model accounts for experience and learning effects, so that more 
competition could be expected in earlier stages of the game.  
An additional set of dimensions is related to the bidders. On the one hand, the 
capacity constraint diversifies the modelling approaches. The contributions of 
Milgrom and Weber (1982
b
), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), Elmaghraby (2003) 
and Reiβ and Schöndube (2010) are limited to a single-unit demand, while 
Katzman (1999), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Katehakis and Puranam 
(2012) allow for the procurement of as many items as possible. Other models have 
constraints in the monetary capabilities (Pitchik 2009) or in the availability of 
man-hours (Takano et al. 2014). Subsequently, the research topics can be 
differentiated according to the identity of the bidders. Most papers deal with the 
same set of contractors and often only take two bidders into account. At the other 
end of the spectrum, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Yildirim (2004) and Said 
(2011) allow for the entry of new buyers. With respect to this chapter, the PPP 
model reduces complexity in the sense that it only considers a limited number of 
suppliers and situations without capacity constraints.  
Last but not least, for the purpose of this setting it is important to look how the 
sequential auction theory deals with heterogeneity among the bidders. Maskin and 
Riley (2000) argue that asymmetric auctions are generally not tractable with 
analytical methods. In a sequential auction, asymmetries could occur in a second 
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auction because of differences in the completion cost between the bidder that has 
won the first auction and the other players (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2014). 
Empirical research has studied the complementarity of contracts, like Wolfram 
(1998) for sequential electricity contracts with start-up prices, Anton and Yao in 
the defense sector and De Silva et al. (2005) for road infrastructure contracts. The 
asymmetry in these cases is an endogenous consequence. Nevertheless, dealing 
with exogenous heterogeneity is rare. However, Reiβ and Schöndube (2010) start 
with differences in the project completion cost in the context of two sequentially 
tendered, stochastically equivalent projects and capacity constraints and describe 
the deviation from the standard independent private value auction. The PPP model 
also allows for exogenous heterogeneity, meaning that bidders may have a cost 
advantage (i.e., a smaller expected cost) and a knowledge advantage (i.e., a smaller 
variance of the cost probability distribution) at each stage of the game. 
5.3 Methodology 
From a methodological perspective, this chapter is greatly comparable with the 
procedure in Chapter 4 for the single-project setting. This section covers the 
extensions of the model to a multi-project setting with overlapping bid 
preparations. The introduction of a pipeline of projects results in the proliferation 
of decision variables.  
5.3.1 The ex ante model 
As explained in the introduction, the consortia are looking into an ex ante strategy 
when they think about how to spread their investment budget over the announced 
pipeline of projects in the near future. Each PPP project requires large research and 
development exertions. Moreover, one should think about the synergies and 
economies of scale that can be realized when multiple projects are part of a 
consortium’s portfolio. Engaging in multiple projects can also be a way of 
mitigating the risk, because suffered losses in one project might be recovered by 
profits in other projects. 
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As this chapter deals with overlapping tendering processes, we actually have an 
auction format without information revelation so that contractors are not able to 
(easily) modify their strategy along the pipeline. From a game-theoretic 
perspective, this is a simultaneous game, which means that a contractor’s ex ante 
strategy is based on the expected beliefs whether he or she will win or lose a 
project before moving to the next project in the pipeline. Alternatively, the fully 
dynamic model of Chapter 6 assumes full information revelation with respect to 
who has won the project at each stage, which requires a different approach in 
finding the optimal strategy. In practice, the most appropriate model will be a 
combination of both worlds. 
In order to deal with the increased complexity of the multi-project setting, a 
number of additional modelling assumptions has been introduced in Section 3.2 
with respect to the characteristics of the pipeline and the identity of the bidders 
(assumptions 8 to 10). In brief, we assume that the initial experience vector 
𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … 𝑒𝑃) is common knowledge. Moreover, the set of shortlisted bidders 
remains constant over the pipeline, which means that the number of bidders stays 
the same, so no bidders leave or enter the game. Additionally, the outcome of the 
tender only affects the experience levels. With respect to the projects, we assume 
that the projects of the pipeline have a similar nature. What is meant by that is that, 
without considering experience or the investment efforts, all projects are 
stochastically equivalent (i.e., have the same parameters for the knowledge impact 
and the direct cost impact assumptions). Assumptions 1-7 of Section 3.2 are also 
applicable in this chapter. In the ex ante model, the contractors could anticipate the 
fact that a future experience increase results in synergies. The direct cost impact 
results from economies of scale (e.g., expensive machinery that could be 
depreciated over different projects) and the knowledge impact benefits from risk 
synergies (i.e., a portfolio of risks is less perilous than the sum of its individual risk 
fractions). 
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Given is a sub-game 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) taking into account a discrete number of 
experience levels ranging from zero (i.e., no experience) to ten (i.e., maximum 
experience). In a sub-game 𝑒, contractor 𝑝 determines the optimal strategy 𝑠𝑝
∗ for 
the entire project pipeline with 𝑍 projects. An ex ante strategy 𝑠𝑝 is composed of 
two decisions for each project 𝑧 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑍}  in the pipeline: an investment 
decision 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑧), that is expressed as a percentage of an initially set project cost 
base, and a mark-up decision 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑧), that is expressed as a percentage value and 
which is applied to the estimated project cost. The strategy for player 𝑝  is 
represented by a vector 𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1), 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
2),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
2), … , 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑍), 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑍)). 
Recall the dual impact of pre-tender investment: it leads to more accurate cost 
estimates, reducing the project risk, and innovations or efficiencies could directly 
decrease the expected project cost (Martzoukous and Zacharias 2013, Lippman et 
al. 2013). Each contractor simultaneously determines his optimal strategy, so it is 
in our goals to identify the bidding equilibria. A (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium 
strategy profile 𝑠∗ = (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠𝑃
∗) for sub-game 𝑒  refers to the combination of 
strategies for the players in which none of the bidders has an incentive to deviate 
from his current strategy choice 𝑠𝑝
∗ given the strategy combination of his opponents 
𝑠−𝑝
∗ , or mathematically expressed in equation (3.1).  
Concerning the composition of the vector 𝑠𝑝, two mechanisms are studied in this 
chapter: the consistent strategy model (CSM) and the variable strategy model 
(VSM). The VSM allows for a different investment percentage and mark-up 
percentage for each project or stage 𝑧 in the game. While this allows for more 
flexibility in the decision options, the number of strategies explodes when more 
projects are included in the pipeline. Alternatively, the CSM imposes that a 
contractor selects a single investment percentage and a single mark-up percentage 
that is applied to all projects in the pipeline. This simplifies the study of longer 
pipelines as the strategy vector now only consists of two elements: 𝑠𝑝 =
(𝑖(𝑠𝑝),𝑚(𝑠𝑝)). In each stage 𝑧, the same investment 𝑖(𝑠𝑝) and mark-up 𝑚(𝑠𝑝) 
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are applied. However, this disregards any flexibility in defining project-specific 
investment and mark-up levels, so we should better consider these figures as the 
average budgeted investment and the average budgeted mark-up percentage.  
5.3.2 Hypotheses 
This chapter assesses how the introduction of a project pipeline, i.e., creating a 
trustworthy project agenda with multiple consecutive projects, triggers a change in 
the strategic behavior. The conclusions from consulting reports (KPMG 2010) and 
interviews with practitioners raise several hypotheses that are theoretically tested. 
Firstly, practitioners claim that the creation of a pipeline would be a trigger to be 
more competitive for the projects earlier in the pipeline. This is based on the 
rationale that a contractor hopes to acquire an established position in the market. 
From the literature review, it is clear that in most cases the competition is fiercer in 
the earlier stages of the sequential auction. Therefore, it seems essential to test 
whether the project proposals become cheaper in the case more projects are added 
to the pipeline. Additionally, we need to investigate whether the model supports 
the intuition that project proposals would also become of a higher quality. The 
majority of the interviewees believe that a higher quality proposal is ought to be 
expected (Section 7.2.4). However, a large international investment company 
claimed that they are sometimes willing to reduce mark-ups to the lower limits and 
play on the price aspect, in order to grasp some essential experience in a particular 
jurisdiction. To the best of our knowledge, there are no academic, theoretical 
results whether this would be the case. Hence, this raises the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: In equilibrium, the investment efforts of the contractors are expected 
to be higher if the number of projects in the sequence is greater. 
Hypothesis 2: In equilibrium, the mark-up levels are expected to be decreasing if 
the number of projects in the sequence is greater. 
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Chapter 4 showed that a large number of shortlisted bidders could inhibit some 
contractors to prepare a proposal. Nonetheless, one could expect that if these 
bidders have also future opportunities to win contracts, the competitive forces are 
reestablished. Chapter 4 also concluded that the fact that governments reimburse 
losing bidders for the bidding effort might level the playing field, leading to more 
competition. Now, we consider the pipeline as a trigger for incentive creation. 
Eventually, this might make the impact of the investment reimbursements 
obsolete. Hence, the next hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 3: In equilibrium, a larger number of projects in the pipeline stimulates 
the participation of the players. As a consequence, government compensation 
policies to create a more competitive market are less essential. 
Finally, as bidders face fiercer competition after the introduction of the pipeline, 
this should also lead to lower procurement expenses for the government. 
Hypothesis 4: The average expected project procurement cost for the government 
decreases if the number of projects in the pipeline increases. 
5.3.3 Analytical background 
Given is a project pipeline with 𝑍  projects, a 𝑃 -player subgame with initial 
experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … 𝑒𝑃)  and a strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃)  in 
which each 𝑠𝑝  with 𝑝 ∈ {1,… , 𝑃}  refers to player 𝑝 ’s strategy, expressed as a 
vector 𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1), … , 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑍),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑍)) . For this project pipeline and this 
strategy profile, the expected pay-off vector is dependent on the expected 
instantaneous pay-off (as defined in Section 3.4) calculations of all projects in the 
pipeline. The outcome for the first project is straightforward, but the expectation of 
the second project will depend on who has won the first project, so that 𝑃 scenarios 
are created for the second project. For the third project, 𝑃2 scenarios need to be 
considered. The total expected pay-off 𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) for player 𝑝 in sub-game 𝑒 and a 
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three-project environment with ex ante strategy profile 𝑠  is decomposed as 
follows: 
𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) =∑∑𝑞𝑗
1(𝑠|𝑒)𝑞𝑘
2(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1)
𝑃
𝑘=1
(𝜌𝑝
1(𝑠|𝑒) + 𝛿1𝜌𝑝
2(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1)
𝑃
𝑗=1
+ 𝛿2𝜌𝑝
3(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1, 𝑦𝑘
2 = 1)) 
with:         (5.1) 
- 𝑞𝑗
𝑧 is the probability that player 𝑗 wins project 𝑧; 
- 𝑦𝑗
𝑧 is a binary variable that has value 1 if player 𝑗 has won project 𝑧 and 
indicates that the experience level of player 𝑗 is increased; 
- 𝜋𝑝
𝑧 refers to the pay-off for player 𝑝 in the tender for project 𝑧; 
- 𝛿𝑧−1 equals a discount factor to account for the time value of money. 
Consequently, the expected total pay-off is a linear combination of the 
instantaneous pay-offs for all the possible combinations of experience levels that 
could be encountered along the pipeline. Section 6.3.2 introduces a more general 
formulation for the expected pay-off. The expected pay-off consists of an 
instantaneous pay-off of the first project together with a continuation value for the 
later projects of the pipeline. As this understanding is not essential for the 
simulation and optimization setting of the ex ante model, we will leave this 
discussion for Chapter 6 that introduces the specific jargon of the sequential game 
with Markov perfect strategies. 
The analytical characterization of the instantaneous pay-off 𝜌𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) is analogue to 
what has been described in Section 3.4. Nevertheless, the instantaneous pay-offs 
are now dependent on the history of the players. The history includes the 
information on who has won projects earlier in the pipeline. This means that the 
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given experience vector 𝑒 is only applicable for calculating the instantaneous pay-
off of the first project in the pipeline. The other instantaneous pay-offs take into 
account the intermediate experience levels ?̅? = (𝑒1̅, 𝑒2̅, … , 𝑒𝑃̅̅ ̅). Moreover, at each 
stage of the game also the appropriate investment and mark-up percentages need to 
be selected to be inserted in equations (3.2) to (3.6) In Chapter 6, we refer to the 
combination of the stage-specific investment and mark-up as the action. In the 
CSM, this is pretty straightforward as this model only considers an average 
investment and mark-up choice for the entire pipeline, so that for the equations of 
Chapter 3: ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅) with 𝑠?̅? = (𝑖(𝑠𝑝),𝑚(𝑠𝑝)). The VSM, on the other 
hand, allows for different decisions for each stage 𝑧 ∈ {1,… , 𝑍} . Hence, the 
expected pay-off calculations require ?̅? = (𝑠1̅, 𝑠2̅, … , 𝑠𝑃̅̅ ̅)  with 𝑠?̅? = 𝑠𝑝
𝑧 =
(𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑧),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑧)). In summary, the latter case means that the appropriate investment 
and mark-up level for this particular stage need to be selected. Recall that in this ex 
ante framework, the strategy is only dependent on the stage of the game and 
independent of which player has won or lost earlier projects in the given pipeline 
(which is referred to as a state in Chapter 6). That is due to the fact that, from an ex 
ante perspective, the bidder does not have the opportunity to modify the strategy 
based on newly available information. 
Following the rationale to derive the total expected ex ante pay-off 𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) as in 
equation (5.1), all players simultaneously optimize this function. In the case of the 
CSM, only a single investment and a single mark-up percentage optimize the total 
expected pay-off for each of the 𝑃  players and therefore lead to the following 
system of 2𝑃 equations, which is identical to the single-project setting: 
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)]
𝜕𝑖(𝑠𝑝
∗)⁄ = 0
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)
𝜕𝑚(𝑠𝑝
∗)⁄ = 0
         ∀𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑃}    (5.2) 
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In the case of the VSM, a system of 2𝑍𝑃 differential equations needs to be solved: 
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)]
𝜕𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑧∗)⁄ = 0
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)
𝜕𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑧∗)⁄ = 0
        ∀𝑧 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑍}, ∀𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑃} (5.3) 
5.3.4 Simulation model 
An identical reason as in the previous chapter motives the use of simulation in the 
ex ante framework. Instead of exactly calculating the expected pay-off for a 
presumed distribution, the simulation reduces computation times and allows to 
gain insights into the distribution of the pay-offs for any given distribution. 
Especially now that multiple projects need to be studied, the computation times for 
exact calculations for the total expected pay-off of a pipeline surge. Essentially, the 
procedure of the simulation is completely in line with the description in Section 
4.3.2, but each iteration is now extended for the multi-project setting.  
The inputs for the procedure consist of the initial (i.e., at the time of tendering the 
first project) experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) and an ex ante strategy profile 
𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃)  with an ex ante strategy 𝑠𝑝  representing the investment and 
mark-up choices for all projects in the pipeline and represented by 𝑠𝑝 =
(𝑖(𝑠𝑝),𝑚(𝑠𝑝)) in the CSM or 𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
2),… , 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
𝑍),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
𝑍)) in the VSM. 
Section 3.5 translates the knowledge impact assumption resulting from the 
project’s complexity and the direct cost impact assumption resulting from 
innovations and efficiency gains in equations (3.5) and (3.6) respectively. The 
output of the simulation procedure is a pay-off distribution for each bidder. The 
average pay-offs for the strategy profile 𝑠 are given by the pay-off vector 𝑓 =
(𝑓1(𝑠|𝑒), 𝑓2(𝑠|𝑒), …𝑓𝑃(𝑠|𝑒)) which is an approximation of the expected pay-off 
vector 𝜋(𝑠|𝑒) = (𝜋1(𝑠|𝑒), 𝜋2(𝑠|𝑒), … , 𝜋𝑃(𝑠|𝑒))  with 𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒)  as derived 
according to the rationale to arrive at equation (5.1).  
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In order to determine the pay-off distributions of a particular strategy profile, a 
user-defined number of iterations 𝑚  is performed. A single iteration passes 
through the entire project pipeline. The input for the first project is 𝑒 =
(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) and the investment and mark-up decisions 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1) and 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1) for the 
first project. Consider Gaussian cost and bidding distributions. The reference 
actual cost Ã1 is a random variable that is drawn from the distribution 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
with 𝜇 = € 1,000,000 and 𝜎𝑢
2 = (𝜇𝜎)2 and that is the same for all players. The 
final actual cost is different, because it is related to the particular cost distribution 
of the winner of the tender. The (unknown) actual project cost for 𝑝 results then 
from the linear transformation Ã𝑝
1 = Ã1(1 + 𝑔𝑝), which is set to the mean of the 
cost probability density 𝑐𝑝
1 for player 𝑝. Hence, 𝑐𝑝
1 is a nested distribution of the 
form 𝑁 (𝜇(1 + 𝑔𝑝), (1 + 𝑔𝑝)
2
(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑝
2)). The contractor’s estimated cost 𝐶𝑝
1̃ is 
randomly selected from 𝑐𝑝
1 and eventually, a contractor applies the mark-up level 
𝑚1(𝑠𝑝) , resulting in the bid: 𝐵𝑝
1̃ = (1 +𝑚1(𝑠𝑝))𝐶𝑝
1̃ . The minimum of these 
simulated bids is the winning proposal and its pay-off is determined, where the 
actual cost is 𝐴𝑤1̃  for winner 𝑤. The losers’ pay-offs equal the fraction of the pre-
tender investments that is not reimbursed by the government. The winner’s 
experience level needs to be increased, resulting in a new experience vector 𝑒′ and 
the procedure is repeated for the second project and the resulting pay-offs are 
discounted with the discount factor 𝛿𝑧−1 =
1
(1.05)𝑧−1
 and accumulated. The iteration 
finishes as soon as all projects from the pipeline have been tendered and then the 
next iteration starts. 
5.3.5 Equilibrium approximation algorithm 
In order to maintain the manageability of the model, we favor a discretization of 
the decision variables. The multi-project setting causes a proliferation of strategies 
in the VSM. 𝐼  investment choice, 𝑀  mark-up choices, 𝑃  players and 𝑍  projects 
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result in in (𝐼𝑀)𝑍𝑃 strategy profiles in the VSM. The CSM, on the contrary, only 
has (𝐼𝑀)𝑃 strategy profiles regardless of the number of projects. 
Apart from the number of strategies and the simulation model that takes the 
sequence of projects into account, the algorithm to approximate the best response 
in equilibrium is analogue to the strategy game algorithm explained in Section 
4.3.3.2 and the pseudo-code in Appendix B. The only difference is that when an 
expected pay-off calculation is performed, the experience vector and strategy 
profile are sent to the multi-project simulation procedure of Section 5.3.4. 
5.3.6 Experimental setting 
The algorithms have been implemented in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. Table 5.1 
lists the parameter values that have been tested in this experimental study and that 
are covered in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Each combination of the parameter settings 
is referred to as a scenario. With respect to the discretization of the problem, Table 
5.2 tabulates the determinants of the CSM and the VSM. As is clear from the table, 
the study of the VSM is limited in the number of projects of the pipeline and the 
considered strategies, since the flexibility adds complexity to the model. The 
equilibrium approximation algorithm reports the equilibrium strategy response for 
the first player, with experience level 𝑒1  of a given experience vector 𝑒 =
(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃). We refer to the vector 𝑒−1 = (𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) as the bidding situation for 
which we determine the equilibrium response of player 1. The number of 
experience intervals 𝑒𝑢 equals five, so that the contractors move on the scale from 
0 to 10 in steps of 2 in case of a win. The values of the tuning parameters of the 
strategy game algorithm itself are equivalent to those in Table 4.3. 
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Parameter Interpretation Values 
(Section 5.4.1) 
Values 
(Section 5.4.2) 
𝜎 Uncontrollable project risk 0.05 0.05 
𝛾𝑒 Maximum risk impact of a lack 
of experience 
0.05 0.05,0.1 
𝛾𝑖 Maximum risk impact of a lack 
of investment 
0.1,0.2 0.05,0.1,0.2 
𝜆𝑒 Experiential learning rate 0.25 0.25 
𝜆𝑖 Investment learning rate 0.25 0.25 
𝛽𝑒 Experiential cost disadvantage 0.1 0.05,0.1 
𝛽𝑖 Investment cost disadvantage 0.05 0.05 
𝜇𝑒 Experiential cost decrease rate 0.25 0.25 
𝜇𝑖 Investment cost decrease rate 0.25 0.25 
𝑑 Government compensation level 0,0.1,0.2,…,0.9 0,0.3,0.6,0.9 
𝛿𝑧 Discount rate 1/1.05 1/1.05 
Table 5.1 Parameter values used in the experimental study 
 Consistent strategy 
model 
Variable strategy 
model 
Number of investment levels 𝐼 11 6 
Investment levels 0%,1%,2%,…,10% 0%,2%,4%,…,10% 
Number of mark-up levels 𝑀 51 6 
Mark-up levels 0%,1%,2%,…,50% 0%,10%,20%,…,50% 
Number of players 𝑃 2,3,4 2,3 
Experience levels  0,2,4,6,8,10 0,2,4,6,8,10 
Number of projects 𝑍 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3 
Table 5.2 Model characteristics in the experimental study 
5.4 Experimental results 
The interest of this chapter lies in the impact of increasing the number of projects 
to be tendered on the strategy equilibrium. Moreover, we are interested in how the 
dynamics that have been discussed in the single-project model are amplified or 
fade out due to the introduction of a pipeline. Hence, the ex ante strategy equilibria 
are compared for each scenario when the number of projects in the pipeline is 
increased.  
Consequently, the outcomes consist of paired observations and the paired samples 
t-test is used to study the differences. Three assumptions are important for the 
paired t-test: random sampling, normal distribution of the response variables and 
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interval or ratio data. The paired t-test is rather robust for the normal distribution 
assumption. However, we are dealing with experimental data with only a limited 
number of discrete strategies and one should be careful for applying the parametric 
paired t-test. Therefore, the equivalent non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test 
has been used, but the findings are identical.  
A final remark relates to the fact that we might be unable to identify marginal 
results due to the discretization of the strategies. Section 5.4.1 defines a base case 
that aims to extend the discussion of the bid cost reimbursement towards the multi-
project setting. Section 5.4.2 additionally adds changes in the other model 
parameters of the VSM. 
5.4.1 Base case analysis 
Motivated by the practical importance of the assessment of governmental policies, 
this section looks into the impact of the introduction of extra projects and bid cost 
reimbursements in a low-risk (𝛾𝑖 = 0.1 ) and high-risk (𝛾𝑖 = 0.2 ) base case 
scenario. In this base-case scenario, the investment mainly has a knowledge impact 
and the experience merely has a cost impact (Table 5.1).  
5.4.1.1 Consistent strategy model 
Table 5.3 reports the average investment and mark-up differences over all 
scenarios in the CSM experiment, that deals with a strategy as an average 
investment and mark-up level for an entire pipeline, with the number of projects 
going from one to five. With respect to the investment levels, there is statistical 
significance in favor of decreasing investments in the four-player case, but the 
economic significance is little. Additionally, the results show a significant positive 
investment impact for three players in the low-risk base case. This result is mainly 
attributed to a 0.11% (p=0.04) and a 0.41% (p=1.9*10
-10
) average investment raise 
by inexperienced players (i.e., 𝑒𝑝 = 0) when moving from a single-project to, 
respectively, a two- and a five- project pipeline. Furthermore, extra projects lead to 
decreasing mark-up percentages for all players in two- and three-player 
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environments in the CSM, but the four-player result is ambiguous (Table 5.3). This 
is due to the fact that the decreased mark-ups of experienced players put pressure 
on the inexperienced players that now tend to stay out of the market, so setting a 
maximum mark-up in the model. Nevertheless, if the number of players is limited 
to two or three, the inexperienced players opt for a larger mark-up drop compared 
to the experienced participants. The impact of the number of projects on the mark-
up change is in that case concave and decreasing in the number of projects. 
According to the experiments, the response to the introduction of compensations is 
in line with the findings of Chapter 4, regardless of the number of projects in the 
pipeline: the most prospering results are obtained in high-risk three-player 
scenarios. Two-player results show a significant increase in investment, but also a 
slight increase in mark-ups when compensations are included, while 
compensations have a convex and increasing investment impact and a concave and 
decreasing mark-up impact in the four-player case, so that only excessively high 
and costly compensations have a positive effect. The interaction between the 
number of projects and the government compensation is only significant in the 
three-player case of the CSM (p=0.04 for investment and p=1.7*10
-5
 for mark-up) 
meaning that lower compensations already lead to a drop in the mark-ups, making 
the market more competitive from a pricing perspective. 
Consequently, in this conservative CSM approach, the tendency to move towards 
lower mark-ups becomes already apparent. Moreover, it is mainly the introduction 
of the second project that causes the largest change. The investment dynamics are 
not yet clear though. Therefore, the next section fine-tunes these tendencies and 
looks at the same base case but now from a variable strategy perspective, the 
VSM. Due to the added complexity that results from the flexibility of applying a 
different investment and mark-up choice in the subsequent stages of the game, 
only a two- and three-project pipeline are discussed. 
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CSM 
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 𝑍 = 4 𝑍 = 5 
𝑃 = 2 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0194 
(0.6920) 
-0.0139 
(0.7618) 
-0.0750 
(0.1036) 
-0.0056 
(0.9061) 
0.20 
-0.025 
(0.6058) 
0.0139 
(0.7643) 
0.0222 
(0.6320) 
0.0167 
(0.7155) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-0.4444 
(0.0010) 
-0.7083 
(5.5*10
-7
) 
-0.8333 
(5.1*10
-9
) 
-0.9583 
(2.4*10
-10
) 
0.20 
-0.6389 
(4.65*10
-5
) 
-0.9722 
(7.82*10
-10
) 
-1.125 
(1.47*10
-13
) 
-1.3056 
(3.04*10
-15
) 
𝑃 = 3 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0191 
(0.6272) 
0 
(1) 
0.0587 
(0.0170) 
0.0627 
(0.0138) 
0.20 
-0.0063 
(0.8349) 
-0.0341 
(0.2794) 
0.0317 
(0.3214) 
0.0429 
(0.1865) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-0.5476 
(2.6*10
-8
) 
-0.8691 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.1468 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.4286 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
0.20 
-0.2063 
(0.3225) 
-0.4722 
(0.0375) 
-1.1349 
(2.35*10
-6
) 
-1.4365 
(6.31*10
-9
) 
𝑃 = 4 
Investment 
0.10 
-0.0515 
(0.0002) 
-0.0378 
(0.0057) 
-0.0372 
(0.0070) 
-0.0491 
(0.0004) 
0.20 
-0.0301 
(0.1342) 
0.0146 
(0.4776) 
0.0024 
(0.9081) 
0.0304 
(0.1414) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
0.3646 
(4.7*10
-5
) 
0.3125 
(0.0006) 
0.2946 
(0.0017) 
0.2307 
(0.0158) 
0.20 
0.0506 
(0.7493) 
-0.2083 
(0.2013) 
-0.2798 
(0.0939) 
-0.5804 
(0.0006) 
Table 5.3
1
 Increase (+) or decrease (-) in the investment and mark-up percentages 
with associated p-values, with respect to a single-project environment 
5.4.1.2 Variable strategy model 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 summarize the results for differences in the investment 
and mark-ups for the first project of the 𝑍-project pipeline and for the averages 
over the given pipeline. The two-player case supports the hypothesis of the 
investment increase for the first project in a two-project pipeline, but looking at the 
averages, only the increase in the high-risk environment is significant. Significance 
disappears though in a three-project environment. While players with a 
competitive advantage might invest more, inexperienced players (i.e., with 
𝑒𝑝 = {0,2}) reduce the investment efforts. An explanation could be that the bidder 
who determines the ex ante strategy has a great belief in at least winning one 
                                                     
1
 In the tables of this dissertation, numbers in bold refer to significant results at the 95% 
confidence level. 
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project and in this vein counts on gained experience for which he does not need to 
invest now. Also for the mark-up change, the drop is more significant for the first 
project. The high-risk three-player setting leads to an average mark-up increase, 
because inexperienced players stay out of the market more often. 
VSM  
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 
(a) First project w.r.t. 
𝑍 = 1 
(b) Average of pipeline 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 
𝑃 = 2 
Investment 
0.10 
0.1611 
(0.0158) 
0.0556 
(0.5236) 
0.0778 
(0.1565) 
0.1000 
(0.1489) 
0.20 
0.1056 
(0.0970) 
-0.0556 
(0.5428) 
0.125 
(0.0230) 
0.1037 
(0.1405) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-2.0278 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-5.0556 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.2222 
(1.25*10
-9
) 
-2.2963 
(4.12*10
-14
) 
0.20 
-4.1944 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-6.1111 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-2.6667 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-3.8148 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
Table 5.4 Increase (+) or decrease (-) in investment and mark-up percentages, with 
associated p-values. The choices for the first project of the pipeline (a) and the 
average choices of the entire pipeline (b) are compared with the single-project 
strategy. 
VSM  
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 
(a) First project w.r.t. 
𝑍 = 1 
(b) Average of pipeline 
w.r.t. Z=1 
𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 2 
𝑃 = 3 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0413 
(0.1959) 
0.0325 
(0.2330) 
0.20 
-0.1048 
(0.0045) 
-0.07619 
(0.0196) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-1.5000 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-0.6865 
(1.76*10
-11
) 
0.20 
0.5968 
(0.0119) 
0.5595 
(0.0039) 
Table 5.5 Increase (+) or decrease (-) in investment and mark-up percentages, with 
associated p-values. The choices for the first project of the pipeline (a) and the 
average choices of the entire pipeline (b) are compared with the single-project 
strategy. 
Besides, the VSM supports the finding related to the compensations: there is only 
interaction between government reimbursements and the number of projects in the 
three-player case, so that a 60% compensation for instance could give extra 
incentives for inexperienced players to refrain from investing less when a new 
project is introduced. Consequently, compensations get a second feature: not only 
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do they level the playing field, but they also inhibit decreasing the ex ante 
investment in the dynamic case. Moreover, the extra expenses that result from the 
reimbursements are partly offset by the increased price competition in the multi-
project setting. 
In this vein, Table 5.6 reports the difference between the total expected 
government cost of the two-project pipeline and the total expected government 
cost in the case a single project is tendered two times consecutively. In order to 
make a valid comparison and to translate the single-project government cost into 
one that is equivalent to the two-project logic, two intermediate results have been 
developed. For the first project, the initial sub-game is represented by (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3) 
and the government cost is calculated. For tendering a second project without a 
former pipeline, three scenarios might have occurred: (𝑒1
′ , 𝑒2, 𝑒3), (𝑒1, 𝑒2
′ , 𝑒3) or 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3
′), for which the prime indicates the updated experience level for the 
player who has previously won. For the worst case method, the expected 
government cost of the most expensive sub-game is discounted and added to the 
cost of the previous project, while for the weighted method an equal probability is 
attributed to each sub-game.  
VSM 𝛾𝑖 
Worst case 
method 
Weighted 
method 
2 players 
0.10 
-36,345 
(1.67*10
-6
) 
-27,946 
(4.77*10
-6
) 
0.20 
-69,922 
(7.43*10
-9
) 
-58,436 
(2.36*10
-8
) 
All scenarios 
-49,633 
(3.16*10
-13
) 
-43,191 
(9.69*10
-12
) 
3 players 
0.10 
-28,282 
(2.58*10
-15
) 
-26,026 
(7.01*10
-14
) 
0.20 
-8,326 
(1.64*10
-6
) 
-4,172 
(0.0037) 
All scenarios 
-18,304 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-15,099 
(1.82*10
-13
) 
Table 5.6 Absolute differences and associated p-values in tendering two times a 
single project or in the case of a two-project pipeline 
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The expected government cost is significantly lower if there is a project pipeline, 
regardless of the project risk or the number of players. The absolute values of the 
differences are greater in the two-player case, especially for risky projects. On the 
contrary, it are the less risky projects that have a greater contribution to the 
government cost decrease in the three-player situation. As a result, the more 
flexible VSM greatly supports the CSM findings. The pipeline concept positively 
influences the competition from a mark-up perspective. This also leads to a lower 
government procurement cost than when the government would only communicate 
about isolated projects without highlighting future opportunities. The impact on the 
investment is ambiguous, but one could say that inexperienced players will tend to 
invest less in bid preparation efforts. Consequently, especially in a three-player 
context, it could be interesting to include bid compensations to fade out this 
negative effect. 
5.4.2 Parameter sensitivity analysis for the VSM 
The base case analysis of the previous section is limited in its investigated 
scenarios. The parameter sensitivity section looks into the robustness of the 
findings if the other model parameters change. The tested parameter values are 
listed in Table 5.1.  
5.4.2.1 Within-strategy dynamics 
The VSM allows for deciding on a different investment and mark-up for the first 
and the second project. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 report the dynamics within the 
optimal strategy and summarize the average differences between the investment 
willingness percentages and the required mark-up for the first and the second 
project in the pipeline. In other terms, if the optimal strategy vector is given by 
(𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1∗),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1∗), 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
2∗),𝑚(𝑠𝑝
2∗)),  this section discusses the difference between 
𝑖(𝑠𝑝
1∗) and 𝑖(𝑠𝑝
2∗) and the difference between 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
1∗) and 𝑚(𝑠𝑝
2∗). The scenario-
by-scenario comparison in the two-player case concludes that the ex ante 
investment percentages are higher for the first project than for the second project.  
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2 players 
 𝑍 = 2  
Absolute mean 
difference 
Paired t-test Wilcoxon test 
𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
2∗) − 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
1∗) -0.0671 0.0272 0.0273 
|𝑒1 = 0 -0.1458 0.0623 0.0631 
|𝑒1 = 2 -0.0486 0.5112 0.5113 
|𝑒1 = 4 -0.0694 0.3412 0.3413 
|𝑒1 = 6 -0.2014 0.0057 0.0059 
|𝑒1 = 8 0 1 1 
|𝑒1 = 10 0.0625 0.4142 0.4137 
𝑚𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
2∗) − 𝑚𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
1∗) 1.4757 <2.2*10-16 <2.2*10
-16 
|𝑒1 = 0 2.5347 <2.2*10
-16 5.13*10
-16 
|𝑒1 = 2 1.8403 8.02*10
-10 2.52*10
-9 
|𝑒1 = 4 1.2153 1.07*10
-5 1.44*10
-5 
|𝑒1 = 6 0.9375 0.0002 0.0003 
|𝑒1 = 8 1.2500 1.28*10
-5 1.71*10
-5 
|𝑒1 = 10 1.0764 0.0003 0.003 
Table 5.7 Differences in the investments and mark-ups within a strategy and 
associated p-values (2 players) 
3 players 
𝑍 = 2  
Absolute mean 
difference 
Paired t-test  Wilcoxon test 
𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
2∗) − 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
1∗) 0.0251 0.0945 0.0937 
|𝑒1 = 0 0.0595 0.0548 0.0546 
|𝑒1 = 2 0.0258 0.4917 0.4968 
|𝑒1 = 4 0.0694 0.0662 0.0659 
|𝑒1 = 6 0.0119 0.7465 0.7454 
|𝑒1 = 8 -0.0198 0.6110 0.6126 
|𝑒1 = 10 0.0040 0.9175 0.9172 
𝑚𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
2∗) − 𝑚𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
1∗) 0.6134 <2.2*10-16 <2.2*10
-16 
|𝑒1 = 0 0.6448 0.0069 0.0065 
|𝑒1 = 2 0.8929 1.58*10
-5 5.90*10
-7 
|𝑒1 = 4 0.7540 1.88*10
-5 1.99*10
-6 
|𝑒1 = 6 0.4464 0.0009 0.0005 
|𝑒1 = 8 0.4167 0.0018 0.0010 
|𝑒1 = 10 0.5258 9.89*10
-6 5.19*10
-6 
Table 5.8 Differences in the investments and mark-ups within a strategy and 
associated p-values (3 players) 
This means that a contractor believes that, on average, he will need to invest less in 
the second project than for the first project. Conditioning on the experience levels 
could not guarantee significant results for all the levels. Moving towards three 
shortlisted bidders, a small significance is attributed to the opposite finding, but for 
the majority of experience levels, neither the paired t-test, nor the Wilcoxon signed 
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rank test proves significant ex ante differences. On the contrary, the mark-up 
dynamics are more outspoken. For both the two-player case as well as the three-
player case, the optimal mark-up is expected to be set significantly higher for the 
second project than for the first project. 
5.4.2.2 First-project comparison 
More interestingly, Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 report the results of the scenario-
specific differences between the preferred pre-tender investment level and the 
mark-up level for the first project in the two-project environment and the single-
project environment respectively. The average results over all scenarios are highly 
significant for the mark-up. The mark-ups of the first project considerably drop 
when a second project is introduced in both the two- as well as the three-player 
situation, with an average decrease of 2.40% and 1.05% respectively. For both 
cases, the absolute impact is greater for inexperienced players than for more 
experienced ones.  
With respect to the investment levels, the statistical tests confirm that pre-tender 
investments ought to be higher when a second project is added to the pipeline in 
the two-player setting. For the three-player case, no significant overall impact 
could be shown, but inexperienced players will now invest less than when the 
government has no project agenda. According to the ANOVA results that prove 
significance for the interaction between 𝑒1 and the vector 𝑒−1 (see Appendix C for 
a full overview), it is in the subgames in which the player has a competitive 
disadvantage that he refrains from investing more.  
A final point of interest relates to the division of the efforts over the projects in the 
pipeline (i.e., whether there is a greater average investment in the overall pipeline). 
Nevertheless, a comparison of the results of the average investment percentage and 
mark-up percentage with the choices in the case that there is no pipeline did only 
support the mark-up drop (that amounts to -1.7% in the two-player case and -0.7% 
in the three-player case), while the average investment over the pipeline is only 
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significantly higher for the two-player case (+0.1%). The average pay-off 
expectation per project drops with € 5,137 in the two-player environment and with 
€ 2,221 in the three-player case according to the simulation. 
2 players  
Measured difference 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
Absolute mean 
difference 
Paired t-test  
Wilcoxon 
test 
Investment 
All scenarios 0.1585 3.76*10
-8 
4.35*10
-8 
𝑒1 = 0 0.3194 8.57*10
-6 1.16*10
-5 
𝑒1 = 2 0.2222 0.0011 0.0012 
𝑒1 = 4 0.0347 0.6125 0.6122 
𝑒1 = 6 0.2153 0.0037 0.0039 
𝑒1 = 8 0.0278 0.6956 0.6952 
𝑒1 = 10 0.1319 0.0586 0.0596 
Mark-up 
All scenarios -2.4016 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0 -3.5069 <2.2*10
-16 <2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 2 -2.3958 <2.2*10
-16 6.88*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 4 -2.3264 2.10*10
-15 4.87*10
-14 
𝑒1 = 6 -2.2222 1.31*10
-14 2.17*10
-13 
𝑒1 = 8 -2.2917 9.29*10
-15 1.63*10
-13 
𝑒1 = 10 -1.6667 3.93*10
-8 8.16*10
-8 
Table 5.9 Differences between the investment and mark-up choice for the first 
project of a two-project pipeline and the choices in a single-project environment (2 
players) 
3 players 
Measured difference 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
Absolute mean 
difference 
Paired t-test  Wilcoxon test 
Investment 
All scenarios -0.0073 0.6178 0.6013 
𝑒1 = 0 -0.1012 0.0018 0.0018 
𝑒1 = 2 -0.0893 0.0181 0.0184 
𝑒1 = 4 -0.0079 0.8210 0.8078 
𝑒1 = 6 0.0060 0.8687 0.8738 
𝑒1 = 8 0.1052 0.0047 0.0049 
𝑒1 = 10 0.0437 0.2189 0.2215 
Mark-up 
All scenarios -1.0516 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0 -1.3988 9.89*10
-8 1.10*10
-7 
𝑒1 = 2 -1.2401 1.91*10
-7 3.16*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 4 -1.0417 4.87*10
-9 1.01*10
-10 
𝑒1 = 6 -0.9722 3.97*10
-12 5.19*10
-13 
𝑒1 = 8 -0.7440 7.53*10
-9 4.66*10
-10 
𝑒1 = 10 -0.9127 1.88*10
-15 7.46*10
-16 
Table 5.10 Differences between the investment and mark-up choice for the first 
project of a two-project pipeline and the choices in a single-project environment (3 
players) 
CHAPTER 5.  An ex ante strategy model 
 
 
123 
The ANOVA output in Appendix C reveals the sensitivity results of the scenario-
defining parameters and also underline the heterogeneous responses in a two-
player or a three-player setting. From these ANOVA results, it also seems 
noteworthy to look into the project complexity parameters and the government 
reimbursement parameter.  
5.4.2.3 Project complexity 
Figure 5.2 digs into the project complexity in the two-player setting. Omitting 
interaction effects, projects with a limited complexity and that do not require a lot 
of research (𝛾𝑖=0.05) incur a significant increase of 0.25% (p=9.6*10
-6
) in the 
investment willingness. The increase in investment willingness drops to 0.18% 
(p=2.6*10
-4
) when the share of the variance that is related to investment rises to 
0.10. In the cases for which 𝛾𝑖  reaches 0.20, the investment willingness is not 
significantly influenced by one additional project. In the two-player case, the 
mark-up results are also significantly related to the project’s complexity. The 
average mark-up drops for the risk categories with 𝛾𝑖 equal to 0.05, 0.10 and 0.20 
are 0.89% (p=2.29*10
-12
), 2.26% (p<2.2*10
-16
) and 4.06% (p<2.2*10
-16
) 
respectively. Thus, mark-ups for project categories with larger risk features drop 
more, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, Figure 5.2 shows that the mark-up for the first 
project has become increasing in the experience level in the two-project setting, 
while it was relatively stable in the single-project setting. Especially for complex 
projects, experienced players require higher mark-ups than their inexperienced 
counterparts.  
This differs from the three-player setting of Figure 5.3 in which the downward 
mark-up trend for increasing experience levels remains. When the impact of the 
knowledge parameter 𝛾𝑖 is studied in a three-player environment, little significance 
is found for the investments. In the high-risk setting (𝛾𝑖 = 0.2), the introduction of 
an extra project results in a drop (0.09% on average with p-value 0.0012) of the 
investment willingness and no significant drops in mark-ups are apparent. 
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However, for lower risk projects, the mark-up impact is largest (p<2.2*10
-16
), 
especially for inexperienced players.  
5.4.2.4 Government compensation 
As the bidding behavior is rather levelled, the government compensation is not 
necessary to increase competition in the case where two bidders are shortlisted for 
a single project. Increasing the number of projects in the pipeline does not modify 
the dynamics. Also the ANOVA results (Appendix C) do not report significant (at 
the 5% level) main or interaction effects with the government compensation 
parameter.  
As has already been highlighted in Section 5.4.1, in the three-player setting with 
one project, government compensations are a helpful tool to increase competition. 
The ANOVA study does support that the effect of government compensations is 
influenced by the introduction of a second project in the pipeline. While only a 
limited number of compensation levels has been tested, a 60% compensation will 
for instance result in a 0.06% higher investment level (p=0.0429) and a 1.32% 
lower mark-up (p<2.2*10
-16
), relative to its respective single-project scenario. 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, the pipeline amplifies the effect of a government 
reimbursement in the three-player setting. 
  
 
   
   
Figure 5.2 Interaction plots of project complexity and the experience level in the two-player setting with independent variable the 
choices for the first project in a two-project pipeline (left), the single-project strategy (middle) and their difference (right) 
  
 
 
   
Figure 5.3 Interaction plots of project complexity and the experience level in the three-player setting with independent variable the 
mark-up choice for the first project in a two-project pipeline (left), the single-project strategy (middle) and their difference (right) 
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5.4.3 Hypotheses 
As a summary, it is necessary to look how the hypotheses from Section 5.3.2 are 
backed up by the experimental findings. Unfortunately, the model could not 
provide a definite answer for Hypothesis 1. The VSM for the two-player case 
slightly supports the investment increase, but no investment change has been 
identified in the three-player case. There is an important interaction with the 
investment willingness and the competitive position in the market. However, all 
models support Hypothesis 2. A pipeline does have a beneficial impact on the 
mark-up, which also results in lower procurement costs for the government 
(Hypothesis 4). Last but not least, with respect to Hypothesis 3, markets become 
more competitive from a mark-up perspective when more projects are introduced, 
but it does not necessarily serve as a mechanism to level the playing field in a 
multi-player case. Therefore, government compensations could still help in three-
player settings with complex projects to increase the competition. 
5.5 Special topic: Spillover model 
The previous sections of this chapter and also the sequential model of Chapter 6 do 
not account for the transferability of knowledge and efforts that result from 
research investments in past tenders. Both the current ex ante model as well as the 
sequential model only account for spillovers if the bidder has won a project. If a 
bidder wins a project earlier in the pipeline, he obtains an increase in the 
experience level for future tenders. However, the investments that have been 
performed were assumed to be project-specific so that investments could not be 
transferred to other projects. This addendum relaxes the non-transferability 
assumption and introduces a spillover variable 𝛼. This variable reflects the fraction 
of the investment of the previous project that will have an impact on the cost and 
knowledge outcome of the next project. In that sense, the investment gets a 
propagation characteristic. Consider for instance a two-project setting and an ex 
ante strategy given by 𝑠1 = (𝑖(𝑠1
1),𝑚(𝑠1
1), 𝑖(𝑠1
2),𝑚(𝑠1
2)) = (3%, 10%, 1%, 15%) 
and a spillover rate 𝑎 = 0.5. Thus, the 3% investment of the first project still has 
5.5. Special topic: Spillover model 
 
 
128 
an impact in the second tender. As a result, in order to calculate the variance and 
cost impact with equations (3.5) and (3.6) the value 𝑖(𝑠1̅) in these equations is 3% 
in the first tender and 2.5% (=1%+0.5*3%) in the second tender. 
In order to test the impact of the spillover capacity, a fraction of the scenarios from 
the VSM has been re-executed. The scenarios that have been tested are defined by 
the following parameter settings: 𝛾𝑖 equal to 0.10 and 0.20, 𝛾𝑒 equal to 0.05 and 
0.10 and 𝑑 equal to 0, 0.30, 0.60 and 0.90. The other parameters are kept constant: 
𝛽𝑒 = 0.1 , 𝛽𝑖 = 0.05  and 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑒 = 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇𝑒 = 0.25 . The simulation experiment 
runs in the same fashion as described in the simulation model of Section 5.3.4 and 
the equilibrium approximation of Section 5.3.5. As expected, the introduction of 
this spillover parameter has significant consequences for the equilibria.  
As in the previous analysis, we first look at the impact of this spillover parameter 
on the investment efforts of the first project of the two-project pipeline. Figure 5.4 
plots the two-player results of the aggregate scenarios and Figure 5.5 concerns the 
three-player scenarios. The graphs indicate the increased investment efforts in both 
the two-player as well as the three-player context, regardless of the experience 
level of the player. According to the experiment, the mark-up does not seem to be 
influenced by the spillover rate at the first sight. Besides, the spillover rate does 
not close the gap between the investment and mark-up percentages of the 
inexperienced versus the experienced players. 
Without spillovers, the comparison of the strategy in a single-project setting with 
the optimal investment and mark-up decision in the two-project setting did not 
always present significant differences. Since this section proves the dynamics of 
the equilibrium in case of a spillover effect, this could now result in significant 
conclusions. For the two-player scenarios, even a 10% spillover rate does already 
give a significant positive difference of 0.37% in the average investment for the 
first project compared to a situation in which only one project is tendered 
(p=2.8*10
-13
). The same can be said for the three-player results. While the 
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investment efforts were even decreasing in the case of a pipeline for inexperienced 
players, they now turn out to be already 0.24% greater (p<2.2*10
-16
) in a world 
with spillover effects.  
  
Figure 5.4 Impact of the spillover rate on the first-project investment decision in a 
two-project setting with two players 
  
Figure 5.5 Impact of the spillover rate on the first-project investment decision in a 
two-project setting with three players 
In the two-player scenarios that have been tested in this section, mark-ups for the 
first project in a two-project pipeline with 𝛼 = 0  are on average 3.58% lower 
(p<2.2*10
-16
) than when only a single project is announced. An increase in 𝛼 does 
not significantly modify this, which is slightly different in the three-player 
scenarios. While the mark-up drop is only 0.26% (p=0.0786) without spillovers, 
the drop becomes 0.53% when 𝛼 = 0.1 (p=0.0005) and to 2.39% when 50% of the 
investment outcomes are transferable (p<2.2*10
-16
).  
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It is rather intuitive that the investment in early tenders would increase, but what 
happens if we look at the average investment and mark-up choices along the 
pipeline? In this exploratory experiment, the average investment in equilibrium of 
the first and the second project are compared to the respective single-project 
investment. In the two-player case, the average pipeline investment is found to be 
larger in a situation without spillovers (p=0.0387), but from a spillover rate of 30% 
onwards, the average investment is 0.11% lower than a situation in which neither 
spillovers nor a pipeline are present (p=0.0128). So the bidder mostly counts on his 
knowledge from the first project to study the second tender. In the three-player 
setting, this negative impact is already significant for spillover rates of 10% 
(p=0.0129).  
Finally, it is necessary to verify how the dynamics are interrelated with other 
parameters. Nevertheless, the sign of the main effects of the spillover rate are not 
significantly influenced by the other parameters. However, some effects on the 
slope of the trend are noteworthy. In the two-player setting, we stated that overall, 
mark-ups do not considerably change in case of a spillover effect. Nonetheless, 
mark-ups do decrease in 𝛼 for the scenarios with a low government reimbursement 
fraction (𝑑 = 0 or 𝑑 = 0.3). And since reimbursements are not necessary in a two-
player context, one might claim that the spillover effect will inflate investments 
and reduce mark-ups for the first project of a two-project pipeline. For the three-
player case, the results pointed towards these overall decreasing mark-ups if the 
spillover rate surges. A more detailed look reveals that this is mostly attributed to 
the scenarios without government reimbursement. The findings related to the 
investments are robust for changes in the reimbursement level, ceteris paribus. For 
both the two-player as well as the three-player scenarios, the spillover impact is 
not interacting with the contingency parameters 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛾𝑒.  
From this model extension, it is clear that the spillover rate significantly influences 
the bidding behavior of all players. Its impact is rather equivalent for any level of 
experience. As a consequence, experiential inequalities will not be levelled by the 
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spillover rate. So, the three-player tenders might still benefit from investment cost 
reimbursements by the government. Evidently, the spillover does have important 
benefits: it will incentivize bidders to invest more in the early stages of the project 
pipeline and contractors can use past experience in future tenders, which might be 
more easily sellable to the management and the board when project opportunities 
are discussed. Therefore, the government should take part in developing efforts to 
increase the transferability of efforts, for instance by the standardization of 
contracts.  
Admittedly, the shortcomings of the simulation methodology also need to be taken 
into account here. On the other hand, it is a daunting task to fully implement the 
spillover rate in the sequential structure of Chapter 6 that elaborates on the Markov 
perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential stochastic bidding game. In that 
approach, the equilibrium strategy consists of state-dependent optimal actions that 
are only limitedly influenced by actions from the past. The spillover rate would 
incur that the (outcomes of the) actions are dependent on the actions that have been 
taken before, which would lead to a proliferation of states.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter was the first attempt to extend the PPP bidding model towards a 
dynamic setting with a sequence of stochastically equivalent projects. More 
particularly, it assessed how contractors change their ex ante bidding strategy in 
the case a pipeline of projects is introduced. The tendering processes are time-
consuming and often overlapping, so contractors will make an initial budget how 
to spread their bidding efforts over the different stages of the game, in the belief 
that experience of winning a project will benefit the competitive position in later 
tenders. The introduction of extra projects mainly has a mark-up impact and 
consequently reduces the expected government procurement cost. Consequently, 
from a government perspective and besides from cementing the project agenda, it 
might also be beneficial to split up large projects into smaller parts as long as there 
are no coordination issues. It is apparent that adding one project to the project 
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renders the largest mark-up drop. Consequently, cementing a trustworthy, short-
term pipeline is beneficial. 
The model could not support the hypothesis that all contractors will put more effort 
in the bid preparation. Looking at the heterogeneous bidding settings, the players 
with a competitive advantage are incentivized towards additional investments 
efforts. Instead, contractors take the expected profits of an experiential gain into 
account for the ex ante strategy determination and therefore directly increase the 
probability of winning by decreasing the mark-up for initial projects. Especially in 
three- and four-player markets, appropriate incentives are necessary to assure 
competitive forces. In this way, they prevent the market to become saturated or the 
mature players to become too comfortable with their competitive advantage. 
Therefore, governments should first try to reduce bidding costs that add no value, 
like excessive design requirements or lengthy negotiation processes. Additionally, 
the spillover study proves that investment efforts in early projects grow in the case 
the knowledge and project cost savings from the investment efforts propagate in 
future tenders. In case governments want to benefit from this insight, they should 
strive for standardization of the tendering procedures and documents. 
Contractors should also ensure that the investment efforts they undertake are easily 
transferable to future tenders. This strengthens the competitive position and 
mitigates the risk for the current project, but also allows to take a lead in future 
tenders. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to take the future pipeline into account when 
one wants to enter a PPP market. Fiercer competition is required, but risks are 
more spread out over different projects. 
The ex ante model of this chapter is an extreme case that does not allow to modify 
strategies when new information becomes available. Chapter 6 points in the 
(extreme) opposite direction in which contractors choose optimal actions with 
respect to the state of the game. 
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Chapter 6 Sequential procurement model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter relates to the public-private partnership pipeline of Chapter 5. In order 
to ensure competition, policy makers are endowed to seek for feasible ways to 
substantiate the PPP market’s attractiveness. A project pipeline could bring solace. 
In Section 5.1, a PPP project pipeline has been defined as: 
 A PPP project pipeline is a sequence of similar projects that the government 
ensures to tender in the near future. It may concern totally independent projects or 
sub-projects that serve a larger purpose. 
Past PPP experiences have led to concise lists of success factors and key 
performance indicators (e.g., Jefferies 2006, Yuan et al. 2012
b
). Nevertheless, the 
majority of the studies are limited to attaining single-project success without 
looking at the broader PPP picture. However, empirical results also underline long-
term and country-specific factors like the country’s government reputation, legal 
framework and economic stability (e.g., Aziz 2007
b
, Chan et al. 2010
a
, Yuan et al. 
2012
b
) or the importance of PPP units in promoting PPPs (Tserng et al. 2012). 
While the previous chapter aimed for developing an ex ante strategy for a set of 
projects with overlapping procurement stages, this chapter considers a fully 
sequential model. The sequential setting allows for changing the strategy along the 
pipeline, which means that tenders are strictly sequential and at each point in time 
(i.e., at each stage in the game), there is perfect information on who has won or 
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lost the previous tenders. The sequential model thus introduces the concept of a 
state of the game that consists of a particular experience vector together with the 
number of projects that remain in the sequence. Equivalent to the philosophy from 
the ex ante model, winning a contract increases the experience in future tenders 
both from a knowledge perspective as well as from an efficiency or cost 
perspective.  
The subsequent sections analytically characterize the structure of the stochastic 
game and employ an experimental setting to approximate the Markov perfect 
equilibrium for different project cost features and a varying number of projects in 
the pipeline. The method of Section 6.3.4 applies a best response heuristic for 
which an algorithmic approximation that is based on both an electromagnetism-
like mechanism as well as a local search procedure detects the best response. This 
approach guarantees to look at the entire, continuous action search space in order 
to identify candidate equilibria.  
The contribution of this chapter adds to the discussion of the possible usefulness of 
a project pipeline that commenced with the ex ante model of Chapter 5. In reality, 
PPP tendering procedures are neither always overlapping, nor is it always possible 
to modify your strategy for each project. Nonetheless, the combination of the 
results of both extreme situations guide towards trustworthy conclusions for the 
field. From a methodological perspective, this chapter follows an entirely different 
approach. Instead of approximating a contractor’s best equilibrium response, this 
chapter draws back to a Nash equilibrium approach, conceptually comparable to 
the Nash equilibrium algorithm of Section 4.3.3.1. In this vein, this chapter allows 
to create an overall view on the equilibrium instead of focusing on a single player. 
An important result in Section 6.4.4 serves as an example of the contribution of 
this particular approach. Besides, the method that is presented does not require a 
discretization of strategies, but allows for a continuous spectrum of investment and 
mark-up percentages. And last but not least, while a multi-agent simulation 
approach derives the expected pay-offs in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the 
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contractors’ pay-offs are exactly computed for presumed distributions in this 
chapter.  
In a managerial vein, the sequential model confirms the idea that a pipeline could 
reduce the average project procurement cost due to increased pricing competition. 
However, the model outcome differs from the practitioner’s perception in the sense 
that it only delivers support for increased investment efforts by consortia that have 
obtained a competitive advantage. Ultimately, the chapter suggests that 
governments could benefit from a combination of bid cost reimbursements that 
levy the investment barrier and a pipeline that reduces the project cost and that 
partially offsets the additional reimbursement expenditures. 
6.2 Literature review 
Albeit analytically-driven, the sequential auction literature is perhaps the most 
closely related to the study of the PPP pipeline. The literature review of Section 
5.2 gives an overview of the dimensions on which the sequential or multi-unit 
auction literature can be positioned. The PPP model of this dissertation adds an 
important feature into the discussion: the pre-tender investment decision. Besides a 
mark-up, contractors in a PPP tender make a decision on the pre-tender research 
efforts, but to the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous studies on 
the impact of a sequential mechanism on the willingness for information 
acquisition. The work of for instance Persico (2000), Bergemann and Välimäki 
(2002) and Shi (2012) considers a single-shot game in which the bidders can gain 
information on the value of the auctioned object, but they do not extrapolate to a 
multi-unit environment. 
With respect to the sequential bidding literature, this chapter is closely related to 
the contribution of Takano et al. (2014) who study the competitive bidding strategy 
in a sequential setting with inaccurate cost estimates. Building upon earlier 
research from Naert and Weverberg (1978) and King and Mercer (1990), the 
authors explicitly account for the fact that bids are usually correlated with the 
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estimated cost that is subject to inaccuracies. Takano et al. (2014) apply a scenario-
based approach for the cost estimates and a capacity constraint. Our work differs 
from and extends this study in several aspects. First of all, in addition to the mark-
up choice, a bidder makes an investment decision that reduces the uncertainty and 
the expected cost. Secondly, Takano et al. (2014) simulate costs and bids for the 
competitors, while we look at action equilibria by simultaneously optimizing each 
bidders’ pay-off. Thirdly, our model does not include capacity constraints or a 
value at risk constraint and deals with a constant number of heterogeneous 
contractors. 
Since the most prominent literature on sequential auctions has been discussed in 
the previous chapter, the remainder of this section considers the related literature 
from a methodological perspective. The methodological approach is based on a 
dynamic programming model for which Markov equilibria are approximated based 
on a best response heuristic. The Markov perfect equilibrium concept, drawn from 
the study of Maskin and Tirole (2001), is a solution concept that solves the 
stochastic game with a finite number of stages and in which the pay-off and 
probabilistic transitions depend on the current state and the chosen actions 
(Shapley 1953). The solution concept is not uncommon within the auction 
literature. In a sequential auction setting with randomly arriving bidders, Said 
(2011) derives Markov equilibria to discuss bid shading (i.e., placing a bid below 
the estimated value) as a consequence of an option value of participation in future 
auctions. Within a procurement setting, Katehakis and Puranam (2012) study the 
cost minimization objective of a buyer who wants to procure a fixed number of 
products and Yildirim (2004) considers the optimal mechanism for piecewise 
procurement of large-scale projects. While these studies (and our work) do not 
account for capacity constraints, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) include 
capacity limitations when defining the states of the game and they use empirical 
highway procurement bidding data to develop an estimation method for a repeated 
auction. Whereas most models allow for a different number of bidders in each 
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stage, the PPP model assumes repeated competition among a consistent set of 
bidders (like in Milgrom and Weber (1982
a
) and Harstad (2010)) and includes the 
current levels of the bidders’ past experience and the number of projects remaining 
in the state variable. Hence, the PPP model allows for heterogeneity among the 
bidders. Moreover, in contrast to models that study infinite time frames (e.g., Oren 
and Rothkopf 1975, Hörner and Jamison 2008, Zeithammer 2007) the PPP pipeline 
has a finite nature which is a logical consequence of the magnitude of the projects 
and the limited budget horizon of governments. 
The experimental setup relies on a heuristic approach to derive the equilibrium. 
Algorithmic game theory attempts to deal with the complexity of real-life models 
(Nisan et al. 2007). Algorithms that use best response reasoning have been 
successfully implemented for instance in empirical games, routing games or 
dynamic oligopoly models and often limit the search space and the number of 
computationally expensive pay-off calculations (e.g., Sureka and Wurman 2005, 
Vorobeychik and Wellman 2008, Farias et al. 2012). Nevertheless, a best response 
heuristic does not always converge and, to the best of our knowledge, formal 
proofs of convergence are limited to super-modular games with unique Nash 
equilibria (Milgrom and Roberts 1990) and congestion games (Monderer and 
Shapley 1996). The experimental results in this paper focus on the scenarios for 
which convergence has occurred, which was the case in the majority of scenarios. 
6.3 Methodology 
This chapter extends the single-project model of Chapter 4 towards a setting with 
𝑍  consecutive projects. Nevertheless, there is an important difference with the 
multi-project setting of Chapter 5 in which an ex ante strategy has been defined. 
This chapter assumes that all projects are strictly sequential and that at each point 
in time (or at each stage of the game), the contractors exactly know their 
competitive position. Since, the methodological approach is considerably different 
in this chapter, some new notation, drawn from the sequential auction literature, is 
introduced in the subsequent sections in order to avoid confusion. 
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6.3.1 Competitive bidding procedure 
The structure of the competitive bidding procedure is essentially the same as 
before. In a particular stage 𝑧 of the game, contractors that are invited for the 
tender will first determine how much effort they are willing to put into the bid 
preparation. This investment may result in a reduction of the cost uncertainty as 
well as in a cost advantage. Moreover, the heterogeneity among contractors leads 
to more advantageous cost probability distribution functions for more experienced 
players, which means a smaller variance and a lower average expected cost. After 
the investment decision, each contractor 𝑝  estimates the project cost that is 
inherently subject to estimation errors. Moreover, the mark-up is determined and 
applied to the estimated cost, resulting in the bid for project 𝑧. The lowest bidding 
contractor is granted the project. Afterwards, the tendering procedure for stage 
𝑧 + 1  is initiated. The sequential model adds an additional feature: winning a 
project in the sequence results in additional experience for all subsequent projects. 
6.3.2 A sequential bidding model 
Given is a commonly known project sequence 𝒵 ≔ {1,2,… , 𝑍} . We want to 
identify the strategy equilibrium of the subgame 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) that defines 
the initial experience setting of the players of the game. The experience levels are 
defined on the experience-scale [0,10] with a user-defined number of experience 
intervals 𝑒𝑢. This setting is a stochastic game, as has been introduced by Shapley 
(1953). A stochastic game is a finite or infinite dynamic game that is played by one 
or more players with probabilistic transitions between a finite number of states. In 
this setting, the players are assumed to be long-lived and to have unlimited 
capacity to perform all the projects of the pipeline. In each stage of the sequential 
game, the contractors want to optimize their expected pay-off which consists of the 
instantaneous pay-off of the current stage and an expected continuation value of 
the pay-offs in future stages. In order to limit the number of strategies that needs to 
be considered, we are looking at Markov strategies and identify a Markov perfect 
equilibrium (MPE) as presented by Maskin and Tirole (2001). The MPE is a 
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refinement approach in game theoretic settings and is a special version of the 
notion of subgame perfectness. The use of the MPE is justified as the current play 
is only influenced by the expected pay-offs of future projects on the one hand and 
the state variable on the other hand. In other terms, the current actions are only 
limitedly influenced by actions from earlier tenders, namely only by the fact 
whether you won or lost the previous tender(s). But before moving to the 
equilibrium determination of Section 6.3.4, this section explains the generic 
structure of the different elements of the total expected pay-off, while Section 6.3.3 
elaborates on the specific implementation for the dissertation’s PPP setting. 
The concepts stage, state and action are essential to guarantee a fluent 
understanding. Figure 6.1 gives an example of an (optimal) sequential strategy and 
serves as a guidance to worm your way through the notation. The figure’s notation 
uses an asterisk with the actions to indicate that the reported strategy is optimal in 
this example. A stage, introduced in the previous chapter, refers to which project 
of the sequence is tendered. For a given stage 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵  from the sequence, we 
determine the current state 𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧 as the combination of the current experience 
levels and the number of remaining projects in the sequence 𝑍 − 𝑧  or 𝜃𝑧 =
(𝑒, 𝑍 − 𝑧) = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃 , 𝑍 − 𝑧). The history ℎ𝑧  at stage 𝑧, that consists of the 
information on what has happened earlier in the stochastic game, is summarized 
into this state variable 𝜃𝑧 and Θ𝑧 is the set of all possible states that could occur in 
stage 𝑧. Consequently, we assume that past investment and mark-up decisions, the 
so-called past actions, solely impact the current behavior by having won or lost the 
past tender. For a given state 𝜃𝑧, a set of actions 𝒜𝑝
𝑧 = 𝒜𝑝
𝑧(𝜃𝑧) is available for 
each player. We assume that the set of available actions is the same in every state 
of the game, so that we can refer to the set of actions as 𝒜𝑝. An action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧 ∈ 𝒜𝑝 in 
a given state 𝜃𝑧 is composed of two elements: the amount of pre-tender investment 
𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) a player 𝑝 is willing to adopt and which is expressed as a percentage of 
an initial cost base equal to 1 and the mark-up 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) defined as a percentage 
that is applied to the estimated project cost. The vector 𝑎𝑧 = (𝑎1
𝑧, … , 𝑎𝑃
𝑧) 
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represents the action profile or the combination of actions (i.e., the investment and 
mark-up percentages) for all 𝑃 players. If we define the set of players as 𝒫 and the 
set of action profiles as 𝒜 =×𝑝∈𝒫 𝒜𝑝 , then we determine the transition 
probabilities 𝒬  from 𝒜 × Θz  to Θz+1  so that 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧, 𝜃𝑧)  represents the 
probability of arriving in state 𝜃𝑧+1 from the current state 𝜃𝑧 with an action profile 
𝑎𝑧. For each stage 𝑧, the vector 𝜋𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) of dimension ℝ𝑃 represents the total 
expected pay-off for each of the players, with 𝜃𝑧 the given state vector in this node 
of the stochastic game and 𝑎𝑧 the decision variables or the action profile of the 
players. Each player-specific element 𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) of this vector is the sum of an 
instantaneous pay-off 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) and the player’s expected value 𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) for 
the future stages {𝑧 + 1,… , 𝑍}  discounted with a factor 𝛿  (0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1) . This 
continuation value depends on the actions that are taken at the current state, 
because these actions will determine the probability of arriving in each of the states 
in stage 𝑧 + 1. These probabilities are represented by the transition matrix 𝒬 that 
represents, for a given action profile 𝑎𝑧 and a given state 𝜃𝑧, the probabilities of 
arriving in all states 𝜃𝑧+1. In summary, the player-specific total expected pay-off 
function that player 𝑝 wants to optimize at stage 𝑧 equals:  
𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) + 𝛿𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧)     (6.1) 
with 
𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = ∑ 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧, 𝜃𝑧)𝜋𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧+1|𝜃𝑧+1) 𝜃𝑧+1∈Θ𝑧+1   (6.2) 
and for each 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵 and 𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧 . Furthermore, we assume that the continuation 
value of the final project of the pipeline is zero, or 𝒱𝑝
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍) = 0 for all 𝑝. 
Hence, the total expected pay-off is a linear combination of instantaneous pay-offs. 
Before moving on to the characterization of the equilibrium, the instantaneous pay-
off for the PPP model needs to be determined.  
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A strategy maps the actions for all the possible states of the game. Hence, the 
combination of investment and mark-up outcomes in Figure 6.1 represent an 
example of an equilibrium strategy profile, while the particular pattern for a single 
player represents the optimal strategy in equilibrium.  
 
 
The figure represents a three-project pipeline. Given is also that the experience 
scale is divided into 𝑒𝑢 = 5 intervals. In the case of an experience scale [0,10], the 
six experience levels are {0,2,4,6,8,10}. The initial experience levels of the two 
players are 0 and 2 and there are two projects remaining, so the state is defined as 
(0,2,2). There are two possible outcomes for the first project: player 1 wins and he 
moves to experience level 2 or player 2 wins and obtains experience level 4. 
Therefore, the second stage of the pipeline has two states (2,2,1) and (0,4,1). 
Looking at the equilibrium, player 1 invests 0.6% and requests a mark-up of 18.8% 
for the first project. If player 1 wins, which happens with a probability of 43% in 
equilibrium, he or she invests 1.3% and requests a mark-up of 17.5% in the second 
stage. Alternatively, if player 2 wins the first stage, player 1 invests 0.6% with a 
mark-up of 19.9% in the second stage. 
Figure 6.1 Example of the sequential strategy for two players and three projects 
with 𝑒𝑢 = 5 and the parameters according to Sc. 1 
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6.3.3 Expected pay-off calculation in the PPP model 
While the assumptions of the previous studies remain valid, we prefer to repeat the 
main elements for the convenience of easily implementing the notational 
modifications. First of all, it is assumed that the state of the game, which consists 
of the experience levels and the remaining projects in the pipeline, is common 
knowledge to all players. Moreover, the general risk structure of the projects is the 
same for all the projects in the pipeline. That means that, without considering 
experience and pre-tender investment, the ex ante cost probability distribution and 
its parameters do not change.  
The experience and the current investment level may change the shape of the cost 
probability distribution. The model does not consider spillovers effects (in the 
sense of Section 5.5), so that the project-specific investments only directly affect 
the current stage and do not contribute to the knowledge base of future stages. 
With respect to the user-defined experience scale [0,10], 𝑒𝑢  could refer to the 
number of projects won beyond which no extra experience can be adopted. 
Nevertheless, this does not need to be true, as experience may also entail other 
qualitative aspects like the consortium’s reputation or the familiarity with a 
particular market or a specific project type. As before, the impact of experience 
and investment is implemented with diminishing scale effects and moreover, 
Gaussian distributions are assumed. Consequently
2
, the contractor-specific project 
cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)  is of the form 
𝑁 (1 + 𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧), 𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)). We assume that 𝑔𝑝(. ) represents the fraction of 
the cost that is accountable for the lack of experience or investment and apply 
equation (3.6) as: 
                                                     
2
 Note that this is somewhat different from the implementation in Section 4.3.2 and Section 
5.3.4 as at the time of studying this problem, we decided not to start from a common cost 
base distribution from which a cost base was randomly selected, but immediately relate the 
contractor-specific cost probability distribution to the investment efforts and the 
experience. Moreover, in line with the literature dealing with MPE in sequential auctions, 
we set the scaling factor 𝜇 equal to 1.  
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𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧| 𝜃𝑧) =  𝛽𝑖𝑒
−𝜇𝑖(100𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 |𝜃𝑧)) + 𝛽𝑒𝑒
−𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑝(𝜃
𝑧)    (6.3) 
Moreover, the variance of the distribution is dependent on the experience level and 
the investment. The total variance of the cost probability density is composed of an 
uncontrollable part that is equivalent for all players, a part attributed to the (lack 
of) experience and a fraction related to the (lack of) investment. In this chapter’s 
notation, we get: 
 𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = 𝜎2 + (𝛾𝑖𝑒
−𝜆𝑖(100𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 |𝜃𝑧)))
2
+ (𝛾𝑒𝑒
−𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑝(𝜃
𝑧))
2
  (6.4) 
(1 + 𝑔𝑝(. )) is the actual cost if player 𝑝 wins the bid. However, the player does 
not know this yet at the time of bidding. Instead, he receives a signal which is a 
cost generated from 𝑐𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧).  In order to account for the inaccuracy of this 
signal, the bidder sets a mark-up 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) that represents the risk premium and 
the profit margin. 
As an example, assume that 𝑒𝑢 = 2 , 𝜎 = 0.05 , 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑒 = 0.1 , 𝜆𝑒 =
𝜇𝑒 = 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 = 0.25, then a player without experience, the first level on the scale, 
and a 1% investment choice has a cost probability distributed as 
𝑁(1.17788,0.01856) and for a player with experience level 5, the second level on 
the scale, and a 2% investment choice, we get 𝑁(1.08930,0.00699).  
When a contractor 𝑝 estimates the project cost 𝐸𝑝
?̃? , which is generated from the 
cost probability density 𝑐𝑝
𝑧(. ), he applies a mark-up to the expected cost to arrive 
at the bid (1 +𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧))𝐸𝑝
?̃? . Consequently, the bid probability distribution 
given a player’s action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧 and a state 𝜃𝑧 equals 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) and is characterized by 
the normal distribution: 
𝑁((1 +𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) (1 + 𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) , (1 + 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧))
2
𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧))   (6.5) 
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with the associated cumulative bid probability distribution 𝐵𝑝
𝑧 . If the lowest 
bidding contractor is granted the project, the probability of winning contract 𝑧 with 
𝑃  players is, apart from notational adjustments, equivalent to equation (3.2): 
𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) =  ∫ 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝)
+∞
−∞
[∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑘))𝑘∈𝒫\{𝑝} ]𝑑𝑥𝑝.  These probabilities also 
refer to the transition probabilities 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧, 𝜃𝑧)  to move from a state 𝜃𝑧  to 
𝜃𝑧+1. The contractor that wins the project receives the proposed bid and pays the 
actual cost (1 + 𝑔𝑝(. ))  of the project together with the monetary investment 
effort. Additionally, this player obtains an updated experience level in all future 
stages of the game, until he reaches maximum experience. The pay-off of the other 
contractors is determined by the lost investment, but we account again for the fact 
that the government might reimburse losing bidders for the investment efforts with 
a fraction 𝑑 . Consequently, the instantaneous expected pay-off (equivalent to 
equation (3.3)) for a player 𝑝 in an action profile 𝑎𝑧 and state 𝜃𝑧 is given by:  
𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) (𝐸[𝐵𝑝
?̃?|𝑝 has won] − (1 + 𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) −
𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) − (1 − 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) (1 − 𝑑)𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)    (6.6) 
with the ex post expected proposal conditional on winning 𝐸[𝐵𝑝
?̃?|𝑝 has won] equal 
to: 𝐸[𝐵𝑝
?̃?|𝐵𝑝
?̃? < 𝐵𝑘
?̃? , ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑝] = ∫
𝑥𝑝
𝑞𝑝
𝑧 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝)∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑝))𝑘∈𝒫\{𝑝}
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑥𝑝.  In 
order to arrive at the total expected pay-off for this state, the discounted player’s 
instantaneous pay-offs of the future stages need to be added to the expected 
instantaneous pay-off. 
6.3.4 Equilibrium identification 
In order to find the Markov perfect equilibrium, one needs to identify the 
equilibrium action profile (i.e., each player’s equilibrium investment and mark-up 
percentage) in each state. In every state, all players simultaneously optimize the 
total expected pay-off function (equation  (6.1)). A player’s pay-off is 
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dependent on the actions taken by the opponents, so we need to propose the 
conditions for the action equilibrium. The equilibrium for this stochastic game is 
derived by backward induction. Consequently, in each state, it is assumed that the 
players bid according to the equilibrium in subsequent stages. In the stochastic 
game with 𝑍 projects, the first order conditions for optimality in the last project 
(i.e., project 𝑍) are defined as: 
∀𝑝 ∈ 𝒫, ∀𝜃𝑍 ∈ Θ𝑍: 
{
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝜌𝑝
𝑍(𝑎𝑍∗|𝜃𝑍)
𝜕𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑍∗|𝜃𝑍)
= 0
𝜕𝜌𝑝
𝑍(𝑎𝑍∗ |𝜃𝑍)
𝜕𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑍∗|𝜃𝑍)
= 0
      (6.7) 
With this information on the action equilibrium in stage 𝑍, the action equilibrium 
of stage 𝑧 = 𝑍 − 1 can be derived and as soon as 𝑧 = 0, a strategy equilibrium for 
the sequential game has been derived. The first order conditions in all states 𝜃𝑧 
with 𝑧 ∈ {1,… , 𝑍 − 1} are: 
∀𝑝 ∈ 𝒫, ∀𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧, 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵\{𝑍}: 
{
𝜕𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧∗|𝜃𝑧)
𝜕𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗|𝜃𝑍)
+ δ∑
𝜕𝑞𝑘
𝑧(𝑎𝑧∗|𝜃𝑧)
𝜕𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗|𝜃𝑍)
𝜋𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧+1∗|𝜃𝑧+1, 𝑘 wins)𝑃𝑘=1 = 0
𝜕𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧∗ |𝜃𝑧)
𝜕𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗|𝜃𝑍)
+ δ∑
𝜕𝑞𝑘
𝑧(𝑎𝑧∗|𝜃𝑧)
𝜕𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗|𝜃𝑍)
𝜋𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧+1∗|𝜃𝑧+1, 𝑘 wins)𝑃𝑘=1 = 0
  
         (6.8) 
Since the derivative may not account for the border points of the investment and 
mark-up interval, one could also rely on the general definition for a Nash 
equilibrium in each state which states that none of the bidders has an incentive to 
deviate from his current action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗, given the action profile 𝑎−𝑝
𝑧∗ , which is defined 
as the action profile of the opponents of player 𝑝:  
∀𝑝 ∈ 𝒫, ∀𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧, ∀𝑧 ∈ 𝒵, ∀𝑎𝑝
𝑧 ∈ 𝒜𝑝: 
𝜋𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧∗|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝
𝑧∗ ) ≥  𝜋𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝
𝑧∗ )     (6.9) 
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Finding this equilibrium is a hard problem and a heuristic approach is developed. 
The equilibrium of the dynamic programming problem is first determined for the 
states that are related to the final project in the pipeline. This is appropriate since 
the current play is only influenced by the current state and not by other actions 
from an earlier stage. Based on a backward induction reasoning, the equilibria for 
each stage 𝑧 are determined, assuming equilibrium play in the stages {𝑧 + 1,… , 𝑍}. 
So for a state variable 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃 , 𝑍 − 𝑧)  that is composed of the 
experience levels of all players and the number of remaining projects in the 
pipeline, we want to derive an equilibrium action profile 𝑎∗ = (𝑖1, 𝑚1, … , 𝑖𝑃 , 𝑚𝑃)3, 
which is a vector with dimension ℝ2𝑃. If no confusion is possible, subscripts and 
superscripts related to the state variable are omitted so as to avoid notational 
complexity.  
In order to determine the equilibrium, a straightforward best response heuristic is 
applied. In each iteration of the heuristic, the algorithm approaches the best 
response for each player sequentially, given the actions of the opponents. Once 
none of the bidders can improve their response given the opponents’ actions, there 
is evidence that one might have arrived in an equilibrium. Academic literature only 
offers theoretical proofs for a limited number of circumstances for which the best 
response algorithm converges (Vorobeychik and Wellman 2008, Brun et al. 2013). 
Also in the context of the PPP procurement setting, we did not succeed in 
theoretically guaranteeing the convergence of the heuristic, while the 
computational results indicate convergence for the majority of the investigated 
cases.  
Due to the complex structure of the pay-off function and the infinite set of possible 
actions, the identification of the best response is challenging and time consuming. 
Therefore, the heuristic uses a combination of an electromagnetism-like algorithm 
and a local search procedure. It is important to note that there is no guarantee that a 
                                                     
3
 In order to avoid notational difficulties, we opted to simplify the notation for this 
methodological section. 
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pure strategy equilibrium exists in the case of an infinite number of actions. The 
algorithm looks into unique equilibria, but of course multiple equilibria might exist 
and the convergence towards a particular equilibrium is path-dependent. Therefore, 
the algorithm is executed for a predefined number of starting points. This repetitive 
structure accounts for the possibility of arriving in alternative equilibria. The 
pseudo-code for the algorithms can be found in Appendix B. 
6.3.4.1 Best response determination 
Optimizing the pay-off function like in Figure 6.2 for a given set of actions for the 
opponents (indicated as 𝑎−𝑝) is a computationally intensive task because of the 
structure of the non-linear pay-off response function. There are two decision 
variables for each player 𝑝 that, together, represent the action 𝑎𝑝: the investment 
percentage 𝑖𝑝 and the mark-up percentage 𝑚𝑝. The best response optimizes: 
 argmax𝑎𝑝 𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝 ) = 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝) + 𝛿𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝)     (6.10)  
In order to efficiently determine the global optimum, this paper uses an 
electromagnetism-like mechanism for global optimization as has been proposed by 
Birbil and Fang (2003) and whose notation and procedure is utilized here. The 
attraction-repulsion mechanism of the heuristic succeeds in efficiently browsing 
through the entire search space and overcomes the danger of arriving in a local 
minimum, which could be the case when adopting the steepest ascent heuristic. 
The derivation of the best response is a two-step process. Given the action profile 
of the opponents 𝑎−𝑝 , a set 𝒯  of 𝑇  solutions is initialized. A solution 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯  is 
represented as 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥1
𝑡 , 𝑥2
𝑡), with 𝑥1
𝑡 ∈ [𝑙1, 𝑢1] the coordinate that refers to the 
investment level and 𝑥2
𝑡 ∈ [𝑙2, 𝑢2] the coordinate that refers to the mark-up level. 
𝑙1 and 𝑙2  represent the lower bounds and 𝑢1  and 𝑢2  the upper bounds. For each 
initial point, the expected pay-off for player 𝑝, for whom the best response is 
derived, equals 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) = 𝜋𝑝(𝑥
𝑡|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝). The best solution is stored as 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
best).  
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Electromagnetism step 
A charge for each point 𝑖 is calculated and represents point 𝑖’s power of attraction 
or repulsion:  
𝑞𝑡 = exp(−2 ∗
(𝑓𝑝(𝑥
best)−𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡))
∑ (𝑓𝑝(𝑥best)−𝑓𝑝(𝑥𝑘))
𝑇
𝑘=1
)     (6.11) 
In the next step, the total forces on each point are computed based on the 
superposition principle of electromagnetism theory. For the pairwise force 
calculations, the point that has a higher expected pay-off attracts the other point, 
while the point with a worse pay-off repels the other point. The forces and moves 
are calculated for all but the currently best found point, in order to keep the 
information of the current best point. Furthermore, let 𝐹𝑛
𝑡𝑢  represent the force 
exerted by point 𝑢  on point 𝑡  for coordinate 𝑛 , with 𝑛 = 1  for the investment 
direction and 𝑛 = 2 for the mark-up direction. Finally, 𝐹𝑛
𝑡 refers to the total force 
exerted by the other points for coordinate 𝑛 . As a result, one obtains 𝐹𝑡 =
{𝐹1
𝑡, 𝐹2
𝑡} = {∑ 𝐹1
𝑡𝑢, ∑ 𝐹2
𝑡𝑢}𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}  and the force is represented as:  
𝐹𝑡 = ∑
(−1)𝑤
𝑡𝑢
(𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢
‖𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡‖2𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}
     (6.12) 
Figure 6.2 Example of the response function 
𝜋1
1(𝑎1|𝜃
1 = (1,1,2,0), 𝑎−1 = (1%, 20%, 1%, 20%)) 
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with 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 0  if 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) < 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑢)  and 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 1  if 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) ≥ 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑢) . In order to 
move the points, the force vector 𝐹𝑡  is normalized into ?̿?𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡/‖𝐹𝑡‖  and a 
random step length 𝜂 is selected from 𝑈(0,1) so that there is a non-zero probability 
to move to the unvisited regions along the direction of 𝐹𝑡. The normalization of 
the force vector ensures that the new solution is located in the feasible region. In 
conclusion, all but the previously found best point are moved so that for each 
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{best} and 𝑛 ∈ {1,2}, the respective coordinate becomes: 
𝑥𝑛
′𝑡 = {
𝑥𝑛
𝑡 + 𝜂?̿?𝑛
𝑡(𝑢𝑛 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 )   if ?̿?𝑛
𝑡 > 0
𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝜂?̿?𝑛
𝑡(𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛)    if ?̿?𝑛
𝑡 ≤ 0
    (6.13) 
The procedure is iterated a predefined number of times with the newly found 
coordinates and subsequently, the local search algorithm is executed. 
Example 
Consider a two-player situation for which we want to determine the best response 
for 𝑝 = 1 and given the action (1,20) for player 2 which refers to a 1% investment 
percentage and a 20% mark-up percentage. Table 6.1 reports the algorithm values 
for 𝑇 = 4. The pay-off of player 1 for each point 𝑡 is given by 𝑓1(𝑥
𝑡), so that the 
best pay-off is obtained in point 1. The sum of all the differences between the 
points’ pay-off values and the best pay-off is 0.035589 and the charge for point 
𝑡 = 2 is found as exp (−2 ∗
0.046640−0.040448
0.035589
). The distance between point 2 and 3 
is 4.4778 and the force that point 3 exerts on point 2 equals 𝐹1
23 = (1.7 − 3.5) ∗
0.7484∗0.7061
4.4778
= −0.2125 for the investment coordinate and 𝐹2
23 = (16.1 − 20.2) ∗
0.7484∗0.7061
4.4778
= −0.4839  for the mark-up coordinate. The forces on point 2’s 
investment coordinate from the points 1 and 4 are -0.1022 and 0.0419 respectively, 
so that the total force 𝐹1
2 = −0.2728. After normalizing and generating 𝜂=0.4 as 
the random variable and defining (𝑙1, 𝑙2) = (0,0) and (𝑢1, 𝑢2) = (5,30), the new 
investment coordinate for 𝑡 = 2  equals 3.5 + 0.4 ∗ (−0.5725) ∗ 3.5 = 2.6985 . 
6.3. Methodology 
 
 
150 
The electromagnetism procedure is iterated with the previously best found point 
(𝑡 = 1) and with the three newly found points. 
𝑡 𝑥1
𝑡 𝑥2
𝑡  𝑓1(𝑥
𝑡) 𝑞𝑡 𝐹1
𝑡 𝐹2
𝑡 ?̿?1
𝑡 ?̿?2
𝑡 𝑥1
′𝑡 𝑥2
′𝑡 𝑓1(𝑥
′𝑡) 
1 2.3 28.4 0.0466 1 - - - - - - - 
2 3.5 20.2 0.0404 0.7061 -0.2728 0.3906 -0.5725 0.8198 2.70 23.41 0.0466 
3 1.7 16.1 0.0414 0.7484 -0.1551 0.4541 -0.3232 0.9463 1.48 21.36 0.0494 
4 1.0 9.7 0.0223 0.2560 0.0804 0.6218 0.1283 0.9917 1.21 17.75 0.0455 
Table 6.1 Illustration of the electromagnetism heuristic 
Local search step 
The points that result from the electromagnetism step are the input for a local 
search procedure around each of these points. In each iteration, the investment and 
mark-up coordinate are modified by applying a random transformation around the 
original point using a step length vector 𝜔 and a randomly generated point 𝜅 from 
a uniform distribution that determines the amount and direction of the perturbation. 
If the new point results in a higher pay-off, the coordinates are updated and the 
local search procedure continues from the newly found point. In the end, the best 
known solution is updated. 
Example 
Let us start from the initial point (1.48,21.37) while the action for the second 
player is (1,20). This results in a pay-off of 0.049456. Assume that the step length 
for the investment is 0.3 and 2 for the mark-up. For each coordinate, a random 
variable is generated from 𝑈(0,1): 𝜅 = 0.09 for the investment coordinate and 
𝜅 = 0.86 for the mark-up coordinate. In order to allow for positive and negative 
perturbations, we subtract 0.5 from the randomly generated number, so the new 
investment coordinate becomes 1.48 + (0.09 − 0.5) ∗ 0.3 = 1.36  and for the 
mark-up shift, the mark-up in the new point equals 21.37 + (0.86 − 0.5) ∗ 2 =
22.09. The point (1.36,22.09) leads to a pay-off of 0.0501 and consequently, the 
local search continues from this outperforming point. 
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6.3.4.2 Equilibrium selection 
For a starting point that is randomly selected from the entire action profile space, 
the best response heuristic is executed until the convergence criterion is satisfied. 
Convergence occurs as soon as no significant pay-off improvements have been 
registered in a pre-defined number of loops and as long as a minimum number of 
loops 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃  has been executed. Moreover, the algorithm stops when the 
number of loops reaches 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃. The convergence is path-dependent, so the 
algorithm is repeated for 𝑅  starting points. Afterwards, the 𝑅  resulting action 
profiles are clustered according to a distance criterion resulting in 𝐶  clusters. 
Points are sequentially assigned to the cluster for which the distance between the 
point and the average coordinates of the cluster is minimal and smaller than 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇.  Alternatively, a new cluster is formed. Within each cluster, the 
coordinate-by-coordinate average of all points belonging to the cluster are 
calculated together with the pay-off profile. Clusters with a number of points 
smaller than 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 are removed as these might have resulted from a local 
optimum.  
The second step in the equilibrium selection process compares the averages of the 
clusters and removes any clusters that are dominated by other clusters (i.e., a 
cluster that has higher expected pay-offs for all players). Subsequently, the clusters 
are ranked according to the sum of the average pay-offs of all players and the 
cluster with the highest total pay-off is moving to the refinement stage. The 
refinement stage executes the best response heuristic again to confirm whether the 
particular action profile is an equilibrium. If this is confirmed, the resulting 
reported equilibrium for the state is stored and is used to compute the equilibria in 
the stage 𝑧 − 1. The determination of the algorithm variables are the result of a 
preceding tuning study with the purpose to trade off computation times and the 
level of accuracy and to assess the speed of convergence. The final values are 
reported in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
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6.3.5 Experimental setting 
The computer experiments have been executed in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 
and Wolfram Mathematica 8.0 performs the pay-off calculations. As the risk 
profile of PPP projects deserves major interest, we are mainly interested in the 
effect of the level of uncertainty, which is reflected by the knowledge impact 
parameters 𝛾𝑖  (i.e., the variability due to a lack of investment) and 𝛾𝑒  (the 
variability due to a lack of experience). Three sets of scenarios have been 
developed. Each scenario is executed for every unique combination of experience 
levels. Section 6.4.2 and Section 6.4.3 give insights into the general dynamics of 
the equilibrium and rely on the four scenarios that are determined by the parameter 
values of Table 6.2. We will refer to these as follows: Sc.1 (𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 0.1), Sc. 2 
(𝛾𝑖 = 0.1, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05), Sc. 3 (𝛾𝑖 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.1) and Sc. 4 (𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05 ). 
Secondly, Section 6.4.4 covers a case (Sc. 5) with extreme risks ( 𝛾𝑖 = 0.2 , 
𝛾𝑒 = 0.1). Thirdly, the impact of introducing government compensation in Sc. 1 
and Sc. 5 is assessed in Section 6.4.5. Finally, Section 6.4.6 highlights some 
noteworthy robustness aspects from a more extensive sensitivity analysis of the 
cost impact related parameters in a setting with only two experience intervals 
(𝑒𝑢 = 2). 
Parameter Explanation Value(s) 
𝛾𝑖 Maximum risk impact of a lack of investment 0.05, 0.1 
𝛾𝑒 Maximum risk impact of a lack of experience 0.05, 0.1 
𝛽𝑖 Maximum cost impact of a lack of investment 0.05 
𝛽𝑒 Maximum cost impact of a lack of experience 0.05 
𝜎 Uncontrollable project risk 0.05 
𝜆𝑖 Investment learning rate 0.25 
𝜆𝑒 Experiential learning rate 0.25 
𝜇𝑖 Investment cost decrease rate 0.25 
𝜇𝑒 Experience cost decrease rate 0.25 
𝑑 Government compensation level 0 
𝛿 Discount rate 1/1.05 
𝑒𝑢 Maximum level of experience 5 
(𝑙1, 𝑢1) Range of investment percentage (0%, 5%) 
(𝑙2, 𝑢2) Range of mark-up percentage (0%, 50%) 
Table 6.2 Parameter values for the computer experiment 
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6.4 Experimental results 
6.4.1 Algorithm performance 
For each state of the game, the algorithm looks for the state-specific action 
equilibrium. As the algorithm is based on a best response heuristic, it is important 
to assess the convergence performance. A scale with 𝑒𝑢 = 5 intervals leads to six 
experience levels on the scale from 0 to 10, which results in 21 experience vectors 
(0,0), (0,2), (0,4), (0,6), (0,8), (0,10), (2,2), (2,4), …, (10,10) in a two-player 
setting. Equivalently, a three-player setting with five intervals results in 56 
experience vectors. Convergence occurs when the algorithm stops before the 
maximum number of replications has been reached. For Sc. 1-4, the convergence 
criterion is met up to a three-project pipeline (𝑍 = 3) in the three-player setting. In 
the two-player setting, convergence issues appeared solely in a three-project 
pipeline for subgames (0,8) and (0,10) in which experienced players are 
randomizing within a small area of the action profile space of Sc. 1 between 
actions without investment on the one hand and with a small investment (0.5%) 
and a slightly higher (1%) mark-up on the other hand.  
In the convergent cases, given the parameters in Table B.1, the search procedure 
converges already after less than 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃  loops towards a specific search 
region in the action profile matrix. Changing the players’ sequence of best 
response selection does not modify this tendency. In the first loops of the best 
response algorithm, the electromagnetism step is mainly attributable for the 
selection of the best response, while in later iterations the local search procedure 
will be mainly responsible for the determination of the optimizing step. 
Admittedly, the electromagnetism meta-heuristic increases the complexity of the 
algorithm. Nevertheless, we could not analytically prove concavity of the expected 
pay-off function for all the scenarios and in all the instances. Therefore, the meta-
heuristic refrains us from arriving in a local optimum and efficiently searches in 
the entire search space. In the vast majority of the cases, the algorithm reports a 
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single cluster. Only in the two- and three-project context of Sc. 1 and Sc. 2, two 
equilibria are apparent for the mature markets (8,8,10) and (8,10,10).  
6.4.2 Impact of the pipeline on the procurement of the first project 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 report the statistical results of the scenario-by-scenario 
analysis for the strategic actions in the tender for the first project in a single-, a 
two- and a three-project environment with two and three players. Within the 
stochastic game notation, the table compares the actions of the states for a constant 
experience vector 𝑒 , but for a variable number of remaining projects in the 
pipeline. So, if a state is represented as 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑍 − 𝑧), this section compares 
the actions for 𝜃1 = (. , . ,0)  with 𝜃1 = (. , . ,1)  and 𝜃1 = (. , . ,2) . A parametric 
paired t-test has been used to study the paired observations. In order to guarantee 
the results’ statistical robustness, the output of the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is also reported. The statistical tests confirm the initial expectation 
that mark-ups are lowered when extra projects are introduced both in the two-
player as well as in the three-player case. The drop in mark-ups is the greatest for 
the inexperienced players, resulting in more competition within the heterogeneous 
market. An analysis of the investment dynamics tends to point towards decreasing 
investment percentages when more projects are in the pipeline. Conditioning on 
the experience levels for the comparison of a three- versus a single-project case 
with three players indicates an insignificant average absolute drop of 0.001% for 
inexperienced players (p-value=0.106), towards a significant average 0.02% drop 
(p-value=0.004) for players with 𝑒1 = 2  and 𝑒1 = 4  and a drop of 0.045% for 
players with maximum experience (p-value=0.0003). Looking at the two-player 
environment in which the investments are generally higher, the results show a 
significant decrease of 0.24% and 0.05% for players with experience levels 0 and 2 
respectively (p-values 0.001 and 0.025), but do report a significant increase for 
players from experience level 6 onwards.  
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2 players (df = 167)  Absolute difference Paired t-test Wilcoxon test 
Investment (%) 
2-1 -0.0055 0.3434 0.5416 
3-1 -0.0287 0.05435 0.2041 
Mark-up (%)  
2-1 -0.7468 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
3-1 -1.2577 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Pay-off 
2-1 -0.0037 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
3-1 -0.0062 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Government cost 
2-1 -0.0079 <2.2*10
-16 
2.2*10
-15 
3-1 -0.0133 7.5*10
-14 
1.7*10
-13 
Table 6.3 Average comparisons and associated p-values of the first stage of a two- 
or three-stage environment with respect to a single-stage environment (2 players) 
3 players (df  = 671)  Absolute difference Paired t-test Wilcoxon test 
Investment (%) 
2-1 -0.0103 0.0002 3.9*10
-8 
3-1 -0.0166 7.3*10
-7 
1.5*10
-10 
Mark-up (%)  
2-1 -0.6159 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16
 
3-1 -1.1308 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Pay-off 
2-1 -0.0019 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
3-1 -0.0035 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Government cost 
2-1 -0.0058 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
3-1 -0.0106 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Table 6.4 Average comparisons and associated p-values of the first stage of a two- 
or three-stage environment with respect to a single-stage environment (3 players) 
Eventually, the decreasing mark-ups also lead to lower bidder’s expected pay-offs 
for the first project and a lower project procurement cost for the government. 
According to the aggregated scenario outcomes, the mark-up and consequently 
also the pay-off drop is largest for the inexperienced players and in the subgames 
in which mainly inexperienced players are involved. On average, a decrease of 
13.53% in the pay-off has been reported in the two-player case and 19.35% in the 
three-player case when moving from a single-project to a three-project pipeline. 
Additionally, inexperienced players are sometimes willing to suffer a loss in the 
first project in order to win the project and obtain a greater experience level for the 
next project. In general, the percentage-wise drop in pay-offs has a negative slope 
in the experience level. The reduced mark-ups have positive repercussions on the 
government expenditures. The government cost for the first project in a three-
project pipeline is 1.12% lower in two-player subgames and 0.92% lower in three-
player subgames than in the case without a pipeline. In immature markets, savings 
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of 5.14% and 4.13% might be realized in two- and three-player settings 
respectively. 
Furthermore, an ANOVA study of the investment percentage in function of the 
model parameters and the state-defining values with first-order interaction effects 
could not support significance at the 5% level of any of the terms related to the 
number of projects in the pipeline in the three-player case. In the two-player 
model, both the interaction term of the experience level 𝑒1  and the number of 
projects in the pipeline as well as the interaction term of the competitor’s 
experience level 𝑒2 and the pipeline length are highly significant (p-values equal 
4.6*10
-7
 and 9.8*10
-5
 respectively). The ANOVA models for the mark-ups, on the 
other hand, reveal the main effect and the interaction effects of the pipeline 
variable. We refer to Appendix C for the full ANOVA results. The ANOVA tests 
also underline the interaction with the players’ experience vector that defines the 
state variable.  
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show the action dynamics in the bidding behavior for the 
first project for a player with experience level 𝑒1 with respect to a variable number 
of projects in the pipeline. Only the scenarios that involve players with experience 
level zero up to four are reported, but analogous results are apparent for the 
remaining scenarios. Moving towards a multi-project environment considerably 
reduces the mark-ups for the inexperienced players. According to these tables, only 
players with a competitive advantage over all their competitors (e.g., the subgames 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3)=(2,0,0), (4,0,0) or (4,0,2) and (𝑒1, 𝑒2)=(2,0), (4,0) or (4,2)) have a 
tendency to invest more in a multi-project environment than in a single-project 
setting, which means that players who were already in a beneficial position opt to 
strengthen their advantage even more. The cases in which a player has an 
experience level that is equal to or lower than at least one of his opponents point 
towards decreasing investment percentages. Also for maximally experienced 
players, we do not find significance for increasing investment levels, regardless of 
the experience level of the opponents.  
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  Investment (%) Mark-up (%) 
𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑍 = 1 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3  𝑍 = 1 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 
0 
0 0.6219 0.6053 0.5873 19.7437 17.0625 14.6955 
2 0.5523 0.4737 0.3935 17.5292 16.0452 14.8581 
4 0.4954 0.3915 0.2948 16.7109 15.9558 15.3513 
2 
0 0.8171 0.8627 0.9024 19.0780 16.9524 15.1775 
2 0.7472 0.7340 0.7257 16.2857 14.8594 13.6578 
4 0.6923 0.6526 0.6146 15.1706 14.2538 13.4889 
4 
0 0.9612 1.0556 1.1304 19.1873 17.5786 16.2922 
2 0.8858 0.9010 0.9153 16.0608 14.9066 13.9701 
4 0.8139 0.8065 0.7998 14.7693 14.0016 13.4085 
Table 6.5 Actions for the first project in a pipeline with 𝑍 stages for a player with 
initial experience level 𝑒1  and competition given by𝑒2 . Only the scenarios that 
involve players with 𝑒𝑝 ≤ 4 are reported. 
  Investment (%) Mark-up (%) 
𝑒1 (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  𝑍 = 1 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3  𝑍 = 1 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 
0 
(0,0) 0.0605 0.0523 0.0475 17.8555 15.5732 13.7851 
(0,2) 0 0 0 17.8903 16.3290 15.0730 
(0,4) 0 0 0 18.0219 16.8438 15.8245 
(2,2) 0 0 0 18.8658 17.4898 16.6131 
(2,4) 0 0 0 19.6958 18.5270 17.8428 
(4,4) 0 0 0 21.5371 20.7122 19.9445 
2 
(0,0) 0.5342 0.5673 0.5951 16.1461 14.2091 12.6989 
(0,2) 0.3885 0.3736 0.3800 15.0596 13.6624 12.4312 
(0,4) 0.2778 0.2024 0.1555 14.7467 13.8614 13.1032 
(2,2) 0.1340 0.1228 0.1122 15.1770 13.8794 12.8762 
(2,4) 0 0 0 15.4669 14.5736 13.8471 
(4,4) 0 0 0 15.8346 14.9218 14.2969 
4 
(0,0) 0.7180 0.7515 0.7656 16.1467 14.6117 13.4599 
(0,2) 0.6477 0.6567 0.6862 14.6991 13.5995 12.6903 
(0,4) 0.6021 0.5864 0.5757 13.9064 13.0796 12.4178 
(2,2) 0.5549 0.5882 0.6018 14.2170 13.1166 12.2588 
(2,4) 0.3966 0.3776 0.3788 13.7333 12.9781 12.3046 
(4,4) 0.1812 0.1726 0.1668 14.0469 13.2049 12.6015 
Table 6.6 Actions for the first project in a pipeline with 𝑍 stages for a player with 
initial experience level 𝑒1 and competition given by (𝑒2, 𝑒3). Only the scenarios 
that involve players with 𝑒𝑝 ≤ 4 are reported. 
6.4.3 Impact of a pipeline on the average expected bidding behavior 
Section 6.4.2 solely looked at the bidding dynamics of the first project of the 
pipeline. A second approach to analyze the dynamics of the bidding behavior 
compares the average expected investment and mark-up percentages of the players 
over the entire pipeline. Given the optimal action profiles 𝑎∗𝑧 , the average 
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investment level over te entire pipeline is calculated by taking the sum of the 
investment levels of each state 𝜃𝑧 = (. , . , 𝑍 − 𝑧)  for each 𝑧  weighted with the 
probability that this state occurs. Consider the three-project pipeline and initial 
experience vector (𝑒1, 𝑒2) = (0,2)  of Fig. 1. The expected average investment 
percentage for player 1 equals (0.6% + 0.43(1.3%+ 0.50 ∗ 1.6%+ 0.50 ∗
1.3%) + 0.57(0.6%+ 0.43 ∗ 1.3% + 0.57 ∗ 0.8%))/3 ≈ 0.9% . These averages 
are then compared to the situation in which a single project is tendered three times, 
which means that only the actions and transition probabilities of the state variables 
𝜃𝑧 = (. , . ,1) are considered. The average expected pay-offs and government cost 
may be obtained in a similar fashion.  
2 players  Absolute difference Paired t-test Wilcoxon test 
Investment (%) 
All -0.012196 0.0687 0.1257 
𝑒1 = 0  -0.109036 0.0007 0.0007 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.024765 0.0240 0.0192 
𝑒1 = 4  0.000970 0.9118 0.4785 
𝑒1 = 6  0.017302 0.0384 0.0618 
𝑒1 = 8  0.022350 0.0087 0.0993 
𝑒1 = 10  0.020006 0.0154 0.1936 
Mark-up (%) 
All -0.580689 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0  -0.886568 0.0002 0.0004 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.887977 2.2*10
-9 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 4  -0.672399 1.0*10
-11 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 6  -0.459318 1.6*10
-8 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 8  -0.341360 1.0*10
-6 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 10  -0.236514 0.0004 0.0002 
Pay-off 
All -0.002871 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0  -0.007250 2.9*10
-10 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.004809 8.4*10
-15 
7.5*10
-9 
𝑒1 = 4  -0.002772 2.5*10
-11 
1.49*10
-8 
𝑒1 = 6  -0.001428 0.0013 0.0004 
𝑒1 = 8  -0.000730 0.0728 0.0004 
𝑒1 = 10  -0.000237 0.5872 0.0156 
Table 6.7 Scenario-by-scenario comparison of the average strategic behavior in the 
case of a three-project pipeline and the case with three times tendering a single 
project (2 players) 
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3 players  Absolute difference Paired t-test Wilcoxon test 
Investment (%) 
All -0.010770 2.1*10
-9 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0  -0.003858 8.8*10
-6 
9.3*10
-5 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.015447 0.0006 9.7*10
-6 
𝑒1 = 4  -0.014114 0.0010 0.0002 
𝑒1 = 6  -0.006935 0.0583 0.0071 
𝑒1 = 8  0.000406 0.9319 0.0847 
𝑒1 = 10  -0.024669 0.0001 6.4*10
-8 
Mark-up (%) 
All -0.552494 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 0  -1.138677 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.772383 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 4  -0.535272 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 6  -0.410947 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 8  -0.310890 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 10  -0.146796 5.1*10
-7 
8.2*10
-13 
Pay-off 
All -0.001648 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 0  -0.002150 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 2  -0.002067 <2.2*10
-16
 <2.2*10
-16
 
𝑒1 = 4  -0.001834 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 6  -0.001498 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 8  -0.001197 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 10  -0.001142 <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Table 6.8 Scenario-by-scenario comparison of the average strategic behavior in the 
case of a three-project pipeline and the case with three times tendering a single 
project (3 players) 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 report the statistical analysis of the differences and agree 
with the previously stated findings. The former mark-up results are confirmed so 
that, from a procurement perspective, bidding becomes more aggressive in the case 
of a project pipeline than when projects are tendered without communicating the 
pipeline. The analysis of the average investment efforts in the experiment shows 
that the pipeline concept does on average not incur extra investment efforts. 
Nonetheless, conditioning on the experience level reveals the experience-
dependent response. The differences in the dynamics are also attributed to the 
competitive position of the player with respect to the opponents. In the model, pre-
tender investment results in a reduction of the uncertainty, so that sometimes more 
accurate estimations point towards higher project costs. Consequently, bidders 
might prefer to be less informed and play with the mark-up, win a project and in its 
turn use the experience for future projects. 
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6.4.4 High-risk situation 
A change of the 𝛾𝑖 parameter of Sc. 1 to a value of 0.2 refers to a case with high 
project-related risk (Sc. 5). The observation of the three-player equilibrium results 
has led to three findings. Firstly, not all subgames could guarantee convergence. In 
the subgames (0,0,8) and (0,0,10) with a single project for instance, the 
inexperienced players are looping over strategy profiles in which they both 
participate or one stays out. Consequently, one might expect that there is an 
equilibrium in mixed strategies. As the results of a multi-project pipeline rely on 
the outcome of the single-project case, this non-convergence effect acts as a 
bullwhip to earlier states of the stochastic game. Secondly, among all scenarios, 
there are only two cases for which the equilibrium allows participation for all 
players for the single-project case: subgame (0,0,0) with a 2.1% investment and a 
25% mark-up for all participants and subgame (2,2,2) with a 2.4% investment and 
a 21% mark-up. In all other subgames, the reported equilibrium always suggests 
that one player should stay out of this engagement (i.e., 0% investment and 50% 
mark-up). Thirdly, adding extra projects has the same consequences as described 
earlier, but players who applied a no-participation action in the single-project case, 
will still prefer to stay out of the market.  
As a result, the model argues that it might be unsustainable to invite three 
contractors for the bid preparation stage in a high-risk project environment. This is 
an important finding that could not be identified by means of the strategy game 
methodology of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Therefore, the equilibria of a two-player 
setting are of very high interest. In this vein, the previous results seem to be robust: 
everyone participates, mark-ups decrease in the length of the pipeline and players 
with a competitive advantage over their opponent tend to invest more, but the 
investment gaps are small. Hence, levelled strategic behavior is expected if 
uncertainty is highly project-dependent. 
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6.4.5 Government reimbursement 
In general, one might say that the introduction of a pipeline leads to fiercer 
competition from a mark-up perspective. Nevertheless, the inexperienced bidders 
are still significantly less willing to invest in research, which is especially the case 
in a three-player setting. Therefore, a government reimbursement might help to 
level the playing field from an investment perspective. In this way the government 
gives all bidders an opportunity to enter the market which would prevent 
oligopolistic behavior or hidden collusion among mature bidders for instance. The 
government determines a compensation percentage 𝑑 that reflects the fraction of 
the investment efforts that is reimbursed to all losing bidders. Table 6.9 
summarizes the main characteristics of the average bidding equilibrium results of a 
three-project pipeline for Sc. 1 and high-risk Sc. 5 in a two-player setting and for 
Sc.1 in the three-player case. The figures use a similar approach as in Section 
6.4.3, so that we look at the average bidding behavior, the average pay-off and the 
average government expenditure over the entire three-project pipeline.  
If two players are prequalified, the investment willingness is relatively symmetric 
for both players, both in the low-risk as well as in the high-risk case. An 
introduction of a compensation raises the investment willingness. The average 
mark-up percentages tend to decrease to the level of 40% compensation in the low-
risk case, while they increase from 40% compensation onwards in the high-risk 
setting. Of course, this reimbursement involves additional expenditures for the 
government, but these extra costs can be partly offset by the savings that result 
from the pipeline concept. 
In the low-risk case with a three-project pipeline, a compensation between 20% 
and 40% would lead to optimal results: an investment increase and a government 
expenditure decrease. Interestingly, the average government expenditure in the 
high-risk setting is lower than in the low-risk environment. Moreover, both players 
have a considerable investment willingness, making the introduction of a 
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reimbursement policy obsolete, because it would only increase the government 
cost and inflate the contractors’ profits.  
 𝑑 No 
part.
a 
All 
invest
b 
Avg. 
investment 
Avg. 
mark-up 
Avg. 
pay-off 
Gvt. cost 
pipeline 
Gvt. cost no 
pipeline
c 
2 players, 
Sc. 1 
0% 0 19
d 
1.50 16.91 0.0428 1.1658 1.1716 
20% 0 21 1.83 16.52 0.0404 1.1650 1.1716 
40% 0 21 2.20 16.35 0.0394 1.1677 1.1748 
60% 0 21 2.61 16.39 0.0399 1.1741 1.1816 
80% 0 21 3.08 16.70 0.0422 1.1852 1.1930 
2 players, 
Sc. 5 
0% 0 21 3.67 18.78 0.0262 1.1617 1.1681 
20% 0 21 3.99 18.72 0.0281 1.1705 1.1773 
40% 0 21 4.35 18.85 0.0312 1.1824 1.1896 
60% 0 21 4.75 19.19 0.0358 1.1980 1.2055 
80% 0 21 4.93 20.02 0.0441 1.2176 1.2255 
3 players, 
Sc. 1 
0% 0 4 0.60 18.09 0.0193 1.1317 1.1377 
20% 0 7 0.95 18.15 0.0173 1.1312 1.1374 
40% 3
e 
20 1.32 18.26 0.0160 1.1345 1.1405 
60% 4
e 
30 1.80 18.09 0.0152 1.1423 1.1481 
80% 5
e 
40 2.46 17.69 0.0154 1.1584 1.1644 
Table 6.9 Aggregate results of the impact of government reimbursement on the 
equilibrium outcome of a three-project pipeline 
a Number of subgames in which at least one player does not participate. The total number of 
subgames is 21 for the two-player setting and 56 for the three-player setting. 
b Number of subgames in which all players have investment levels greater than 0% 
c Average cost of tendering three times a single project consecutively 
d An inexperienced player does not invest for the first project if he is playing against 𝑒2= 8 or 10 and 
𝑍 = 3 
e A player with experience level 0 in subgames (0,8,8), (0,8,10) and (0,10,10) does not participate 
when 𝑑=40%. Moving to 60% and 80% also adds (0,6,10) and (0,6,8), respectively, to the set of no-
participation subgames. 
A three-player setting will generally lead to fiercer competition and a lower 
government cost. Nevertheless, Table 6.9 shows that without compensation, it 
rarely happens that all players of a particular subgame invest. The use of 
compensation overcomes this dynamic in the majority of the subgames, resulting 
in a higher average investment. In the subgames where inexperienced players are 
competing against two mature contractors though, the inexperienced player moves 
to an equilibrium action in which he does not participate. On average, a 
compensation of 40% together with a pipeline of three projects is cheaper than a 
situation without compensation and without a pipeline. So, in the case 
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governments aim for three competing consortia, a combination of both policies 
leads to promising results.  
Section 6.4.4 highlights the mixed equilibrium behavior of the high-risk three-
player case, which prevents us from giving a full analysis of the compensation 
mechanism. Nevertheless, the experiments show that an 80% reimbursement levies 
the convergence issue and would ensure that all players of the subgame invest in 
46 out of the 56 subgames. For the ten remaining vectors, the 80% reimbursement 
does not serve as a sufficient incentive to make the inexperienced player who is 
facing two players with an 𝑒𝑝 of at least 2 to invest more. Without a compensation, 
it is only the case in two out of 56 subgames that all participants invest, while one 
player does not participate in all the other subgames. Nevertheless, in this high-risk 
setting, it is very expensive to attribute these compensations. Consequently, this 
analysis could suggest the policy to prequalify only two contractors in a high-risk 
setting. However, if the government wants to create a levelled field in the long run 
with three prequalified bidders despite the additional cost in the short run, a 
compensation could be effective. Nonetheless, since the investment percentages 
reflect the willingness of the contractor to invest, it should evidently be the 
government’s priority to reduce the (non-value adding) investment requirements. 
6.4.6 Additional scenarios 
In order to investigate the robustness of the results, a full factorial 2
4
 design has 
been set up with two levels (i.e., 0.05 and 0.1) for the parameters 𝛾𝑖, 𝛾𝑒, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑒. 
The scenarios have been executed for each subgame (i.e., every possible 
combination of the experience levels) in a two- and three-player setting with 
𝑍 = {1,2,3}.  For this robustness study, only two experience intervals are 
considered, so that 𝑒𝑢 = 2 and a player’s experience level is 0, 5 or 10.  
First of all, the results for the states with experience vectors (0,10) and (0,0,10) 
often did not converge (i.e., in 11 out of 16 scenarios and 5 out of 16 scenarios 
respectively). In these instances, the algorithm loops between different action 
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profiles. The inexperienced players mix their choice between no investment and a 
high mark-up and a moderate investment with a low mark-up. The experienced 
player responds accordingly with a low or a high mark-up. It is especially when the 
parameters that are related to the experiential advantage (𝛾𝑒 and 𝛽𝑒) are high that 
these convergence issues occur. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the previous 
sections are confirmed by this sensitivity study. Mark-ups are decreasing in the 
number of projects, regardless of the number of players and their respective 
experience levels. Concerning the investments, the players who have a competitive 
advantage in the initial stage of the game increase the investment willingness when 
the project pipeline grows larger.  
The limited number of experience intervals underlines the importance of winning a 
project early in the pipeline. Therefore, the percentage-wise impact of the pipeline 
on the mark-ups is greater than when 𝑒𝑢 = 5. According to the aggregated scenario 
outcomes, the pay-off drop for the first project of a three-project pipeline is largest 
for the inexperienced players and in subgames in which inexperienced players are 
involved. On average, a decrease of 73% in the pay-off has been reported in the 
two-player case and 109% in the three-player case when moving from a single-
project to a three-project pipeline. Consequently, inexperienced players are willing 
to suffer a loss in the first project in order to win it and obtain a greater experience 
level for the next project. The pay-off drops for the medium experienced player 
equal 20% and 33% for the two- and three-player setting respectively and for the 
player with maximum experience, this amounts to an 8% and a 17% drop. As a 
result, the combined sensitivity findings also confirm the reduction in the 
government expenditures. A three-project pipeline reduces the procurement cost of 
the first project with 1.7% in subgames with two players and with 2.2% in three-
player subgames. 
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6.5 Special topic: The continuation value 
So far, the model has assumed that the continuation value of the final project of the 
pipeline equals zero. From a practical perspective, this means that the contractor 
would only believe in the communicated, finite pipeline and does not have any 
belief in project opportunities beyond the pipeline. This is not illogical due to the 
long time frames of the project preparation, the budgetary approval and the 
execution itself. This was reflected in the analytical model by assuming that 
𝒱𝑝
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍) = 0 in equation  (6.1). 
But how would the dynamics change if this project pipeline is believed to have an 
infinite nature? As a contractor, one would like to know how to take this into 
account in the research and mark-up determination. It might become essential to 
penetrate the market and establish a comfortable competitive position among the 
construction consortia. The government, on the other hand, is interested in how 
this would affect the attractiveness of the market.  
When the number of projects in the pipeline 𝑍 is gradually increased, one soon 
bumps against the limits of the Markov perfect equilibrium. From a particular 
number 𝑍∗ of projects onwards, which depends on the state of the game, the best 
response heuristic does not manage to find an equilibrium in unique strategies 
anymore. Instead, the procedure loops among a set of actions which would suggest 
to look into mixed equilibria. These are difficult to analyze in this multi-
dimensional setting with heterogeneous players. Since a stochastic game with a 
pipeline of 𝑍∗ + 1 utilizes the strategic results of a pipeline with 𝑍∗ projects, this 
looping problem for a particular subgame acts as a bullwhip effect through the 
longer pipeline.  
For instance in a case with 𝑒𝑢 = 5 and three players for which a pipeline with four 
projects leads to a looping problem in state (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, 𝑍 − 𝑧) =(2,4,6,3), the 
project-project pipeline will have issues to derive the equilibrium for states 
(0,4,6,4), (2,2,6,4) and (2,4,4,4). The first subgames for which this occurs is for 
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these in which one or two inexperienced players are playing against one or two 
mature players (e.g., (0,8) or (0,0,10)). In fact, what is happening is that, initially, 
(one of) the inexperienced player(s) sets a considerably higher mark-up without 
investment. But once the pipeline becomes longer, they might consider switching 
to a strategy in which they do invest with a lower mark-up. In this transition 
period, the equilibrium becomes unstable and players will randomize their 
behavior, because they are on the verge to moving to another strategy. 
Because these challenges are hard to overcome in the model, we preferred to make 
an approximation for this long-term perspective of the pipeline. The scenario Sc. 1 
has been re-executed for the two- and three player setting with one and two 
projects in the pipeline. However, two different values for the continuation term 
𝒱𝑝
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍)  are defined. This term has been replaced by an infinite pay-off 
stream that equals the cumulative pay-off of the three-project pipeline without 
continuation value beyond the pipeline. A first set of scenarios assumes that this 
cumulative expected pay-off will be obtained every three periods (the “infinite (3 
years)” scenarios). A second set of scenarios assumes that this cumulative 
expected pay-off is obtained every ten periods (the “infinite (10 years)” scenarios).  
An example may clarify this approach. To initialize the procedure as described in 
Section 6.4, we need to define the new continuation value of the last project in the 
pipeline for equation  (6.1) for each possible subgame. The total cumulative 
expected pay-off of the three-project pipeline is used. Consider for instance the 
situation of Figure 6.1. To determine the continuation value for this section, the 
cumulative pay-offs that are given for state (0,2,2) are considered to be the infinite 
stream of income for the future. Consequently, for the “infinite (3 years)” scenario, 
the continuation value for player 1 in subgame (0,2), given an interest rate of 5%, 
is calculated as: 
𝒱1
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍) =
0.104
1.053 − 1
= 0.660 
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For the “infinite (10 years)” scenario, this present value is given by: 
𝒱1
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍) =
0.104
1.0510 − 1
= 0.165 
In a practical setting, this approach actually means that beyond the communicated 
pipeline, a steady state of the experience levels in the market occurs. In fact, the 
contractor believes that the market shares are fixed and none of the players is able 
to obtain more experience. Instead, a continuous stream of pay-offs is expected in 
the far future. The “infinite (3 years)” scenario generates this research stream every 
three periods, while the “infinite (10 years)” scenario generates a stream every ten 
periods. 
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 plot the average investment and mark-up decisions 
according to the experience level of the player. Each line represents a scenario: the 
finite scenario refers to the original setting without a continuation value beyond the 
pipeline, the “infinite (3 years)” refers to the fact that the experience levels are 
fixed beyond the pipeline and a revue stream is expected in cycles of three periods 
and the “infinite (10 years)” has a ten-year cycle. Each of these three settings is 
then executed in a single-project setting and a two-project pipeline. One may 
consider this pipeline as the short-term pipeline in which experience levels can still 
change, while the continuation value reflects the long-term pipeline with constant 
experience levels. 
The findings are experience-dependent. Nevertheless, the modification of the revue 
stream has a significant impact on the bidding behavior. Contractors tend to set 
lower mark-ups, and especially in the “infinite (3 years)” scenario, the mark-ups 
nosedive for less experienced players. The slope of the curve becomes even 
increasing in the experience level. There is one exception for this statement: the 
inexperienced player in the two-player setting. In that case, the behavior is 
dependent on the experience level of the opponent. In the (0,0)-subgame, 
inexperienced players tend to move to zero-mark-ups and prefer to make a loss, in 
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order to guarantee a future stream of revenues. However, in the (0,8)- or (0,10)-
subgames, convergence issues arise with looping behavior among a maximum 
mark-up and a zero mark-up, which biases the graph in these subgames.  
The change in investment willingness is more subtle, with only minor moves in the 
three-player setting, except for experienced players who tend to invest less when 
the future stream of pay-offs grows larger. Also for the investment efforts, the 
interaction with the opponent contributes in determining the direction of the 
change. Eventually, it is clear that in the case the pipeline consists of two projects, 
there are no significant modifications in the aforementioned dynamics. 
Last but not least, it is interesting to see how these scenarios impact an immature 
market, i.e., an initial experience vector or subgame (0,0) or (0,0,0). For the two-
player case without a short-term pipeline and without a continuation value, the 
average investment willingness amounts up to 1.0% with a mark-up equal to 
24.7%. Adding the long-term prospects with ten-period cycles diminishes the 
investment willingness to 0.8% and the mark-up to 8.8%. Increasing the 
continuation value even more, by considering three-period cycles, results in 2.9% 
investment efforts and zero-mark-ups. A similar tendency characterizes the three-
player setting for subgame (0,0,0). In the original situation, a zero-investment 
versus 22.8% mark-up is played. In the 10-period cycle, the investment stays 0%, 
but mark-ups drop to 11.0%. In the more extreme 3-period cycle, the investment 
slightly increases to 0.62% and now the mark-up becomes 0%. 
As a wrap-up of this section, we claim that the continuation value and the 
expectation about the long-term pipeline might significantly and even dramatically 
influence bidding behavior. Especially less experienced consortia bid aggressively, 
willing to suffer losses. Of course, this may be partly explained by an important 
assumption in the sequential model: winning a contract results in an experience 
increase, regardless of the ex post evaluation of the project. This section draws an 
extreme picture: experience levels are assumed to stay fixed after the short-term 
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pipeline is finished. In reality, one might expect new entrants and future growth 
opportunities. Since the truth will be somewhat in the middle, we expect that a 
continuous flow of pipelines definitely caps the mark-ups, but one might maybe 
also fear the reduced investments so that the infinite pipeline acts as a trigger for 
trial-and-error behavior of consortia.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Impact of the continuation value on the action equilibrium (2 players) 
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Figure 6.4 Impact of the continuation value on the action equilibrium (3 players) 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter offers a second model to study the impact of a pipeline on the 
dynamic bidding behavior in a PPP setting. The dynamic procurement format has 
been translated into a sequential procurement auction model in which contractors 
that are heterogeneous in their cost probability distributions will determine their 
sequential strategy over the course of a commonly known pipeline and a constant 
set of bidders. The bidders may change their bidding behavior depending on the 
state of the stochastic game. Being granted a project results in a knowledge and 
cost advantage for future projects. This chapter introduces a heuristic best response 
approach to derive the Markov perfect equilibrium.  
Under the assumptions that outline the scope of the chapter, the results support the 
hypothesis that mark-ups tend to decrease when more projects are included in the 
pipeline, regardless of the number of bidders. In this vein, the mark-up result is in 
line with the contemporary sequential auction theory literature. Consequently, 
bidders are willing to accept lower profits if this might lead to future benefits. 
Moreover, a continuation value of the final project that is greater than zero (as in 
Section 6.5) actually amplifies this finding. As a consequence, the government 
procurement cost tends to have a decreasing nature in the number of projects.  
Looking at the upfront investment willingness, there has been only limited support 
for an increasing trend for players who dispose of a competitive advantage at the 
start of the pipeline. In all other cases, the investment percentages tend to decrease. 
Therefore, an investment reimbursement might still be necessary to trigger the 
consortia’s enthusiasm to perform more upfront research. This levels the 
competition and reduces the risk of a contractor’s default, which would always 
come at the government’s expense due to the societal value of PPP projects. The 
extra cost of investment reimbursements might be partly offset by the reduced 
mark-ups that result from the pipeline. Nevertheless, in cases with considerable 
project-specific risks, it might be better to only prequalify two contractors to 
engage in the expensive tendering process according to the experimental results.  
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For the private sector, a government’s project agenda may definitely have benefits 
in the sense that it allows to spread out budgets and mitigate risks over several 
projects. Nevertheless, it leads to fiercer competition and profits could shrink 
compared to one-shot games. However, it might not be recommended to penetrate 
a market with an established pipeline and mature players. Entering an immature 
market could be beneficial and putting a lot of effort together with limited mark-
ups in this first project would contribute to the experience base for future projects. 
Experienced players on the contrary, should increase the investment efforts when a 
pipeline is introduced if they want to cement their competitive advantage. 
The results of this chapter greatly support what has been found in the ex ante 
framework of the previous study. Nevertheless, the methodological approach of 
this chapter’s sequential setting renders additional insights since we have been 
looking at the full equilibrium profile, while the methodology in the previous 
chapter considered an approximate equilibrium bidding strategy for a single player. 
This revealed the fact that high-risk settings with three bidders are unsustainable 
without the introduction of extra investment incentives (i.e., the government 
reimbursements). However, how contractors randomize between strategies if no 
equilibrium in unique strategies was found, remains an open question.  
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Chapter 7 Two empirical approaches 
 
The models that have been presented in this dissertation are the result of an 
investigation of the available literature and the contribution of practitioners. 
Nevertheless, the results are still subject to assumptions or to biases that cannot be 
incorporated in computer experiments. For instance, game theory assumes that 
bidders behave rationally in all instances. Behavioral factors have not been 
discussed so far. Nevertheless, in order to open the discussion of underlying 
factors in the decision making, we would like to present the results of two 
approaches towards this question. Section 7.1 discusses the results of a laboratory 
experiment. Our models have been transferred into a computer platform that 
allows real participants to compete against each other using the Z-Tree 
experimentation software (Fischbacher 2007). For Section 7.2, we have consulted 
our research network and contacted companies and institutions that were willing to 
participate in our semi-structured interviews concerning the set-up of the models 
and the discussion of the results. 
7.1 Laboratory experiment 
In order to grasp some of the behavioral aspects influencing bidding under 
uncertainty, one may develop a laboratory setting in which subjects compete 
against each other for fictitious projects. This chapter reveals that the preferred 
bidding strategies indeed differ from the equilibrium predictions of the previous 
chapters. The aim is to investigate to what extent the bidding behavior is in line 
with or overrules the theoretical prediction. Moreover, it is of major concern to 
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confirm or nuance the previously stated dynamics that result from the introduction 
of governmental policies like the bid cost reimbursement and the project pipeline.  
The managerial insights in this chapter are threefold. Firstly, the laboratory 
experiment supports previous studies its identification of underbidding and hence 
amplifies the disheartening winner’s curse. Secondly, given the inclusion of the 
costly bid preparation, this chapter pioneers in showing that human interaction and 
the drive to win could lead to socially suboptimal equilibria. Last but not least, the 
study of the subject’s bidding behavior underlines that the government should 
carefully design the contracting procedure and its incentive creation mechanisms, 
especially taking into account contractors’ heterogeneity.  
Since this chapter paves the road for the introduction of the jargon of laboratory 
auction experiments, this section starts with a concise overview of the available 
literature and introduces some important concepts. In Section 7.1.2, the 
experimental set-up is explained in detail. The research questions and statistical 
results are described in Section 7.1.3 and Section 7.1.4 respectively. Afterwards, a 
concluding section relates the results with our theoretical findings.  
7.1.1 Introduction and lessons from the literature 
Laboratory experiments are a common means to analyze auction formats. Mostly, 
they are set up to compare the theoretical equilibria with the subjects’ strategies or 
to get insights into the equilibrium when the auction models are too complicated to 
arrive at closed-form analytical expressions. Kagel and Levin (2012) discuss the 
academic literature on experiments and the different decisions that need to be 
made. Finally, researchers rely on experiments to study human aspects of decision 
making like collusion and bid shading (Sherstyuck 2008). 
The remainder of this introduction digs deeper into the important decision 
dimensions of the PPP laboratory experiment and highlights the main concepts of 
the experimental auction literature. 
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7.1.1.1 Design of laboratory experiments 
The organization of an experiment requires a large number of participants in order 
to be able to make statistically relevant conclusions. In a session, a group of 
players takes part in the experiment on a particular date and place. A group plays 
multiple (independent) games consecutively, which we call periods. The number 
of observations is the number of times a game is played. A game is played multiple 
times within a group, but also in other groups and in other sessions. Nevertheless, a 
robust statistical analysis can only be performed on independent observations. An 
observation in a particular group must not be influenced by the interaction with 
another group. The literature refers to a group as a cohort. Within the cohort, there 
is interaction, because the players from a particular cohort are for instance 
randomly matched together in each period. However, subjects from a cohort 
cannot be matched with subjects from another cohort. A session consists of 
multiple periods that are executed within a cohort, but these multi-period 
observations are also correlated with each other, which could lead to the problem 
of pseudo-replication. Consequently, the number of truly independent observations 
is equal to the number of cohorts. The number of players within a cohort depends 
on the treatment and the auction format one wants to model. A treatment is defined 
by a particular set of parameters in the bidding format. The experimenter needs to 
trade-off the fact that the influence of a single individual decreases when the size 
of the cohort increases against the fact that the number of independent 
observations decreases when the size of the cohort increases for a fixed number of 
participants. 
This issue also relates to the number of players that are participating. The 
following equation expresses the relation among the different decision variables: 
# participants = (# treatments )x(# independent observations)x(#number of players in cohort)
(# treatments per player)
   
(7.1) 
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Within the literature, the number of participants is very diverse with evidence of 
experiments with 72 participants (Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005) and 212 participants 
(Georganas and Kagel 2011). Also the length of the experiment is an important 
characteristic of the design. While experiments with hundred periods exist 
(Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou 2007), we find Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) with 
only nine periods at the lower end of the spectrum due to the complexity of their 
multi-attribute procurement setting.   
7.1.1.2 Experimental procedure 
The procedure is related to the complexity of the game and the available time. The 
number of periods is a decision variable that impacts the possibility of learning for 
a player during the game. This effect also depends on the grouping of participants 
and the information reporting after each period. 
On the one hand, players may be consistently matched to the same opponents. If a 
player knows that he is always playing in the same group, he might modify his 
bidding behavior, maybe even rendering collusive behavior. Nevertheless, 
Leufkens et al. (2007) claim in their sequential auction experiment that cooperation 
is not occurring in a four-player setting. The other option is to randomly regroup 
participants in each period (Cason et al. 2011) or, as is the case in our setting, 
based on a preset profile matching protocol (Haruvy and Katok 2007). 
Symmetry in information is a common assumption in analytical auction models, 
while this is often violated in practice. In this vein, the attribution of types is also a 
decision that requires some thought. Güth et al. (2005), for instance, study the 
difference between weak and strong players in asymmetric auctions. The player’s 
type may be randomly generated at the beginning of a period (e.g., Cason et al. 
2011, Watanabe and Nakabayshi 2011), players may switch roles after a number of 
periods (Jog and Kosmopoulou 2014) or there is no change in the asymmetric 
types (e.g., Lunander and Nilsson 2004, Güth et al. 2005, Brunner et al. 2010). 
Also the amount of information that is given after each period can be symmetric or 
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asymmetric and requires careful consideration as the explicitation of reference 
points could have a great impact on the decision-making.  
A next step concerns the organization of the treatments. In a within-subject design, 
participants play several treatments and the change in behavior can be easily 
observed by the experimenter (Brosig and Reiβ 2007, Cason et al. 2011). The 
advantage is that fewer participants need to be recruited which trades off against 
the fact that transition effects or order effects may be apparent. Cason et al. (2011) 
solve this threat by randomizing the sequence of conditions. At the opposite end, 
Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) opt for a single treatment per session, which is called a 
between-subject design.   
7.1.1.3 Dealing with uncertainty 
From a traditional auction perspective, the buyer faces a certain amount of 
uncertainty in the value of the object to procure. The literature is traditionally 
divided in two categories: private value auctions and common value auctions.  
In auctions with a private value component, the player has a personal valuation of 
the object that he knows with certainty, but the uncertainty lies in the valuation of 
the other players. Typically, the valuations are independently generated from a 
distribution. In the symmetric case, these probability distributions are the same for 
all participants (e.g., Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou 2007, Goeree et al. 2013). 
In the asymmetric case, the values are generated from distributions that are 
different for the players. Typically, the distributions are known by all players (e.g., 
Lunander and Nilsson 2004, Jog and Kosmopoulou 2014). Finally, some 
experimental setups are combinations of the symmetric and asymmetric case. The 
sequential auction in Leufkens et al. (2007) accounts for synergies so that the 
distributions for the second auction are asymmetric. Grimm et al. (2006) start with 
a symmetric situation, but allow players to invest, resulting in a more beneficial 
probability distribution.  
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In auctions with a common value component, the value for all bidders is equal, but 
uncertain. The value of a project or object is selected from a (known) distribution, 
but the players receive a signal about the value. Early example studies include 
Capen et al. (1971) and Kagel and Levin (1986). 
However, Pinkske and Tan (2005) underline the fundamental concern whether 
practice allows for these two distinct classes. Laffont et al. (1995) discuss that 
most real-life applications, like the one in this dissertation, have a combination of a 
common and a private value component. 
7.1.1.4 Practicalities  
From a practical angle, the experimenter makes a decision on the organization of a 
session. The available time is limited. The time per period could be bounded in 
order to reduce the total time of the experiment. Sessions typically take 90 to 180 
minutes. In this respect, the majority of studies offer a monetary compensation to 
the participants when they participate on a voluntary basis. Experimental currency 
units are converted into a real currency (Leufkens et al. 2007, Cason et al. 2011, 
Jog and Kosmopoulou 2014). In asymmetric auctions, the profits of advantaged 
participants could be higher, which would lead to a feeling of injustice (Goeree et 
al. 2013) that could be compensated by differences in the exchange rate depending 
on the role of the participant (Georganas and Kagel 2011). Last but not least, the 
explanation of the experiment needs to be complete and clear. A combination of an 
oral briefing and written guidelines is key. Finally, some trial periods are usually 
introduced to make sure everyone understands the setup, although these have the 
disadvantage that some information on the first real period is lost due to learning 
effects of the trial periods. 
7.1.2 Experimental design 
7.1.2.1 Aims of the experiment 
The purpose is to design a bidding model that imitates tendering for complex PPP 
projects. In line with the previous chapters of this dissertation, each bidder makes 
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an investment decision that results in a lower expected project cost and improves 
its accuracy. Besides, each bidder makes a mark-up decision that reflects the risk 
premium and the profit margin. 
It is impossible to test each scenario that has been discussed in this dissertation, so 
the number of treatments is limited and is outlined in Section 7.1.2.3. First, the 
experiment examines the impact of the bidding environment (or the experience 
vector) on the selected strategy. A player can have previous experience or not, 
denoted by E and I respectively. An experienced contractor has an advantageous 
cost probability density with respect to an inexperienced player. A lower expected 
project cost and a smaller standard deviation reflect the advantage. The experiment 
looks at the impact of a two- and a three-player environment with experienced and 
inexperienced players. 
Apart from the bidding environment, we want to investigate the impact of the risk 
structure that is reflected in the variance of the cost probability density. Last but 
not least, we look at the impact of governmental policies, like attributing a 
reimbursement for investment efforts in case of a loss and the impact of adding a 
second project to the sequence. 
7.1.2.2 Participants 
The experiments took place at the Faculty of Economics and Business of KU 
Leuven. Students were recruited from the courses Integrated Quality Management 
(Integrale Kwaliteitsbeheersing) and Project and Production Scheduling. Since 
these courses are part of the Master in Business Engineering program, we could 
assume that, after a brief recap, students are familiar with the necessary 
understanding concerning probability theory. The experiment was part of the 
compulsory assignments of the respective courses. In total, six sessions have been 
organized with each 30 participants. 202 students registered for a session 
depending on their availability. In order to account for no shows, some of the 
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subjects were randomly selected to be part of the reserve list. Each session had the 
same setup, but the treatments that have been tested in each session were different.  
The main limitation of this setup is that we have only invited students to 
participate in this experiment, while a more trustworthy setup would entail project 
managers. This point is also discussed in the literature with for instance Dyer et al. 
(1989
a
) and Falk and Heckman (2009) being in favor of the use of students and 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) claiming that people that are familiar with the 
bidding setting considerably better approach the equilibrium while inexperienced 
participants (e.g., students) consistently underbid. Nevertheless, since we aim to 
test different scenarios (or treatments), a large number of participants is required in 
order to have sufficient independent observations. Therefore, we preferred to 
perform this study with business students. 
7.1.2.3 Treatments and cohorts 
In order to obtain a satisfactory number of independent observations, we need to 
limit the number of treatments to test. In three out of six sessions, participants were 
competing against only one opponent. These are the two-player treatments. In the 
remaining sessions, each participant was playing against two competitors, i.e., the 
three-player treatments. Within these two classes of sessions, three situations have 
been tested: 
1) A base case setting with a single project being tendered in each period; 
2) A single-project setting in which the losing bidders are reimbursed with 
50% of their research investment efforts; 
3) A setting in which each project consists of two projects: in the case an 
inexperienced player wins the first project, he or she becomes experienced 
in the second tender. 
Within each session, two conditions are sequentially tested: a low-risk setting and 
a high-risk setting. Consequently, this leads to twelve treatments for this bidding 
experiment. Table 7.1 lists the treatments and their representation. 
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  Low risk High risk 
2 players 
1 project, no compensation 2/1/L 2/1/H 
1 project, 50% compensation 2/C/L 2/C/H 
2 projects, no compensation 2/2/L 2/2/H 
3 players 
1 project, no compensation 3/1/L 3/1/H 
1 project, 50% compensation 3/C/L 3/C/H 
2 projects, no compensation 3/2/L 3/2/H 
Table 7.1 Overview of treatments and their codification “number of 
players/setting/risk” 
In order to investigate the possible diversification of strategies with respect to the 
differences in experience levels, we have randomly attributed a role to the 
participants: 50% of the players are experienced and 50% of the players are 
inexperienced. Being experienced means that this participant has, on average, an 
advantage in the expected cost (i.e., a smaller mean value of the cost probability 
density) and a knowledge advantage (i.e., a smaller variance of the cost probability 
density). The role of the players did not change during the session.  
The participants are divided in groups or cohorts, consisting of six players. The 
participants of the experiment are unaware which players are part of their group. 
Each group consists of three experienced and three inexperienced players. For each 
period of the game, the participants from the same cohort are randomly matched. 
This is necessary to avoid collusive behavior. A subgame is defined as a 
combination of experience levels. Since we only include two experience levels 
(i.e., E for the experienced player and I for the inexperienced player), there are 
three subgames in the two-player case (i.e., I/I, I/E and E/E) and four subgames in 
the three-player setting (i.e., I/I/I, I/I/E, I/E/E and E/E/E). Consequently, with three 
experienced and three inexperienced players in a cohort, the following number of 
combinations for matching are obtained: 
- In the two-player case: 
o 3 permutations for I/I matching 
o 9 permutations for I/E matching  
o 3 permutations for I/I matching 
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- In the three-player case: 
o 1 permutation for I/I/I matching 
o 9 permutations for I/I/E matching 
o 9 permutations for I/E/E matching 
o 1 permutation for E/E/E matching 
One might argue that the single permutation (for I/I/I and E/E/E) might lead to 
collusive behavior. Nevertheless, this is usually not the case in single-shot games 
with three players and without the possibility of communication.  
Given this random matching within a cohort, we only acquire one independent 
observation per cohort within this auction setting. This limits the possibilities of 
finding statistical significance for the research hypotheses. Therefore, we have five 
cohorts for each session. Given that six sessions have been organized and that 
there are six participants in each cohort, the entire experiment required the 
participation of 180 students. 
7.1.2.4 Process of a period 
At the start of the experiment, the participants are attributed a specific role: 
experienced or inexperienced. In each period, the software randomly selects an 
actual base cost that is the same for all bidders but that is not revealed to the 
bidders. Subsequently, the participant needs to enter an investment percentage and 
a mark-up percentage for each possible combination of experience levels of the 
opponent(s). The investment choice determines the remaining variability of the 
cost probability distribution. Moreover, the investment decision will have an 
impact on the actual cost of the project. In line with assumptions 3 and 4 from 
Section 3.2, investing more results in a lower expected actual cost and a smaller 
standard deviation of this cost probability density. Of course, investment costs 
money (i.e., € 10,000 per percentage point while the project cost will be around € 
1,000,000). The impact of the decision in the high-risk sessions is shown on the 
strategy sheet of Figure 7.1. These values can be found by applying the following 
CHAPTER 7.  Two empirical approaches 
 
 
183 
parameter values to equations (3.5) and (3.6) : 𝛽𝑖 = 0.1, 𝛽𝑒 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.1, 𝜆𝑖 =
𝜆𝑒 = 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇𝑒 = 0.25, 𝜎 = 0 and 𝛾𝑖 = 0.1 for the low-risk treatments and 𝛾𝑖 = 0.2 
for the high-risk treatments. However, the direct cost impact is here calculated as a 
discount instead of a penalty. 
 
In the next stage of the game, which is executed in the background, the participants 
within the same cohort, are randomly matched. As stated in the previous 
paragraph, the participants needed to enter investment and mark-up percentages for 
each possible combination of experience levels for their opponents. Consequently, 
Figure 7.1 Investment impact in the high-risk treatments 
7.1. Laboratory experiment 
 
 
184 
in the two-player sessions, two investment and two mark-up percentages are 
required (i.e., for opponent being I or opponent being E), while three investment 
and three mark-up levels are requested in three-player settings (i.e., for opponents 
being I/I, I/E or E/E). Figure 7.2 represents the input screen of session 3/1/L. The 
reason why participants are randomly matched is to avoid learning effects or 
biased results due to a focus on particular scenarios. Therefore, we follow the 
method of Dyer et al. (1989
b
) to only match the participants after the input stage. 
An example of the matching protocol in a three-player setting is shown in Table 
7.2. The computer program then selects the appropriate investment levels and 
mark-up levels according to the outcome of the matching. 
  
The investment decision then modifies the base cost given the fractions shown on 
Figure 7.1, arriving at the average cost which will also be the actual cost in the 
case this bidder wins. The player-dependent actual cost (as the actual cost also 
depends on the experience and investment) is only revealed to the winning bidder. 
Moreover, the standard deviation of the cost probability distribution is computed 
as the investment-dependent percentage of the average cost. Now that the software 
Figure 7.2 Input screen for session 3/1/L 
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has shaped the cost probability density, it randomly selects a cost for this player 
and applies the mark-up that the participant has entered. This is the resulting bid.  
Group 
No 
Experience Experience 
 
Sub-
game 
No 
Experience Experience 
Period Q R S X Y Z 
 
Period Q R S X Y Z 
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
 
1 A B A A B B 
2 1 1 2 1 2 2 
 
2 A A B A B B 
3 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 
3 C C C D D D 
4 1 1 2 2 2 1 
 
4 A A B B B A 
5 2 1 1 2 1 2 
 
5 B A A B A B 
6 1 2 1 2 2 1 
 
6 A B A B B A 
7 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 
7 C C C D D D 
8 2 1 1 1 2 2 
 
8 B A A A B B 
9 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 
9 C C C D D D 
10 2 1 1 2 1 2 
 
10 B A A B A B 
11 1 1 2 2 1 2 
 
11 A A B B A B 
12 1 2 1 2 2 1 
 
12 A B A B B A 
13 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 
13 C C C D D D 
14 1 1 2 2 1 2 
 
14 A A B B A B 
15 1 1 2 1 2 2 
 
15 A A B A B B 
16 2 1 1 2 2 1 
 
16 B A A B B A 
17 1 2 1 1 2 2 
 
17 A B A A B B 
18 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 
18 C C C D D D 
19 1 2 1 2 2 1 
 
19 A B A B B A 
20 2 1 1 2 1 2 
 
20 B A A B A B 
Table 7.2 Example of the matching procedure for three-player treatments. The left 
table shows the division in groups within each cohort and the right table shows the 
respective subgame in order to select the correct input data. 
The winner of the period is the one who has submitted the lowest bid. The losing 
bidders lose their investment, while the pay-off for the winner is given by the 
proposed bid minus the actual cost of the project minus the investment in research. 
The output screen for a participant shows whether the competitor(s) was/were 
experienced or inexperienced, the participant’s cost estimate and the resulting bid, 
the lowest submitted bid and the identity of the winner (I or E) followed by the 
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participant’s personal stepwise pay-off calculation (Figure 7.3). Consequently, the 
pay-offs of the opponents are not revealed.  
 
In the single-project treatments, the period ends, pay-offs are reset to zero and the 
next period commences with a new input screen. In the two-project treatments, 
there is an additional stage after this output stage. A new input screen appears, but 
now only a single investment and a single mark-up needs to be entered. This is 
because the participants will be matched to the same opponent(s) for the second 
tender. Nonetheless, if an inexperienced player has won the first project, he or she 
becomes experienced for the second project. Experienced players stay experienced 
regardless of whether they won or lost the first tender. As a result, at this stage, 
each participant perfectly knows the identity of the opponents (i.e., the experience 
levels in the subgame). Once all bidders have entered their investment efforts and 
mark-ups, the software simulates and subsequently compares the bids. The profits 
and losses are added to these from the first project to which an interest of 5% has 
been applied in order to account for the timing aspect of the pipeline. After this 
second output stage, pay-offs are reset and a new period starts. 
Figure 7.3 Output screen for session 3/1/L 
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7.1.2.5 Example 
Consider the 3/1/L session and a player that is inexperienced. In the input screen, 
the subject needs to enter the investment and mark-up choices for the three 
possible subgames: 
- In the case of two inexperienced players: 2% investment, 15% mark-up; 
- In the case of one inexperienced and one experienced player: 1.5% 
investment, 18% mark-up; 
- In the case of two experienced players: 1% investment, 18% mark-up. 
Once all players from the same cohort have filled out the data input boxes, the 
software performs some computation steps in the background and the player is 
randomly matched with two other players. These appear to be both inexperienced. 
Therefore, the software selects the 2%-15% decision combination. Firstly, a cost 
base is selected that is the same for all players. In this example, the cost base is € 
962,314. In the second step, the computer shapes the cost probability distribution 
based on the investment choice and the experience level. The 2% investment 
effort results in an average cost factor of 0.961 and a standard deviation of 11.70% 
in the low-risk scenario. Consequently, the actual cost in case he wins amounts to 
0.961*962,314= € 924,784 and the standard deviation is 11.70%*924,784= € 
108,200. From this distribution, the program randomly selects a value that equals 
the cost estimate for the contractor: € 900,145. The program then applies the 
mark-up to this cost estimate: 900,145*(1+15%) = € 1,035,167 which is the bid 
that is sent to the government. The software follows the same procedure for the 
opponents, resulting in a bid of € 1,014,362 for competitor 1 and € 1,245,101 for 
competitor 2. Consequently, this player has lost the tender and the pay-off equals 
his lost investment or € -20,000. 
Alternatively, imagine that the software selected a cost estimate of € 824,701 with 
all other figures remaining constant. This would result in a bid of € 948,406. In 
this case, the player wins the tender and the pay-off obtained in this period equals: 
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948,406 (proposed bid) – 924,784 (actual cost) – 20,000 (investment effort) = € 
3,622. 
7.1.2.6 Process of a session 
The participants are randomly assigned to a computer in the room. They have 
received an envelope with the necessary information about the session. It consists 
of a protocol, registration sheets and a feedback sheet. Moreover, they are 
requested to sign an informed consent form
4
 that ensures that everyone is willing 
to participate and knows about the purpose of the research. They also receive an 
information sheet with data concerning the assumptions and the impact of their 
actions, which has been further explained in Section 7.1.2.4.  
Afterwards, the experimenter gives a thorough explanation of the purpose and the 
process of the experiment. The instructions last about 30 to 40 minutes. A full 
version of the protocol of an example session can be found in Appendix D. After 
the explanation, there is the possibility to ask questions. Afterwards, the 
experimental software is started. The Z-Tree software is used for the 
implementation of the experiment (Fischbacher 2007). Each session is divided in 
two parts: a low-risk part and a high-risk part. The sequence of low-risk and high-
risk is randomly determined. Then, at least two guided trial periods for the first 
part of the session are made to get familiar with the software, the game parameters 
and the process of the period. Afterwards, the payable periods start. The number of 
periods played equals 20 for the treatments 2/1, 2/C, 3/1 and 3/C, 16 for 2/2 and 13 
for 3/2. The aim was to limit the total duration of the experiment to two hours and 
as the number of inputs differs for the different sessions, the number of periods has 
been adjusted accordingly. After the first part of the session, there is a short break 
before the second part takes off. Also the second treatment of the session starts 
with at least two trial periods.  
                                                     
4
 For the organization of the experiment, we received approval from the ethical commission 
of KU Leuven (SMEC, Sociaal-Maatschappelijke Ethische Commissie). The approval 
number is G-2014 10 061. 
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At the end of the experiment, the participants are requested to leave their personal 
details for the profit calculations and to fill out a feedback form on which they had 
to write down their strategy: “how did you play against (in)experienced players?”, 
“did you apply a different strategy in the high-risk or low-risk setting?”.  
A debriefing session has been organized to inform the participants about the 
outcome of the experiment and to show the most important differences within and 
between the sessions.  
A final aspect that is worth noting concerns the compensation mechanism and 
score calculation. Also from this perspective, one needs to avoid that participants 
are optimizing the entire game. In each period, we study a single-shot setting in the 
single-project treatments or a two-project setting in treatments 2/2 and 3/2. 
Therefore, after each period, the pay-offs are reset to zero. To calculate the score 
of the participants, six periods are randomly selected in each of the sessions. For 
these periods, the average pay-offs are calculated and compared to the average 
pay-off within the respective cohort. The pay-offs of the participants are 
transformed into a standard normal distance from the average. These values 
represent the score. Since the experiment is part of the assignments in the 
curriculum, we decided not to reward the participants in monetary terms. 
Nevertheless, a show-up fee was attributed to the students in the form of a 
teambuilding activity with the entire group. 
7.1.3 Research questions 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the theoretical results with respect 
to the equilibrium bidding strategies and their dynamics differ from a situation 
with human interaction. When we offer the same bidding model (i.e., cost 
probability distributions and parameters) to a computer or to a group of people: 
how do the respective equilibria relate? First of all, Section 7.1.4.3 studies whether 
there is a gap between the equilibria in the laboratory experiment and the 
theoretical Nash equilibrium.  
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A second set of questions relates to the dynamics of the equilibria. The previous 
chapters have studied the impact of contingencies, the number of shortlisted 
bidders and a bidder’s competitive position on the investment and bidding results. 
This study hopes to identify whether the findings from the laboratory experiment 
confirm or nuance the findings from the computer experiments. 
Last but not least, the government, as the developer of the tendering process, has 
an important stake in the resulting strategy equilibrium profile. Therefore, this 
study assesses how the policies of pre-tender investment reimbursements and a 
(short) pipeline of projects are perceived by bidders. 
7.1.4 Results 
The analysis of the experimental outcomes is a challenging task and one needs to 
beware of underlying aspects and hidden features of the experiment that might 
have an influence on the statistical analysis. Therefore, this section undertakes a 
robust statistical analysis before discussing the most important learnings in Section 
7.1.5. Moreover, the number of independent observations is rather limited. As 
discussed in Section 7.1.2.3, the experiment only deals with five cohorts per 
treatment. Since the people within a cohort interact, this only leads to a single 
independent observation per cohort. Consequently, the experiment delivers five 
independent observations for each treatment. A parametric analysis on the basis of 
the limited number of data points would require important assumptions on the data 
structure that would not be guaranteed. Therefore, the analysis in this section is 
based on a descriptive analysis, together with non-parametric statistical tests.  
Suriya (2013) claims that a minimum of eight independent observations leads to 
robust statistical results of the non-parametric tests, but some papers, like ours, do 
consider less independent observations for all or some treatments (e.g., Haruvy and 
Katok 2007, Georganas and Kagel 2011). However, a lot of information is lost in a 
non-parametric analysis because these tests are all based on averages within a 
group over a number of periods, so that a lot of intra-group variability is concealed 
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(Goeree et al. 2013). Hence, this section also develops a mixed effects model to 
study the impact of the treatments on the bidding results. Albeit a parametric 
approach, this study supports the non-parametric findings which is also the case in 
other parametric regression studies (e.g., Songchoo and Suriya 2012, Kiatkarun 
and Suriya 2013). 
7.1.4.1 The periods of study 
Before studying all the results, it is important to decide which periods will be taken 
into account. One needs to reckon the fact that in the periods at the beginning of 
the session, the participants are still learning about the game, the decision variables 
and the parameters. Moreover, as the total number of periods is shown, also the 
final round could lead to biased behavior. We observed that the variance in the 
average responses per group in the single-project treatments is larger when we 
study periods 5-9 than when periods 15-19 are considered. Selecting only a single 
period to study the behavior might also bias the results and therefore the data from 
the final five periods of each treatment (not taking into account the last period) are 
selected to undergo the statistical analysis.  
This results section also compares the realized pay-offs with the pay-offs in the 
equilibrium of the computer experiment. In order to obtain sufficient data points to 
make a valid comparison, two measures have been taken. Firstly, in the single-
project scenarios, the pay-offs of ten periods have been considered to limit the 
impact of pay-off outliers. Due to the lower number of executed periods, only five 
periods are considered in the two-project treatments. Secondly, in line with a 
similar procedure in Dyer et al. (1989
b
), the pay-offs in each round have been 
calculated for all players in all possible matching combinations within the cohort, 
averaged for each scenario.  
The generation of random numbers for the estimated cost simulation is an 
important step in the laboratory experiment and greatly influences the pay-offs 
(i.e., if a “very negative” random number is chosen as the cost, one will 
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considerably underestimate the cost which could lead to a larger probability of 
winning, but with a negative pay-off). This outcome could then change the 
strategic behavior in subsequent periods. As it might be necessary to reduce the 
bias when comparing the bidding behavior over treatments, the same set of random 
variables has been applied in the different sessions for the respective periods 
(Brosig and Reiβ 2007, Brunner et al. 2010). This method hopes to account for any 
biases in the behavior that are due to randomness. 
7.1.4.2 Statistical tests 
A plethora of statistical tests is available to study the bidding outcomes from a 
non-parametric or parametric angle. Which test to choose depends on the 
interrelation between the observations and the hypothesis that is tested. 
Nonetheless, because of the very limited number of independent observations, the 
non-parametric alternatives are preferred. This paragraph lists the non-parametric 
tests and the reason why these are selected. 
A first set of hypotheses investigates the difference between the observed bidding 
behavior in the experiments and the prescribed theoretical bidding behavior. In a 
parametric setting, this study would involve a one-sample t-test. The non-
parametric alternative is the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test that tests 
whether the median of a data set equals a specified value. 
While this first set of hypotheses compares the behavior with a fixed (theoretical) 
number, the remainder of the tests compares the dynamics of the behavior of the 
players themselves. The alternative hypotheses are derived from the expected 
dynamics that the theoretical equilibrium outcomes predict.  
A second set of hypotheses compares the behavior of the same players in different 
conditions. This is the case for participants that are subject to a within-subjects 
design. On the one hand, this type of hypothesis is applicable when one wants to 
compare the different investment and mark-up choices for the different 
compositions of the opponents, previously referred to as the subgame. Do 
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participants enter other numbers when they would play against inexperienced or 
experienced players? On the other hand, this approach is also applicable when one 
compares the strategic behavior in the low-risk and the high-risk setting, since in 
each session subjects are playing both a low-risk as well as a high-risk treatment. 
As a result, we are dealing with paired observations. Instead of using the 
parametric paired t-test, we opt for the paired-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Lastly, the experiment also wants to compare the behavior with respect to the 
different sessions. From this session perspective, we have a between-subjects 
design, because the samples are independent. These hypotheses answer the 
question whether the input data in the different sessions come from the same 
underlying data structure. The most common statistical test to compare two 
independent samples is the Mann-Whitney U test, also referred to as the Mann-
Whitney Wilcoxon test. 
All tests have been executed in a subgame-by-subgame (i.e., comparing two 
samples pair-wise for each equivalent combination of experience levels like 
comparing a subgame I/I in a 2/1/L and a 2/1/H treatment) or scenario-by-scenario 
analysis (e.g., comparing the input in a 2/1/L scenario for playing against opponent 
I on the one hand and opponent E on the other hand). Due to the limited number of 
observations, it could be difficult to significantly support or reject the expectations. 
Therefore, also aggregate analyses are executed. The respective p-values are 
consistently reported between brackets.  
7.1.4.3 Participant’s play versus equilibrium play 
The parameter settings and treatments that have been described in Section 7.1.2 
have been implemented in the PPP computer model with a continuous set of 
investment and mark-up percentages of Chapter 6. The resulting equilibrium 
strategy for a player, for each of the possible subgames in a particular treatment is 
found in Table 7.3, Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. Also the expected pay-off in 
equilibrium is reported. Moreover, the tables summarize the average play of the 
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participants in the selected periods (discussed in Section 7.1.4.1). Note that these 
averages are just reported as a matter of comparison, but formal (non-parametric) 
statistical tests are required to present robust insights.  
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2/1/L I I 2.50% 13.63% -7,367 2.23% 23.72% 51,049 
E 2.31% 13.57% -239 2.04% 19.59% 22,902 
E I 2.03% 14.58% 10,312 2.75% 22.15% 59,328 
E 1.91% 14.16% 26,272 2.66% 16.33% 23,417 
2/1/H I I 2.76% 19.94% 16,296 3.94% 26.50% 40,307 
E 2.79% 17.75% -3,026 3.81% 22.33% 13,137 
E I 1.85% 16.72% 36,046 4.41% 24.75% 46,663 
E 2.58% 15.31% 30,743 4.38% 19.09% 13,080 
2/C/L I I 2.24% 14.89% -1,751 3.14% 24.84% 55,197 
E 2.24% 12.96% -10,251 3.05% 20.56% 26,954 
E I 2.91% 12.26% 14,242 3.60% 23.06% 63,010 
E 3.17% 11.68% 6,826 3.59% 17.35% 28,757 
2/C/H I I 2.72% 17.99% 14,786 4.79% 28.05% 52,362 
E 2.27% 18.62% -18,701 4.72% 23.92% 26,100 
E I 4.06% 13.32% 35,508 5.00% 26.18% 59,902 
E 4.32% 12.85% 19,701 5.00% 20.90% 29,011 
2/2/L
b 
I I 1.72% 15.30% 4,194 2.19% 19.28% 31,538 
E 1.95% 16.33% -4,835 /
a 
/ / 
E I 1.96% 14.49% 24,476 / / / 
E 1.98% 14.57% 20,502 2.65% 16.34% 23,498 
2/2/H
b 
I I 2.48% 17.03% -393 3.88% 21.95% 20,996 
E 2.44% 17.71% -19,442 3.24% 25.23% 7,028 
E I 2.94% 17.32% 26,979 4.77% 24.02% 62,903 
E 2.87% 16.89% 19,745 4.38% 19.11% 12,678 
Table 7.3 Equilibria and average play in the two-player treatments 
aRefers to the fact that no convergence was found in the exact equilibrium calculation 
bOnly the strategies for the first project in the pipeline have been reported 
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3/1/L I I/I 1.69% 13.96% -24,156 0.97% 21.68% 17,381 
I/E 1.52% 14.60% -17,495 0.00% 25.62% 11,543 
E/E 1.43% 15.51% -21,257 0.00% 47.67% 200 
E I/I 1.32% 11.95% -7,773 2.85% 22.78% 64,862 
I/E 1.62% 10.22% -9,416 2.58% 16.16% 21,456 
E/E 1.83% 9.76% -14,884 
0.00%
1 
2.20%
2 
23.60%
1 
15.61%
2 10,285 
3/1/H I I/I 1.98% 15.89% -23,226 2.80% 25.05% 1,547 
I/E 2.10% 14.75% -30,368 
0.00%
1 
3.40%
1 
50.00%
1
 
22.72%
1 14 
E/E 2.02% 19.28% -37,548 0.00% 50.00% -7,690 
E I/I 2.06% 13.61% -6,663 4.12% 24.17% 36,803 
I/E 2.43% 11.06% -11,767 4.11% 19.26% 8,681 
E/E 2.63% 9.36% -16,961 
0.00%
1 
4.11%
2 
50.00%
1 
19.17%
2
 
11,443 
3/C/L I I/I 2.55% 14.17% -9,337 2.25% 21.32% 13,621 
I/E 1.95% 14.47% -14,510 1.66% 21.52% 3,911 
E/E 1.75% 15.25% -18,012 0% 50.00% 60 
E I/I 2.50% 9.09% -4,113 3.41% 19.83% 39,324 
I/E 2.48% 9.37% -6,678 3.55% 17.14% 26,824 
E/E 2.19% 9.37% -8,924 2.68% 15.39% 12,235 
3/C/H I I/I 2.57% 22.72% 866 3.99% 24.76% 6,967 
I/E 2.46% 21.11% -19,756 3.57% 25.04% -2,940 
E/E 2.38% 22.52% -20,398 0.72% 50.00% -6,850 
E I/I 3.16% 11.10% 9,617 4.99% 22.52% 28,932 
I/E 2.58% 10.81% 4,088 5.00% 20.36% 21,295 
E/E 2.49% 10.59% 422 4.45% 18.75% -2,563 
Table 7.4 Equilibria and average play in the three-player, single-project treatments 
1,2Refers to the fact that there is an asymmetric strategy for the players with the same experience 
level. The superscript means that either one or two of the equivalently experienced players apply that 
particular choice. 
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3/2/L I 
I/I 2.37% 14.29% -21,885 
0.00%
1
 
1.30%
2
 
18.10%
1
 
15.22%
2 1,858 
I/E 1.82% 14.56% -13,670 0.00% 23.77% 5,813 
E/E 2.04% 15.71% -18,939 0.00% 40.07% 95 
E I/I 1.62% 11.59% 1,942 2.98% 19.70% 55,174 
I/E 1.75% 11.04% 3,450 2.53% 15.97% 19,795 
E/E 2.04% 9.99% -2,379 
0.00%
1
 
2.19%
2 
23.58%
1 
15.61%
2
 
10,326 
3/2/H I I/I 2.35% 17.21% -33,089 2.73% 20.65% -10,293 
I/E 1.89% 19.01% -33,810 
0.00%
1 
3.22%
1 
50.00%
1
 
21.72%
1
 
-3,855 
E/E 1.52% 20.71% -22,455 0.00% 50.00% -7,710 
E I/I 1.72% 18.46% 4,758 4.26% 22.18% 33,881 
I/E 1.47% 20.40% 6,538 4.10% 19.18% 8,424 
E/E 1.74% 21.21% 23,707 
0.00%
1 
4.10%
2 
50.00%
1 
19.20%
2 3,923 
Table 7.5 Equilibria and average play in the three-player, two-project treatments 
1,2Refers to the fact that there is an asymmetric strategy for the players with the same experience 
level. The superscript means that either one or two of the equivalently experienced players apply that 
particular choice. 
The one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test for each of the subgames compares the 
played equilibrium with the expected investment and mark-up choice. In the two-
player setting, the alternative hypothesis that players tend to invest less than the 
choice that the equilibrium prescribes is confirmed in 82% of the total number of 
subgames. Mark-ups are significantly below expectation in 82% of the scenarios at 
a significance level of 10%. Instead of comparing each pair of observations 
separately, all results have been compared on a pairwise aggregated basis, 
confirming the underinvestment (p=3.78*10
-16
) and underbidding (p<2.2*10
-16
). 
The median of the gaps is a decrease in investment percentages of 0.96% and in 
the mark-up percentages of 6.86%.  
In the three-player setting, the observations led to a different null hypothesis for 
experienced and inexperienced players. For inexperienced players, the null 
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hypothesis that investments are equal to or smaller than the prescribed equilibrium 
is rejected in 61% of the individual subgames at a confidence level of 90%. Also in 
61% of the subgames of experienced players, the opposite null hypothesis (i.e., 
that investments are equal or larger than the equilibrium) is rejected. Executing this 
statistical test on the aggregate results leads to the same observation: inexperienced 
players tend to overinvest (p=7.8*10
-7
) and experienced players tend to 
underinvest (p=1.8*10
-10
). For the mark-ups, the aggregate study clearly supports 
the underbidding behavior (p<2.2*10
-16
), which is confirmed in the subgame-by-
subgame analysis in 89% of the cases. 
The large gaps in the realized pay-offs of the laboratory experiment with the 
expected pay-offs in equilibrium underline the consequences of the deviating 
strategic behavior. Nevertheless, the participants do outperform the theoretically 
expected pay-off in the E/E games of treatment 2/2/H and the E/E/E games of 
treatment 3/2/H. Could this be a “hidden collusion”?  
Finally, there are some cases in which a player should stay out of the three-player 
market (i.e., no investment and a 50% mark-up) in the high-risk treatments. In 
practice, this almost never occurs. There were only seven out of ninety participants 
in the three-player treatments that decided to stay out of the market in at least one 
period. Nevertheless there are only two inexperienced players that consistently 
decided to not participate as described by the equilibrium in the high-risk settings 
when playing against experienced opponents. Moreover, Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 
highlight that it is unsustainable to invite three bidders in the treatments 3/1/H and 
3/2/H with all experienced players. One contractor should decide to stay out of the 
market. In the laboratory setting, this never occurred.   
7.1.4.4 Low-risk play versus high-risk play 
In each session, participants are subjected to both a low-risk treatment as well as a 
high-risk treatment. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for paired observations on a 
subgame-by-subgame level in two-player treatments reported a significant increase 
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(confidence = 90%) in the investment levels in 58% of the subgames and an 
increase in mark-ups in 75% of the cases. The aggregated analysis rejects the null 
hypotheses that investments are equal or lower in the high-risk treatments than in 
low-risk treatments (p=2.1*10
-6
) and an equivalent result with respect to the mark-
ups (p=5.4*10
-7
).  
The subgame-by-subgame analysis for the same hypotheses are less outspoken for 
the three-player treatments, i.e., only significant results in 39% of the investment 
comparisons and in 44% of the mark-up comparisons. On an aggregate level 
though, we could conclude that, on average, investments and mark-ups tend to be 
higher in high-risk treatments than in low-risk treatments (p=2.5*10
-4
 and 
p=2.1*10
-10
 respectively). The median of the investment increase is 0.27% and 
3.26% for the mark-up increase.  
7.1.4.5 Subgame-dependent play 
The next step is to investigate whether the participants diversify their strategy over 
the different compositions of the competitors. In other terms, do they insert 
different figures in the respective investment input and mark-up input boxes of 
Figure 7.2. Looking at these dissimilarities from the theoretical Nash equilibrium 
angle, the differences are sometimes outspoken and sometimes quite subtle. Albeit 
a little bit simplistic, we could bluntly generalize the dynamics into the following 
statements. Firstly, lower investment ought to be expected when the opponents are 
more experienced. Secondly, the mark-ups are expected to be increasing for 
inexperienced players and decreasing for experienced players when the 
competitive position of the opponent(s) becomes stronger. 
No straight line can be drawn by analyzing the scenario-by-scenario comparisons. 
While there seems to be a general tendency that is in line with the statements, 
statistical significance is often lacking as the impact is subtle. Admittedly, looking 
at the theoretical equilibria in the two-player settings, these investment differences 
are expected to be rather small. Interestingly, the empirical analysis does find 
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significance for an opposite tendency, namely that an experienced player invests 
more when he plays against an experienced opponent (p=0.04). Moreover, that 
experienced player also requests a smaller mark-up (p=0.05).  
While there is also no outspoken result in the scenario-by-scenario study, the 
aggregate three-player results point towards a decreasing investment when 
inexperienced players are playing against I/E (p=0.03) and E/E (p=0.06) relative to 
an I/I situation. The mark-up difference for inexperienced players is also 
significant in that case (p=0.02). The analysis for the experienced players did not 
significantly reveal these dynamics. In summary, while we expect players to tune 
their behavior with respect to the competitors, these tendencies are not always 
supported by the empirical evidence from the experiment.  
7.1.4.6 Session-dependent play  
Two governmental policies are tested in the experiment: the impact of a 
government reimbursement and the impact of an introduction of a second project. 
For the assessment of the latter policy, we only looked at the changes for the first 
tender in the pipeline. For the session comparison, the 2/1 and 3/1 treatments are 
considered as the baseline. The tested hypotheses are defined by the expected 
dynamics of the theoretical equilibria. As these dynamics are often depending on 
other variables, i.e., the project risk and the experience levels of the opponent(s), a 
subgame-by-subgame analysis is executed for the low-risk and high-risk settings 
separately.  
Two-player treatments 
The introduction of an investment reimbursement is expected to result in greater 
investment efforts, which is confirmed for experienced players in the low-risk 
setting (p=0.05 for play against I and p=3.9*10
-3
 for play against E) and the high-
risk setting (p=3.9*10
-3
 for play against I or E). In the high-risk case, experienced 
players should move to the maximum investment level according to the theory and 
this is the case for 4 out of 15 participants in the selected periods. The mark-up 
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influence tends to be limited in theoretical terms and also in the experiment, no 
strong dynamics are found, except for a mark-up decrease for the inexperienced 
players (p=0.08).  
The introduction of a second project without spillover effects of the investments 
was expected to only create additional incentives for experienced players that face 
inexperienced players which is interestingly confirmed in the experiment (p=0.03). 
The inexperienced player in this particular subgame diminishes the investment 
effort (p=0.05). Concerning the mark-ups, the statistical tests were not able to 
reveal any dynamics.  
Three-player treatments 
The introduction of compensation could lead to higher investment efforts, which is 
the case in the low-risk setting if the inexperienced player faces I/I (p=0.05) and if 
the experienced player faces I/I (p=0.02) or I/E (p=0.05). In the high-risk case it is 
only the experienced player facing I/I who finds enough statistical significance for 
the investment effort adjustment in a positive direction. From a mark-up 
perspective, inexperienced players even increase the preferred mark-up. Also in the 
single-project setting of Chapter 4, we claim that reimbursements should amount 
up to 80% in order to trigger additional incentives. Additional sessions are required 
to assess this impact. 
Last but not least, the introduction of the second project has mostly a mark-up 
impact, but not as expected. The mark-ups of the experienced players are 
significantly greater in the high-risk treatment of the two-project pipeline with 
respect to 3/1/H (p smaller than 0.01 for all subgames). 
Comparing treatments is a daunting task and the previous analysis could not give 
us very clear insights into the overall dynamics, because of the limited number of 
independent observations. One divergent result is heavily penalized in the non-
parametric test. Besides, the treatments are organized in different sessions and 
played by different cohorts. The impact of the group can highly influence the 
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equilibrium convergence. Therefore, it is interesting to account for these group 
effects. As a result, the next section adventures to assume the parametric nature of 
the data and builds a linear mixed effects model. 
7.1.4.7 Linear mixed effects model 
The input data for the linear mixed effects model consist of investment and mark-
up percentages from the five selected periods of all subjects. The data of the two-
player treatments and the three-player treatments are split. Since we have different 
observations for each subject, we should account for the fact that these are panel 
data. Moreover, the non-parametric tests do not account for intra-group variability. 
Consequently, a mixed effects model is developed with the variable “subject”, 
referring to the identification number of the participant, and the variable “group”, 
referring to the identification number of the cohort as random effects. The fixed 
effects in the model are the player’s experience level (i.e., the variable “exp”), the 
experience vector for the opponents (i.e., the variable “opp”) and a factor variable 
that refers to the specific treatment (i.e., the variable “tr”). Furthermore, including 
the first-order interaction effects improves the Restricted Maximum Likelihood, so 
that these effects are also added to the mixed effects model. Conceptually, the 
model is defined as follows: 
Investment ~ exp + opp + tr + exp * opp + exp * tr + opp * tr + (1|subject) + 
(1|group)  
Mark-up ~ exp + opp + tr + exp * opp + exp * tr + opp * tr + (1|subject) + 
(1|group)  
with the following codification in the two-player model (Table 7.6): 
- “exp” is the experience level  of the participant (0 = “inexperienced”, 1= 
“experienced”);  
- “opp” is the experience level of the opponent (0 = “inexperienced”, 1 = 
“experienced”); 
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- “tr” is the treatment identity (t1 = 2/1/L, t2 = 2/1/H, t3 = 2/C/L, t4 = 2/C/H, t5 
= 2/2/L, t6 = 2/2/H); 
and with the following codification in the three-player model (Table 7.7): 
- “exp” is the experience level of the participant (0 = “inexperienced”, 1= 
“experienced”);  
- “opp” is the experience factor for the opponents (opp1 = “I/I”, opp2 = “I/E”, 
opp3 = “E/E”); 
- “tr” is the treatment identity (t7 = 3/1/L, t8 = 3/1/H, t9 = 3/C/L, t10 = 3/C/H, 
t11 = 3/2/L, t12 = 3/2/H). 
 
 Investment Mark-up 
Random effects Variance Std. Dev. Variance Std. Dev. 
subject 0.66611 0.8162 22.352 4.728 
group 0.01827 0.1352 2.887 1.699 
Residual 1.31959 1.1487 33.207 5.763 
# observations: 1800; # subject: 90; # group: 15   
Fixed effects Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 2.55920 10.279 13.62468 8.762 
exp -0.52453 -1.586 0.96758 0.517 
opp -0.30227 -2.110 -0.04189 -0.058 
t2 0.08173 0.503 6.26737 7.691 
t3 -0.32277 -0.922 0.82927 0.379 
t4 0.04360 0.125 4.54073 2.073 
t5 -0.73190 -2.091 1.81540 0.829 
t6 -0.01000 -0.029 3.58437 1.636 
exp*opp 0.23733 2.191 -0.39782 -0.732 
exp*t2 -0.15653 -0.834 -4.09913 -4.356 
exp*t3 1.20580 2.614 -2.72280 -1.041 
exp*t4 2.10733 4.560 -5.98547 -2.288 
exp*t5 0.54260 1.176 -2.05507 -0.785 
exp*t6 0.85040 1.843 -1.03833 -0.397 
opp*t2 0.57480 3.064 -1.05287 -1.119 
opp*t3 0.31420 1.675 -1.01427 -1.078 
opp*t4 0.08760 0.467 0.31893 0.339 
opp*t5 0.31060 1.656 0.79560 0.845 
opp*t6 0.12320 0.657 0.36660 0.390 
Table 7.6 Linear mixed effects model for two-player treatments 
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The regression output shows that the introduction of the subject-specific random 
effect adds to the explanation of the variability. Comparing the two-player and 
three-player setting reveals that dynamics differ. The response to the bid 
reimbursement are for instance stronger in the three-player setting. In the two-
player treatments, the competitive position significantly influences the investment 
 Investment Mark-up 
Random effects Variance Std. Dev. Variance Std. Dev. 
subject 0.9123 0.9551 26.3726 5.1354 
group 0.0260 0.1613 0.5387 0.7339 
Residual 1.4229 1.1929 40.6828 6.3783 
# observations: 2700; # subject: 90; # group: 15   
Fixed effects Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 1.61290 5.712 14.44036 9.611 
exp -0.21527 -0.578 -2.97166 -1.486 
opp2 -0.08141 -0.547 -0.28568 -1.486 
opp3 -0.11876 -0.798 1.03792 1.305 
t8 0.36593 2.301 2.41749 2.843 
t9 0.88622 2.234 -0.67047 -0.318 
t10 1.24209 3.131 7.57569 3.589 
t11 0.65100 1.641 -0.05027 -0.024 
t12 0.68789 1.734 2.33538 1.106 
exp*opp2 0.29096 2.587 -0.52558 -0.874 
exp*opp3 0.49031 4.360 -2.70664 -4.501 
exp*t8 0.29640 1.864 -1.25004 -1.470 
exp*t9 0.26356 0.509 -1.30613 -0.469 
exp*t10 0.23062 0.445 -7.23858 -2.599 
exp*t11 -0.32067 -0.619 0.06813 0.024 
exp*t12 -0.32018 -0.618 5.09498 1.829 
opp2*t8 0.18140 0.931 -1.29547 -1.244 
opp3*t8 0.17787 0.913 -0.11433 -0.110 
opp2*t9 -0.37207 -1.910 0.83520 0.802 
opp3*t9 -0.67993 -3.491 0.99407 0.954 
opp2*t10 -0.40473 -2.078 -0.40200 -0.386 
opp3*t10 -0.55207 -2.834 -0.03840 -0.037 
opp2*t11 -0.27660 -1.420 0.40927 0.393 
opp3*t11 -0.08067 -0.414 0.22367 0.215 
opp2*t12 -0.41460 -2.128 2.41573 2.319 
opp3*t12 -0.52773 -2.709 3.43533 3.298 
Table 7.7 Linear mixed effects model for three-player treatments 
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responses, but in the three-player environment, this is also the case for the mark-
ups. The increased mark-ups that are due to the greater risks, however, are mostly 
applied by inexperienced players in both sets of experiments. The introduction of a 
second project does not really result in significant strategic turnarounds according 
to the mixed effects model. A comparison of the two tables indicates that, on 
average, the bidding behavior differs in a two-player setting or a three-player 
setting. On average, investment efforts are lower in more competitive 
environments but the introduction of a compensation (treatments 9 and 10) helps to 
bridge this gap to a certain extent. Albeit a little bit daunting to assume normality 
of the data, this linear mixed effects model succeeds in better isolating the effects 
and including the interactions, which was hardly obtainable in the non-parametric 
analyses.  
These regression results prove that policy assessments need to be seen in 
perspective as their success is impacted by the contingencies of the project and by 
the experiential parameters of the bidder and the opponents. 
7.1.5 Discussion and conclusion   
This first practical study is an attempt to verify how students, that are familiar with 
probability theory and equilibrium concepts, respond to risky bidding situations. It 
is definitely clear that participants consistently underbid which could therefore 
lead to negative pay-offs. This is especially the case in three-player settings. 
Eventually, this finding is in line with earlier auction studies (e.g., Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. 2007)  
The PPP market is very competitive and is subjected to the secrecy of bidding and 
cost data. The experiment aims to reveal as little pay-off information as possible to 
the participants, which reflects practice. Bidders only receive real cost information 
if they won a project. The winner’s curse was mostly apparent in the three-player 
treatments. It seems that bidders preferred to take risk in order to receive real cost 
information instead of mitigating the risk. Inviting three bidders in high-risk 
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projects is often unsustainable, but only few participants consistently stayed out of 
the market. In practice, this could lead to inefficient tenders and unfavorable social 
equilibria. 
Not all dynamics that were predicted by theory have been validated, but there is a 
clear response to changing risks and in general it are mainly the experienced 
players who respond to the introduction of government incentives. This supports 
the managerial insight that governments should beware of the danger that incentive 
creation mechanisms inflate the undue difference in experience levels. Besides, 
although the responses of practitioners could differ, one should still account for the 
fact that a determined willingness to win could lead to dangerous situations in 
which contractors with insufficient financial capabilities could go into default. 
From a methodological perspective, this section offered some modelling guidelines 
that could be applied in a wide range of settings. The setup considers a carefully 
designed procedure to avoid collusion and learning effects that could lead to biased 
effects. The test of this setup could pave the way for further laboratory studies in 
fields that are suffering from a lack of empirical data. 
7.2 The practitioner’s perspective 
The outcomes from the previous section stem from a laboratory experiment played 
by students that are familiar with probability and risk management concepts, but 
who are often not aware of the traps and challenges of PPP procurement. 
Nevertheless, the results gave an insight into how human dynamics might not be in 
line with expectations from theory.  
In this section, we turn towards the practitioners. Assumptions needed to be made 
in order to build the model, taking into account the trade-off between analytical 
manageability and the trustworthy representation of complexity. The models have 
led to results and policies, but so far the triangulation of these results has been left 
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at the surface. This is the time at which the extensive modelling draws back to its 
practical application: the real world of public-private partnerships. 
Along the course of the project, a research network has been established for model 
building and assumption triangulating purposes. Moreover, in a later stage of the 
project, intermediate findings have been discussed with a number of international 
contracting companies, Belgian and Australian public institutions and a set of 
advisory firms. The purpose of this section is to present how the conclusions from 
this dissertation are put in perspective from a practitioner’s point of view and how 
the results are confirmed or nuanced by experience from practice. The subsequent 
sections cover the main themes that have consistently been covered in the previous 
chapters: the competitive environment, the project risk and the two government 
intervention mechanisms, namely the research cost reimbursement and the project 
agenda.  
It is outside the scope of this dissertation to give a full empirical analysis of the 
current market and about the tendering strategies of consortia or public institutions. 
We endeavored to gather bidding data, but the highly competitive and immature 
nature of the PPP market inhibits to retrieve these very sensitive data. 
Nevertheless, attempts are currently made by European research networks to 
assemble a market overview based on case studies. Unfortunately, what is really 
living within the consortia from a strategic angle will always be hard to unravel.  
This section discusses some important feedback from a selection of the 
interviewees (Table 7.8). Opting for a multi-faceted and multi-stakeholder view, 
the selected respondents are recruited in developed and developing countries at the 
public and the contractors’ side and among advisors of the middle field. However, 
since we only exhibit a few opinions, it should be clear that these views are not 
generalizable. The country-specific and project-specific peculiarities inhibit 
imposing an all-embracing view on the theoretical findings. The interviews with 
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the practitioners had a semi-structured, open-ended nature based on a predefined 
list of themes.  
Respondent Function Region of expertise 
A Partnerships Victoria Victoria (Australia) 
B Manager at Department of Treasury & 
Finance South Australia  
South Australia 
(Australia) 
C Executive director of investment company Australia and other 
developed countries 
D PPP project coordinator Chile 
E Independent PPP consultant Czech Republic 
F Independent PPP consultant South Africa 
G Principal at infrastructure advisory service 
provider 
Developing countries 
H Director at advisory firm Belgium 
I Advisor in research and advisory institution 
for construction sector 
Belgium 
J Partner at consultancy firm Australia 
K Construction lawyer Australia 
L Lawyer (public law) Belgium 
M Independent legal PPP consultant Europe 
Table 7.8 List of respondents 
7.2.1 The competitive environment 
The PPP bidding environment, which consists of the number of prequalified 
bidders and their respective experience levels, plays a significant role in the 
determination of the strategy equilibrium. This is especially driven by the bidding 
costs that are peculiar for PPP tenders. These costs consist of design, consultancy 
and legal fees, but also the consortium’s working cost. The investment costs in 
example cases amount easily up to two million euro for large Belgian projects 
(respondent L) and even 20 million dollar for mega-projects in Australia 
(respondent K). Respondent G experienced intrinsically attractive projects in the 
port and power sectors with fairly low bidding costs relative to the rewards of 
winning, while they are high in rail projects that are subject to market risk, 
attracting far less bidders.  
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As bid costs could become a burden for consortia, the theoretical results claim for 
a clear funneling principle. Neither the government nor the contractors benefit 
from an environment where four or more contractors are invited for the tender 
when considerable investments are required. The results show that strategic 
behavior is close to being levelled in the two-player environment, so that this 
automatically leads to more competition in the investment choice. Nonetheless, the 
results regularly identify soaring mark-ups. This seems counterintuitive for the 
public sector (respondents A,B), because they expect fierce price competition 
because of higher winning probabilities.  
Alternatively, governments might fear for oligopolistic mechanisms and prefer 
three-player environments in order to increase competition and reduce the 
government cost (respondent A). The results agree that mark-ups will be lower, but 
they also state that, especially in markets with large gaps in the experience levels, 
the entrant will face a low probability of winning and will therefore not be 
enthusiastic to put a lot of effort in the bid preparation. Chapter 6 even claimed 
that it could be unsustainable to invite more than two bidders for a high-risk 
project. Nonetheless, the majority of example cases are characterized by a three-
player prequalification while a two-player setting could be socially optimal. 
Respondent C, from a private sector perspective, acknowledges that one should 
favor a limited number of bidders for complex projects, but not for less complex 
projects.  
Nonetheless, the theory states that entrants in the market will suffer from their 
disadvantageous position in relation to well-established firms. However, 
respondent D acknowledges that firms are reluctant to invest in bid preparation if 
they are not rewarded for the effort. The amount of investment should be 
positively correlated with the weight of the quality aspect (i.e., the cost adjustment 
share 𝛽𝑖) in the selection process. Alternatively, a standardization of procedures 
could result in transferable investments, in line with the spillover model in Section 
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5.5. In this vein, pre-tender investment efforts are not sunk in case of a loss, but the 
knowledge may be utilized in later tenders (respondent A).  
The models reveal that opportunistic behavior has a heterogeneous nature in the 
three-player case: incumbent firms might use their experience advantage as a 
motive to request higher mark-ups, while inexperienced players tend to be averse 
for losing the upfront investments and in general initially apply higher mark-ups, 
while the investment is only considered in a second instance. Respondent C, an 
established player in his less competitive local market, has experience in coping 
with highly competitive heterogeneous market environments. When they first 
entered the international market, a lot of upfront consultancy costs were spent to 
offset their competitive disadvantage since they were not familiar with the 
jurisdiction. These high investment requirements serve as barriers for entry and are 
often perceived as an advantage for bigger companies with robust financial 
backgrounds (respondent E). Markets are different in this respect as the Canadian, 
for instance, is very competitive and efficient (respondent C), while Belgium, 
despite sufficient interest, usually attracts the same bidding audience (respondents 
H,L).  
If a market gets mature and narrow, one might expect soaring government costs, 
but only respondent K claimed that Australian construction costs are escalating at a 
rate above the inflation rate. The other governmental and consultancy respondents 
believe the project costs for the government remained stable regardless of inflation 
and the increased financing cost after the financial crisis. Possible explanations 
could be that the final stage of maturity has not yet been reached and that 
governments and consortia benefit from learning effects and efficiencies and the 
increased ability of more accurately estimating working costs (respondent G). 
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7.2.2 The project complexity 
In this dissertation, the complexity of the project is expressed as a single risk 
measure to model the uncertainty in the revenues and costs of the agreement. In 
contrast to former PPP literature, the model studies the impact of risk allocation in 
a competitive environment. Transferring uncontrollable risk is expensive. 
Supported by the argument that a project becomes troublesome once the contractor 
faces difficulties, contractors require high compensations for the transfer of tricky 
risks like the demand risk and permits risk (respondent E). Surprisingly, the 
political instability in a developing country like Nigeria makes port and energy 
projects financially very attractive because of the inefficient public sector 
alternative (respondent G).  
On the other hand, the bidder should deal with the controllable risk like the 
operational risk and the capital expenditure risk. Low-risk projects with a 
repetitive nature like sewage infrastructure and social housing projects usually 
require less upfront investments (respondent K). Instead, inexperienced players 
will play on their mark-ups and will try to be the cheapest in order to obtain a 
position in the market and not necessarily by investing more upfront (respondent 
C).  
The dynamics of the analytical results change when projects are more complex. In 
mature markets, experienced players are eager to invest in pre-tender research and 
the competitive mechanism is working well so that qualitative bids ought to be 
expected. Respondent H supports that contractors are keen to take up risks, 
because if these are managed well, the project allows for considerably higher 
profits compared to classic building projects where margins are under pressure. In 
a heterogeneous market, the results show the skepticism of inexperienced 
contractors to run the risk of losing high investments. When an inexperienced 
player faces at least two incumbents, he could leave the deal. All practitioners 
agreed that incentive mechanisms need to be considered to increase competition. 
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7.2.3 Government reimbursement 
The theoretical results in the different chapters show that the impact of 
compensations is limited when two players are invited for tender, but becomes 
successful in a three-player environment. According to the low-risk project results, 
bidding strategies are not very diverse conditional on the experience levels and 
compensations should amount up to 80 or 90% so as to result in higher 
investments. A government compensation proves to give more prospering results 
for high-risk projects (without a pipeline). A partial compensation of 80% triggers 
proper incentives for both incumbents as well as entrants and their bidding 
strategies converge. It enables the willingness to invest and withholds a player 
from setting a high mark-up so that the initial heterogeneity becomes hazy and 
probabilities of winning get levelled. The respondents at the private side agree that 
compensations might work for complex projects (respondents C-M).  
Less attractive projects could become more attractive when compensations are 
introduced and as a result, respondent K is in favor of compensations if it is 
impossible to attract two bidders without them. Respondent H refers to the Dutch 
market in which principally only two consortia kept interest as, together, they won 
all initial PPPs. The government restored other bidders’ interest by compensating 
losing bidders. The reimbursements create a larger pool of capital that could 
benefit the market’s attractiveness (respondent K). Another situation to reimburse 
investment efforts is when important informational or innovative added value can 
be created (respondent A). A major concern in that latter respect is to what extent 
the contractors should reveal their findings to the procuring government or to the 
general public. In low-risk projects, the compensations might trigger trial-and-error 
behavior and then they should only be applied if the market is still developing 
(respondents C,E).  
In summary, respondent E believes in the threefold impact of bid compensations: 
more bidders will be attracted, bidding prices will be lower and it could enable 
smaller projects to be delivered by PPPs. Nevertheless, respondent J fears the 
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undue difference in the treatment of bidders, so that strict limitations and 
guidelines are necessary. Anyhow, it is acknowledged that governments should 
first attempt to decrease the bidding costs (respondents K,M).  
The views on the amount of compensation that will make a significant difference 
are diverse, ranging from 50% for respondent A to up to the entire reimbursement 
of prequalified SPVs in the South African context (respondent F). While 
compensations could have a large societal value because of the reduced 
renegotiation risk and the increased market competition, they come at a 
considerable cost in the short run. Awarding authorities do not always have the 
budget to offer sufficient compensations and often only attribute amounts that can 
barely cover the design costs (respondent L). Within the public entity, there is no 
real agreement between jurisdictions. Compensations range from zero to up to 
seventy or ninety percent in France and Canada (KPMG 2010). In the belief that 
competition for PPPs is still strong, South Australia does not have a policy of 
providing compensations for bid costs, preferring to determine this on a case by 
case basis, while neighboring state Victoria has a proactive policy of compensating 
to open up the market (respondent B). Because of the requirement of detailed 
design plans that would refrain potential bidders to participate, the Chilean 
government attributed compensations to the second and third runner-up, which 
resulted in more bids (respondent D). 
7.2.4 The project pipeline 
Markets significantly differ in their respective project pipelines. The pipeline 
approach that has been outlined in this dissertation has a more stringent nature than 
how pipelines are perceived in practice. For the purpose of the modelling, a 
pipeline was defined as a finite sequence of projects with an equivalent risk 
structure. In practice, this would mean that cost and income uncertainty are similar 
and the contractual arrangements are equivalent. Practitioners tend to broaden this 
understanding and consider a pipeline as a set of same-type projects (e.g., a 
pipeline of road infrastructure projects or a pipeline of sports infrastructure 
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projects) or even a set of PPP projects in general. In this broader view, Canada has 
a reputation of keeping the market going, while the pipeline of the Private Finance 
Initiative in the United Kingdom dropped off (respondent C). In Australia, the state 
Victoria tries to maintain a pipeline and communicates the prospects of future 
opportunities when projects are launched, under the belief that a strong pipeline 
results in new competition and higher investments (respondents A, K). 
Respondents I and F, on the other hand, claim that it is not always evident to have 
a continuity of projects due to the magnitude of the budgetary requirements. Also 
the longevity of projects in combination with rapidly changing government 
structures do not benefit the feasibility of the pipeline. Eventually, respondent E 
claims that the number of projects should not exceed market capacity. An 
oversupply of projects could trigger cooperative bidding behavior or a lack of 
competitive eagerness.  
The interviewed respondents are unanimously in favor of a project pipeline. The 
hypothesis claiming that investments would increase if a project pipeline is 
introduced could not be generally confirmed in the game-theoretic experiments. 
With respect to the results in Chapter 6 for instance, players with a competitive 
advantage invest slightly more in a two-project pipeline than when there is no 
pipeline. However, in the other cases, this could only occur if a spillover effect is 
present, i.e., if pre-tender investments still generate benefits later in the pipeline 
(Section 5.5). According to the respondents, however, a first advantage of the 
project pipeline is that it would definitely result in more investments in initial 
projects (respondents A,C,H,J,M) and that the total investment is spread over 
different projects (respondent K). The private sector is willing to invest more in 
non-project fixed costs and better plan its financial strategy (respondent E) and 
human resources can be employed for a longer time (respondent K). The 
experience of respondent A learned that consortia recently have a more consistent 
structure, apart from the financial partner. This means that consortia are entering 
different tenders with the same entities or companies (e.g., a particular dredging 
7.2. The practitioner’s perspective 
 
 
214 
company that consistently collaborates with the same tunnel construction 
company). As a result, this steadiness reduces the start-up cost and other overhead 
costs for governing the stakeholders within the consortium.  
Moreover, the government benefits from a pipeline because of the increased 
competition and the lower procurement cost which is in line with the experimental 
findings. Respondent C admits that the increased competition puts a ceiling on the 
contractors’ profits in the longer run. Another downside is the danger of the so-
called “lazy Susan” (i.e., the traditional Chinese turntable) approach in established 
markets: the work goes around and might be attributed to the desperate contractor 
(respondent C). Practitioners claim that the market sometimes settles a natural 
equilibrium. Contractors take into account “how busy” the competition is when 
they determine the bidding strategy. Often, consortia are not substantial enough to 
carry out more than two projects at the same time, so governments need to be 
conscious about the magnitude of the project and about spreading the work 
(respondent C,K). An alternative could be to split up large-scale infrastructure 
projects into a sequence of smaller projects. According to the theoretical results, 
this could lead to a more competitive tendering procedure. As a result, also small 
contractors, for whom the bid costs and the project budget requirements might 
become a financial burden, could benefit from entering the market. Of course, the 
project decomposition would only work to such an extent that it remains feasible 
or that no animosity among opposing consortia depraves the value of the project. 
Since all respondents expect more competition and since the majority expects 
higher investments in the initial projects, all interviewees explicitly favor a long-
term project pipeline over short-term bid cost compensations. Respondent M 
stipulates that pipelines will be better to attract overseas contractors, but 
respondents A and C claim that the pipeline should be visible and trustworthy. 
Nevertheless, as has been shown in Section 7.2.3, respondents still believe in the 
applicability of compensations.  
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
Practitioners can share interesting views on the topics that have been covered in 
this dissertation. This small sample of interviews emphasized the importance of the 
questions that are addressed in this research project. However, it is a challenge to 
find a compromise between the multi-faceted PPP domain and an abstract 
modelling framework. 
Most insights from the dissertation could find resonance among the practitioners. 
The insights concerning complexity and the impact of the procurement cost are in 
line with the practitioner’s upfront expectations. However, also new insights on the 
investment-related dimensions and the incentive creation capability of government 
reimbursements found resonance. Especially the interplay of project risk and the 
composition of the bidding consortia (i.e., the number of players and their 
heterogeneity) add value to the practitioner’s views on PPP procurement. 
Nonetheless, this section once again underlines the diversity in markets and 
jurisdiction-specific views and policies. Unfortunately, the practitioner’s views 
originate from mother wit, expectations and guesswork without a quantitative, 
objective soundness. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and future research 
 
This final chapter serves as a wrap-up of what has been studied in this dissertation. 
It also recapitulates the limitations of the research, that immediately pave the way 
for new research opportunities. The research project instigated from a need to offer 
new theoretical approaches to model the tendering procedure in public-private 
partnerships. PPPs have gained importance in developing and developed countries. 
However, data are hard to obtain and the high-risk environment raises new 
challenges for both the public as well as the private sector, that are, if not managed 
properly, open sesames for disastrous project outcomes.  
The objective of the dissertation was to model the PPP tendering procedure from 
the contractor’s perspective and to subsequently assess governmental policies to 
ensure the competitiveness of the market. In a competitive format, each interested 
contractor optimizes his strategy which is composed of how much money he will 
invest in upfront research and which mark-up is appropriate in order to maximize 
the expected pay-off. At this lower level, the contractors converge towards a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. At the upper level of this bi-level programming-like 
model though, the public sector has the tools at hand to steer the procurement 
outcome. Governments are looking for the most advantageous proposal from a cost 
and quality perspective, but also consider the competitiveness of the market in the 
longer and shorter term. This has been studied in a single-project and multi-project 
setting. While a considerable number of insights were brought to the forefront 
along this dissertation, the next section summarizes the key takeaways. 
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8.1 Key takeaways from this dissertation 
The different experimental and empirical results have led to quantitative and often 
abstract insights. The challenge lies in translating these results into straightforward 
policy measures that are founded by means of the methodologies of this 
dissertation. We distinguish the public scope and the private scope of the PPP. 
8.1.1 The public sector’s perspective 
The government impersonates the architect of the tendering procedure and should 
take this assignment seriously. Since research costs for the contractors are high, the 
procurer should strive for a clear and efficient funneling principle. The contractors’ 
expenditures should be predominantly postponed to the final bidding stages. 
Ideally, only two players are prequalified to move to the final bidding stage, 
because both will be incentivized to properly prepare the tender documents. 
However, governments might fear a reduction in the competitive powers. 
Alternatively, the model finds resonance to prequalify three bidders. In a low-risk 
setting this is certainly a cost-benefiting option, but in a high-risk setting, this 
could lead to a socially unsustainable situation. Empirically, prequalified 
contractors do not dispose of the bravery to withdraw.  
Nevertheless, provided that sufficient incentives (i.e., research cost 
reimbursements) are introduced, three-player settings could function properly. It 
shows that compensations, if used in a smart sense, could close the gap between 
incumbents and newcomers. The experiments show that the compensations need to 
be close to the total investment expenditures. Of course, this would require clear 
guidelines to not overcompensate the bidders. This intervention might come at a 
cost in the short run, but could trigger the contractor’s enthusiasm to enter the PPP 
market and preclude the contraction of the playing field in the long run. 
Essentially, governments should focus on reducing non-value adding pre-tender 
costs for the consortia. This statement pleads for a standardization of contracts and 
contracting procedures and a reduction of exuberant project requirements. 
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Standardization might of course inhibit the flexibility and freedom of the 
contractors, so the standardization should not obstruct the creative and innovative 
process of the contractors. Nevertheless, reducing the investment needs and some 
parameters that unnecessarily add complexity to the project has a short-term 
beneficiary impact from a mark-up perspective and a long-term consequence in 
terms of the competitiveness of the market. Additionally, standardization could 
also make project-specific investments transmissible to future projects in the case 
of a project pipeline. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 introduced the concept of a pipeline of projects which 
serves as a government’s project agenda. The theoretical results and the vision of 
practitioners both reveal the positive aspects of this pipeline. Contractors are better 
able to spread out budgets and risks over a prospect of projects, which would lead 
to a decrease in the government procurement cost and which would attract more 
international bidders on the long term. The impact of one additional project is 
already sufficient to create significant incentives. Therefore, it is in the public’s 
interest to maintain and cement a short-term pipeline to keep on drawing the 
attention of the contractors. Besides, governments could also benefit from splitting 
up large and complex projects into smaller sub-projects if no coordination issues 
would arise. However, the theory could not find evidence in all scenarios that the 
pipeline creates a levelled playing field and attracts newcomers, which means that 
additional incentive creation mechanisms are certainly not otiose. 
8.1.2 The private sector’s perspective 
Look before you leap into marriage is not only an appropriate warning for the 
government, but is also true for the private sector. Consortia should beware of 
entering the deal, as it can be a long and expensive process without any guarantees 
for success. Even once granted the project, the risky envelopment can lead to the 
disheartening winner’s curse. Consortia need to be financially capable of 
performing the contracts and a careful mitigation of the risk is appropriate. As a 
consequence, it was shown that, even though being pre-qualified, contractors 
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might benefit from refraining to continue the bidding process in high-risk 
environments, unless if additional government incentives are involved in the deal.  
In this sense, the practice of underbidding was emphasized in Section 7.1. Since 
experiences are limited and the contracts require the utilization of considerable 
resources, default might be problematic, both for the contractor as well as for the 
society in general. Mark-ups should be appropriately reflecting the expected risk 
that cannot be accounted for by investing in research efforts. 
These research efforts also deserve attention from a practical point of view. The 
bidding models propose equilibria that actually prescribe not to invest a lot in pre-
tender research, especially as an inexperienced player. This might sound 
counterintuitive, but that could be partly attributed to the fact that the government 
decision mechanism was mainly focused on the bid price. Nevertheless, the 
equilibria advise incumbent players in a heterogeneous market to usually invest 
more to stay ahead of the newcomers. Consequently, the interaction between the 
expected investment efforts and the competitive environment was consistently 
significant. Instead of only assessing the need for investment based on the project’s 
complexity, a consortium should also account for the competitive forces. 
Finally, contractors would benefit from making the bid preparation efforts 
transferable to multiple projects. Establishing a consortium typically requires large 
start-up and overhead costs. Stable consortia and internal knowledge management 
diminish the necessity of project-specific pre-tender costs.  
The majority of these findings stem from theoretical results under particular model 
assumptions and practical insights that were revealed during the research journey. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the model serves as a sounding board to initially 
assess the effectiveness of governmental policies. However, the rationality 
assumption that makes modelling feasible is often violated. Country-, project- and 
consortium-specific elements should always be incurred to make optimal PPP 
decisions. 
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8.2 Future research opportunities 
The models that have been presented are subject to limitations that offer new 
research questions. We opted for a representative approach that closely mimics 
reality. Nevertheless, relaxing some of the model assumptions that have been 
introduced in Chapter 3 could disclose additional dynamics that approach reality 
better. This section elucidates four interesting research journeys. 
8.2.1 Resource constraints 
First of all, the models assume that the contractors have unlimited resources to bid 
on and to execute the projects, while the practitioners of the qualitative study in 
Section 7.2 claim that it is often impossible as a contractor to engage in more than 
two projects. The tendering process is time-consuming and the execution of 
projects requires a lot of resources. Therefore, resource constraints for the 
contractors ought to be introduced. A contractor usually has to make an allocation 
of monetary and physical resources over different activities. Moreover, a 
contractor’s financial position is influenced by its history based on the total 
research cost that has been incurred for past tenders and the financial development 
in terms of profit and loss of the projects for which it was appointed the preferred 
bidder. The resource constraints are expected to render important repercussions on 
the bidding strategies of the contractors.  
Nevertheless, its introduction poses important challenges for the modelling. Since 
the model needs to keep track of the resource position of the contractors, the 
number of additional state variables could skyrocket. Relying on a monetary 
constraint could be challenging, but in a simplified manner, it could be a 
convenient approach to cap the number of projects that a consortium is able to 
execute.  
In line with the auction and procurement literature that does include capacity 
constraints, one could expect fiercer competition and more aggressive bidding 
earlier in the pipeline. Later in the pipeline, greater mark-ups and lower 
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investments could be expected because of the reduced competition. This would 
then support the analogy with the “lazy Susan” (Section 7.2.4) and projects are 
naturally attributed to the contractors that have sufficient capacity. Moreover, we 
intuitively expect that the budget constraint will be proven to be another inhibitor 
for inexperienced contractors to enter the PPP market. Contractors will try to avoid 
default and might limit their expenditures early in the project pipeline. Therefore, 
the intervention of the government could be of paramount importance to open up 
the market and close the gap between incumbents and entrants.  
8.2.2 Randomly arriving contractors and projects 
In the current models, the pipeline of projects was fixed and commonly known. 
Also the number of bidders and their identity remains constant along the pipeline. 
In fact, the project characteristics and bidding environment characteristics are 
exogenously set. Adding the possible entry of new projects or adding the feature 
that a contractor may face different opponents for each project, adds complexity to 
the model. This is mainly due to the fact that the PPP model considers 
heterogeneity in the contractors’ experience levels. In a fully dynamic setting, one 
needs to include a probability for each possible scenario (or subgame) that may 
occur in the future. Therefore, we need entry probabilities or the probability that a 
player may be prequalified.  
To illustrate, in the current two-player setting with two players and initial 
experience vector (0,2), we only need to consider the experience vectors (2,2) and 
(0,4) for the second project. If two players are prequalified in a two-project setting 
with randomly arriving bidders, one needs to investigate each possible outcome. 
On the one hand, if one would win the first project, one will take into account the 
occurrence of the subgames (2,0), (2,2), (2,4), (2,6), (2,8) and (2,10) for the second 
tender. On the other hand, if one loses the first project, the probabilities of 
subgames (0,0), (0,2), (0,4), (0,6), (0,8) and (0,10) need to be included. 
CHAPTER 8.  Conclusions and future research 
 
 
223 
At first sight, the impact of allowing other consortia to enter the project pipeline 
would be expected to be highly dependent on the experience level of the contractor 
under study and on the experience levels of the opponents. Hence, defining a 
hypothesis on this matter could be perilous. However, if we would only allow for 
the arrival of new entrants, one might expect contractors to safeguard the 
competitive position as soon as possible, resulting in more competition. Also the 
pipeline itself could have a more randomized feature in the sense that projects 
arrive with a particular probability. Moreover, the current multi-project settings 
assumed stochastically equivalent projects, but also this assumption could be 
relaxed, which would render a methodological turnaround. 
8.2.3 Model parameters 
The previous extension relates to the multi-project setting, but also each individual 
project is subject to assumptions. First of all, the government compensation 
mechanism that has been implemented compensates all losing bidders with a 
predefined fraction of their research cost. This entails some consequences: the 
contractors need to prove the pre-tender expenses and also underperforming 
contractors receive an equivalent reimbursement fraction. Other mechanisms could 
be investigated, like only compensating the second best bidder or letting the 
fraction depend on the ranking of the bid. 
Secondly, the impact of experience and investment was assumed to be 
uncorrelated. Nevertheless, in some markets, it could for instance be the case that 
experienced bidders more adequately utilize investment efforts. This would mean 
that the covariance between pre-tender research and a consortium’s experience 
needs to be contained within the model. 
8.2.4 Opportunities for related disciplines 
This research topic and the methodology that is outlined in the dissertation are on 
the verge of a wide spectrum of research fields. The manageability of the study 
required a compromise with each of the interrelated fields.  
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With regard to the operations research experts in algorithmic game theory, the 
equilibrium heuristics are an opportunity for further improvement. The purpose of 
the dissertation lies in gaining important insights from a flexible theoretical study 
in a relevant business context. We managed to uncover important general bidding 
dynamics, but a detailed study that overcomes for instance computation time issues 
and convergence problems requires additional efforts. 
With respect to the economists and the analytical game theory and auction theory 
specialists, the research managed to apply the essential concepts that these 
respective fields have to offer. The analytical closed-form expressions and 
mathematical proofs were subordinate to the practical application and the veracity 
of the models and findings. 
The dissertation contributes to the construction infrastructure literature in general 
and to the academic PPP literature in particular. The PPP field has a merely 
empirical nature, but the theoretical model adds initial insights into a highly 
relevant topic that is difficult to study from an empirical angle due to the scarcity 
of data. The research track that this dissertation offers would benefit from scrutiny 
of past projects tenders in order to fully validate the modelling approach. 
As a final remark of this work, the relevance of this topic and methodology do not 
necessarily need to stop at the boundaries of operations management. We believe 
that there are also important aspects of the PPP model that are applicable in other 
fields. The Research & Development research also deals with uncertain 
developments that require large upfront investments in a competitive context. 
Secondly, corporate finance could gain insights in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. If these are organized in a competitive context, the acquiring 
corporations need to assess the resources to attribute to these procurement options 
while a lot of uncertainty exists in the bidding outcome and the profitability of the 
acquisition. 
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Appendix A  Definitions and notation 
 
Abbreviations & definitions 
Cohort Refers to a group of participants in a laboratory bidding 
experiment. The players within a cohort interact with each other, 
but they do not interact with players from distinct cohorts. 
Continuation Refers to the expected pay-off for the future stages of the  
   value stochastic game. Chapter 6 initially assumes that the continuation 
value beyond the communicated pipeline is zero. Section 6.5 
relaxes this assumption and constructs an infinite stream of 
revenues. 
CSM Consistent strategy model: this approach is used in Chapter 5 and 
means that the ex ante investment and mark-up decision is the 
same for all the projects in the pipeline. 
MPE Markov perfect equilibrium, an equilibrium refinement concept 
that states that a strategy consists of state-dependent actions 
Partial strategy A partial strategy reflects the actions for a particular subgame. In 
the dissertation, a “strategy” actually refers to a partial strategy. 
Pipeline A sequence of similar-type PPP (sub-)projects in which the 
government engages in the near future  
PPP  Public-Private Partnership 
Spillover  Modification to the model that incurs that pre-tender investment 
for a particular project has a propagating effect in later tenders 
SPV  Special purpose vehicle, the contractor’s consortium 
Stage The stage of the game in the context of this dissertation refers to 
the sequence number of the project of the pipeline. Consequently, 
a three-project pipeline consists of three stages. 
State The state variable in the context of Chapter 6 consists of an 
experience vector and the number of projects that are remaining in 
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the pipeline. A Markov strategy relies on the concept of a state as 
this strategy prescribes an action for each state of the game. 
Stochastic A finite or infinite dynamic game that is played by one or more   
  game players with probabilistic transitions between a finite number of 
states 
Stochastically Equivalence in the stochasticity: two projects are for instance   
  equivalent  stochastically equivalent if their a priori cost probability 
distributions (i.e., without considering experience or investment) 
have the same expected value and variance 
Subgame A game-theoretic concept that refers to a game within a game up 
to a particular point where the players know exactly where they 
are. A subgame in the dissertation’s context refers to an 
experience vector. 
Treatment In Section 7.1, a combination of model parameters defines a 
treatment 
VSM Variable strategy model: this approach is used in Chapter 5 and 
means that the bidder will determine, ex ante, a specific 
investment and mark-up choice for each project separately in the 
pipeline, but this choice cannot be changed when new information 
becomes available later in the pipeline  
 
Notation 
𝑎𝑧  The action profile in stage 𝑧 of the stochastic game, that consists 
of the individual actions 𝑎𝑝
𝑧 of the players  
𝐴𝑝 The actual cost of the project, taking into account that player 𝑝 has 
won the tender 
𝛼 Spillover variable, the fraction of the investment that is 
transferable to the next project in the sense that it has an impact on 
the cost and knowledge outcome 
𝒜  Refers to the set of available actions 
𝑏𝑝 Bid probability distribution for player 𝑝 and associated cumulative 
probability distribution 𝐵𝑝 
𝛽𝑒 Maximum disadvantage of a lack of experience 
𝛽𝑖 Maximum disadvantage of a lack of investment 
𝑐𝑝  Cost probability distribution for player 𝑝 
𝛾𝑒  Maximum risk impact of a lack of experience 
𝛾𝑖  Maximum risk impact of a lack of investment 
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𝑑 Percentage fraction of the investment efforts that the government 
reimburses to losing bidders 
𝑒𝑝  The experience level for a player 𝑝 
𝐸  The number of experience levels (=𝑒𝑢+1) 
𝑒𝑢  The number of experience intervals on the experience scale 
𝜃𝑧 State variable in the sequential bidding model, a combination of 
the current experience levels and the number of remaining projects 
in the sequence   
Θ𝑧 The set of available states in stage 𝑧 
𝑓  Vector of the players’ average pay-offs 𝑓𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) that results from 
the simulation and that is an estimator for the expected pay-off 𝜋 
𝑔𝑝 Player- and strategy-specific direct cost impact that is expressed as 
a fraction that is applied to the (unknown) project cost 
ℎ𝑧 The history variable that summarizes the information of previous 
tenders in the pipeline 
𝐼 Total number of discrete investment levels 
𝑖(. ) Investment percentage that is related to a particular strategy or 
action 
𝜆𝑒 Experiential learning rate 
𝜆𝑖 Investment learning rate 
𝑀 Total number of mark-up levels 
𝑚(. ) Mark-up percentage that is related to a particular strategy or action 
𝜇 A scaling factor that equals the a priori expected actual cost and 
that is common for all bidders 
𝜇𝑒 Experiential cost decrease rate 
𝜇𝑖 Investment cost decrease rate 
𝑃  The total number of players 
𝜋 The pay-off vector that consists of all players’ expected  pay-offs 
𝜋𝑝. It might consist of an instantaneous term and a continuation 
value. 
𝑞𝑝 Probability of winning for player 𝑝  
𝒬 The set of transition probabilities to move from one state to 
another state, given a particular action profile 
𝜌  The instantaneous pay-off vector that consists of all players’ 
expected pay-offs 𝜌𝑝. It consists of the stage-specific pay-off 
without taking into account future projects. 
𝑠 A strategy profile (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … 𝑠𝑃) 
𝑠∗ The equilibrium strategy profile 𝑠∗ = (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠𝑃
∗) 
APPENDIX A.  Definitions and notation 
 
 
228 
(𝑠|𝑒) Strategy profile 𝑠, given the experience vector 𝑒. Typically used in 
combination with a probability or a pay-off calculation 
𝑠𝑝 A strategy for player 𝑝 
𝑠−𝑝 A strategy vector for the opponents of player 𝑝 
𝑠𝑝
𝑧 The decisions within strategy 𝑠𝑝 that are specific for project (or 
stage) 𝑧 
𝑆 Set of available strategy profiles, for which 𝑆𝑝 thus refers to the 
set of available strategies for player 𝑝 
𝜎 Uncontrollable risk parameter 
𝜎𝑝  Experience- and investment-specific standard deviation that is 
expressed as a fraction of the actual (unknown) project cost. It is 
also referred to as the controllable risk parameter. 
𝒱 The continuation value that reflects the expected pay-offs for the 
future stages of the stochastic game 
𝑍 The number of projects in the pipeline 
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Appendix B  Pseudo code algorithms 
 
Code strategy game algorithm (Chapter 4 & Chapter 5) 
ALGORITHM 1: StrategyGame(𝑝, 𝑒) 
𝑘2 = number of strategy game iterations 
1: for all 𝑦 ≠ 𝑝 do 
2:   HomogeneousGame(𝑦) 
3:  HeterogeneousGame(𝑦) 
4: end for 
5: for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑘2 do 
6:  for all 𝑦 ≠ 𝑝 do 
7:   Select 𝑠𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑦 randomly 
8:  end for 
9:  for all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑝 do 
10:   𝑠 ← (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑝−1, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑠𝑝+1, … , 𝑠𝑃) 
11:   CalculatePayoff(𝑒, 𝑠) 
12:   𝐹(𝑥𝑖) ← 𝐹(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑓𝑝(𝑠|𝑒) 
13:  end for 
14: end for 
15: 𝑠𝑝
∗ ← argmax {𝐹(𝑥𝑖), ∀𝑖} 
 
ALGORITHM 2: HomogeneousGame(𝑞) 
𝑟𝑑𝑠 = number of rounds 
1:  𝑒′ ∈ ℝ𝑃 
2:  𝑒′ ← (𝑒𝑦, 𝑒𝑦, … 𝑒𝑦) 
3: 𝑠′ ∈ ℝ𝑃 
4: 𝑡 ∈ ℝ𝑃
𝑟
 
5:  for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠 do 
6:  Select 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑦 randomly 
7: end for 
8: while 𝑟𝑑𝑠 > 1 do 
9:  for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠−1 do 
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10:   𝑠′ ← (𝑡(𝑖−1)∗𝑃+1, … 𝑡(𝑖−1)∗𝑃+𝑃) 
11:   CalculatePayoff(𝑒′, 𝑠′) 
12:   𝑡𝑖 ← argmax {𝑓𝑝(𝑠
′|𝑒′), ∀𝑝}  
13:  end for 
14:  𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝑟𝑑𝑠 − 1 
15: end while 
16: (𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑃) → 𝑅𝑦 
 
ALGORITHM 3: HeterogeneousGame(𝑞) 
𝑘1 = number of iterations 
𝑛 =number of shortlisted strategies 
1: for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑘1 do 
2:  for all 𝑟 ≠ 𝑦 do 
3:   Select 𝑠𝑟 ∈ 𝑆𝑟 randomly 
4:  end for 
5:  for all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑦 do 
6:   𝑠 ← (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑦−1, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑠𝑦+1, … , 𝑠𝑃) 
7:   CalculatePayoff(𝑒, 𝑠) 
8:   𝐹(𝑥𝑖) ← 𝐹(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑓𝑦(𝑠|𝑒) 
9:  end for 
10: end for 
11: Sort(𝑆𝑦, 𝐹(𝑥𝑖))  
12: Best (𝑛 − 𝑃) strategies → 𝑅𝑦 
 
Code best response algorithm (Chapter 6) 
ALGORITHM 4: MainAlgorithm() 
1: Generate 𝑅 random action profiles 𝑎𝑟 ∈ 𝒜 for 𝑟 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑅} 
2: for 𝑟 = 1 to 𝑅 do 
3:  BestResponseAlgoritm(𝑎𝑟)  
4: end for 
5: EvaluateEquilibria() 
 
ALGORITHM 5: BestResponseAlgorithm(𝑎) 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃= maximum number of loops 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃= minimum number of loops 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣=convergence threshold 
1: 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ← 0 
2: for 𝑘1 = 1 to 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
3:  𝑜 ← 𝑎  
4:  for 𝑝 = 1 to 𝑃 do 
5:   𝑎−𝑝 ← 𝑎 \{𝑎𝑝 } 
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6:   SelectBestResponse(𝑝, 𝑎−𝑝) 
7:   𝑎𝑝 ← 𝑥
best 
8:  end for 
9:  If ‖𝑜 − 𝑎‖² < 0.00001 do 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ←  𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 +  1 
10:  If (𝑘1 > 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃 & 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 > 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣): break 
11: end for 
 
ALGORITHM 6: SelectBestResponse(𝑝, 𝑎−𝑝) 
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃: number of electromagnetic iterations 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃: number of local search iterations 
𝜔 = (𝜔1, 𝜔2): step length for local search procedure 
1: Generate 𝑇  random actions 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒜𝑝  for 𝑡 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑇}  and calculate 
𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) ← 𝜋𝑝(𝑥
𝑡|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝) 
2: For 𝑘2 = 1 to 𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
3:  𝑥best ← argmax{𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡), ∀𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯} 
4:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 do 
5:   Calculate charges 𝑞𝑡 
6:   𝐹𝑡 ← 0  
7:  End for 
8:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{𝑥best} do 
9:   For all 𝑥𝑢 ∈ 𝒯 do 
10:    If 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) < 𝑓(𝑥𝑢) do 𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡 +
(𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢
‖𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡‖2
 
11:    Else 𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡 −
(𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢
‖𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑡‖2
 
12:   End for 
13:  End for 
14:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{𝑥best} do 
15:   𝜂 ← 𝑈(0,1) 
16:   𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡/‖𝐹𝑡‖ 
17:   For 𝑛 = 1 to 2 do 
18:    If 𝐹𝑛
𝑡 > 0 do 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ← 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 + 𝜂𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑢𝑛 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ) 
19:    Else 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ← 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛) 
20:   End for 
21:  End for 
22: End for 
23: For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 do 
24:  For 𝑘3 = 1 to 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
25:   𝑦 ← 𝑥𝑡 
26:   For 𝑛 = 1 to 2 do 
27:    𝜅 ← 𝑈(0,1) 
28:    𝑦𝑛 ← 𝑦𝑛 +𝜔𝑛(𝜅 − 0.5) 
29:   End for 
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30:   If 𝑓𝑝(𝑦) > 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡): 𝑥𝑡 ← 𝑦 
31:  End for 
32: End for 
33: 𝑥best ← argmax {𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡), ∀𝑡}  
 
ALGORITHM 7: EvaluateEquilibria() 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇= maximum distance from existing cluster 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇= minimum support criterion to avoid local minimum 
1:  Vector with number of points per cluster 𝑤 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑅) ∈ ℤ𝑅 ← 0  
2: 𝑐1 ∈ 𝒞 ← 𝑎
1, 𝐶 ← 1, 𝑤1 ← 1  
3: For 𝑟 = 1 to 𝑅 do 
4:  𝑐closest ← argmin {‖𝑎𝑟 − 𝑐𝑖‖
2
, ∀𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝒞} 
5:  If ‖𝑎𝑟 − 𝑐closest‖² < 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 do 
6:   𝑐𝑖 ← (𝑐𝑖𝑤𝑖 + 𝑎𝑟)/(𝑤𝑖 + 1) 
7:   𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖 + 1 
8:  Else 𝑐2 ∈ 𝒞 ← 𝑎
𝑟, 𝐶 ← 𝐶 + 1, 𝑤𝐶 ← 1 
9:  End if 
10: End for 
11: For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝐶 do 
12:  If 𝑤𝑖 < 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 do 𝑤𝑖 ← 0 
13:  Else for 𝑗 = 1 to 𝐶 do 
14:   If 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 & 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 do 
15:    If (𝑓𝑝(𝑐𝑖) < 𝑓𝑝(𝑐
𝑗), ∀𝑝) do 𝑤𝑖 ← 0 
16:   End if 
17:  End for  
18:  End if 
19: End for 
20: 𝑐best ←  argmax{∑ 𝑓𝑝(𝑐
𝑖), ∀𝑖𝑝  with 𝑤
𝑖 > 0}  
21: 𝑜 ← 𝑐best  
22: BestResponseAlgorithm(𝑐best) 
23: If ‖𝑜 − 𝑐best‖² > 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇  print “Cluster is no equilibrium. Further 
investigation required.” 
 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
𝑅  10 𝑇  5 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃  10 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃  30 
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃  4 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃  30 
𝛼  (0.5, 2) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣  5 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇  5 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇  2 
Table B.1 Algorithm parameters used in the experiment 
  
 
233 
 
 
 
Appendix C Additional statistical output  
 
Chapter 5: ANOVA results
5
 
 Analysis of variance table – 2 players  
  (𝑖(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑖(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=1
 (𝑚(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑚(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=1
 
Variable Df Mean 
Sq 
F 
value 
p-
value 
Sign Mean 
Sq 
F 
value 
p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑒  1 0.4 0.28 0.5946  229.7 12.03 0.0005 *** 
𝛾𝑖  1 12.0 8.67 0.0033 *** 2889.0 151.33 <2.2*10
-16 
*** 
𝛽𝑒  1 2.0 1.41 0.2352  259.8 13.61 0.0002 *** 
𝑑  1 3.5 2.54 0.1113  65.1 3.41 0.0650 * 
𝑒1  1 7.4 5.35 0.0208 ** 380.6 19.94 8.5*10
-6 
*** 
𝑒−1  5 2.6 1.91 0.0905 * 232.4 12.17 1.3*10
-11 
*** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛾𝑖  1 3.4 2.45 0.1178  93.0 4.87 0.0274 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑒  1 2.8 2.05 0.1520  0.5 0.03 0.8688  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.0 0.02 0.8980  3.3 0.18 0.6756  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 1.2 0.90 0.3437  82.5 4.32 0.0377 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 0.8 0.60 0.6990  12.1 0.63 0.6760  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑒  1 7.0 5.03 0.0250 ** 15.9 0.83 0.3617  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑑  1 3.7 2.66 0.1033  40.7 2.13 0.1442  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 13.4 9.72 0.0019 *** 138.8 7.27 0.0071 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 3.4 2.49 0.0295 ** 158.0 8.28 9.7*10
-8 
*** 
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 4.7 3.42 0.0645 * 14.2 0.74 0.3889  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1   1 4.1 2.94 0.0867 * 11.0 0.57 0.4488  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 4.2 3.01 0.0104 ** 97.7 5.12 0.0001 *** 
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.5 0.33 0.5663  28.3 1.48 0.2233  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 1.8 1.32 0.2539  41.3 2.16 0.0557 * 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 0.8 0.59 0.7075  12.6 0.66 0.6553  
residuals 1682 1.4    19.09    
Table C.1 ANOVA output for the differences in the investment and mark-up choices for 
the first project in a two-project setting with respect to a single-project setting. 
                                                     
5
 The statistical significance of the results are highlighted as follows: (*) refers to 
significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level and (***) at the 1% level 
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 Analysis of variance table – 3 players  
  (𝑖(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑖(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=1
 (𝑚(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑚(𝑠1
1∗))
𝑍=1
 
Variable Df Mean 
Sq 
F 
value 
p-value Sign Mean 
Sq 
F value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑒  1 3.4 2.70 0.1004  11.2 0.35 0.5536  
𝛾𝑖  1 17.0 13.35 0.0003 *** 6701.1 210.39 <2.2*10
-16 
*** 
𝛽𝑒  1 9.8 7.75 0.0054 *** 222.5 6.99 0.0082 ** 
𝑑  1 11.4 9.00 0.0027 *** 833.3 26.16 3.2*10-7 *** 
𝑒1  1 25.1 19.80 8.8*10
-6 
*** 229.0 7.19 0.0073 ** 
𝑒−1  20 1.7 1.30 0.1638  96.2 3.02 6.6*10
-6 
*** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛾𝑖  1 0.3 0.21 0.6474  139.8 4.39 0.0362 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑒  1 0.0 0.03 0.8551  11.2 0.35 0.5536  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.8 0.60 0.4380  102.4 3.22 0.0730 * 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 1.2 0.93 0.3361  34.5 1.08 0.2981  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 0.9 0.70 0.8342  30.9 0.97 0.4959  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑒  1 3.3 2.61 0.1061  32.5 1.02 0.3121  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑑  1 14.7 11.53 0.0007 *** 0.1 0.00 0.9522  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.0 0.01 0.9189  1910.3 59.98 1.1*10
-14 
*** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.8 1.44 0.0909 * 96.1 3.02 6.7*10
-6 
*** 
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.1 0.09 0.7595  26.8 0.84 0.3592  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1   1 0.9 0.71 0.3999  0.1 0.00 0.9468  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 0.8 0.61 0.9105  32.5 1.02 0.4334  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒1  1 4.6 3.59 0.0582 * 48.1 1.51 0.2191  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.6 1.28 0.1786  93.1 2.92 1.3*10
-5 
*** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.9 1.53 0.0624 * 46.7 1.47 0.0825 * 
residuals 5912 1.3    31.9    
Table C.2 ANOVA output for the differences in the investment and mark-up 
choices for the first project in a two-project setting with respect to a single-project 
setting. 
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Chapter 6: ANOVA results 
Analysis of variance table – 2 players 
Response: 𝑖(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 𝑚(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 
Variable Df Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑖  1 267.2 11867 <2.2*10
-16 *** 1055 1510.9 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒  1 1.151 51.12 3.4*10
-12 *** 521.3 746.89 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1  1 18.54 823.56 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 58.99 84.519 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒2  5 1.475 65.517 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 178.1 255.18 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑍  1 0.069 3.0677 0.0805 * 132.9 190.38 <2.2*10-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑒  1 0.449 19.924 1.0*10
-5 *** 0.58 0.8291 0.3630  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 8.845 392.83 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 1.11 1.5936 0.2074
  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.179 7.9488 3.3*10
-7 *** 2.35 3.3718 0.0053
 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.194 8.6360 0.0035 *** 4.43 6.3520 0.0121 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.252 11.175 0.0001 *** 173.4 248.41 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.079 3.5118 0.0040 ** 32.84 47.046 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.009 0.3921 0.5315  4.38 6.2805 0.0126 ** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.027 1.2185 0.2992  26.29 37.666 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.589 26.173 4.6*10
-7 
*** 25.34 36.305 3.4*10
-9 
*** 
𝑒2 ∗ 𝑍  5 0.119 5.2837 9.8*10
-5 *** 14.00 20.052 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
Residuals 468 0.023    0.70    
Table C.3 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline 
for a player with experience 𝑒1 and the opponent’s experience level 𝑒2 as a factor 
variable 
Analysis of variance table – 3 players 
Response: 𝑖(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 𝑚(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 
Variable Df Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑖  1 167.9 5575.5 <2.2*10
-16 *** 13366 3255.1 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒  1 0.002 0.0725 0.7877  2057.3 501.05 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1  1 81.29 2698.4 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 6482 1578.6 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
(𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 2.875 95.431 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 53.7 13.083 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑍  1 0.093 3.0858 0.0791 * 429.7 104.64 <2.2*10-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑒  1 0.002 0.0649 0.7990  3.0 0.7243 0.3948  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 81.22 2696.2 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 301.7 73.473 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 2.871 95.301 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 24.5 5.9789 1.3*10
-15 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.091 3.0308 0.0819 * 2.9 0.7145 0.3981  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.108 3.5908 0.0583 * 1959 477.02 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 0.034 1.1337 0.3065  6.7 1.6248 0.0395
 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.000 0.0001 0.9920  15.5 3.7734 0.0522 * 
𝑒1 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 0.518 17.202 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 90.0 21.919 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.015 0.4841 0.4867  131.0 31.915 1.9*10
-8 
*** 
(𝑒2, 𝑒3) ∗ 𝑍  20 0.011 0.3739 0.9947  4.2 1.0164 0.4384 *** 
Residuals 1905 0.030    4.1    
Table C.4 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline 
for a player with experience 𝑒1 and the opponents’ experience vector (𝑒2, 𝑒3) as a 
factor variable 
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Appendix D Laboratory experiment files 
 
Protocol – Session 3/1 
Welcome at this experiment that studies bidding behavior in high-risk projects. 
This session will last about 2 hours. In a few moments, I will start the experiment 
and you will all play at the same speed during the entire experiment. This means 
that everyone will leave at the same time.  
The session consists of two parts. In the first part, you will be playing a “low-risk” 
environment. Each project involves some risk. In order to conquer this risk and in 
order to make a profit on the project, you will need to make two decisions: an 
investment decision and a mark-up decision. For the investment decision, you have 
received a sheet of paper that shows the effect of investing in research. Firstly, 
research results in a slightly smaller project cost. Secondly, research will give you 
more certainty about the project cost (so you will be closer to the actual cost of the 
project). The values on that sheet of paper are expressed as percentages. We will 
run through some examples to become familiar with the effect and with the 
characteristics of the normal distribution.  
There are experienced and inexperienced players. You will always play against 
two other players. The computer decides randomly which players are experienced 
and which players are inexperienced and these roles will be the same during the 
entire session. Beware, because investment costs money. For each percentage, you 
will need to pay € 10.000 (while project costs will be around € 1.000.000). 
The two parts of this session consist each of 15-25 rounds. The first few rounds are 
practice rounds.  A round runs as follows:  
1) You will see a screen with on the left top corner the number of rounds to 
go. Beneath you will see whether you are an EXPERIENCED or 
INEXPERIENCED player. That will be the same for the entire game. 
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2) At the start of each round, you do not know who your competitors are. 
You can be playing against 2 INEXPERIENCED, 1 INEXPERIENCED 
and 1 EXPERIENCED player and 2 EXPERIENCED players.  
3) You will need to give your preferred investment (between 0 and 5 % and 2 
decimals) and your preferred mark-up percentage (between 0 and 50% and 
2 decimals). You may enter the same numbers for the different cases or 
you may apply different choices for each of them. You have approximately 
60 seconds to make your decision. So you need to press the “Submit” 
button when I say “Please, submit your bids now”.  
4) Now the program will perform some steps in the background: 
a. A cost base is selected for this round and this is the same for each 
player. The cost base is always around € 1.000.000.  
b. Depending on who your competitors are, your investment and 
mark-up level are selected. 
c. The computer will shape your normal cost probability distribution 
based on your investment choice. The average of this distribution 
is unknown to you, but that will be the actual cost if you win the 
project.  
d. The program randomly selects a cost estimate based on your 
distribution. Consequently, you have a 50% probability that your 
cost estimate is lower than the average and a 50% probability that 
your cost estimate is higher than the actual cost. 
e. Next, the program will apply the mark-up to your cost estimate. 
This will result in your bid for the project. 
f. The program will do the same for your competitors. The winner is 
the one who has submitted the lowest bid. 
g. If you lose, you will lose your investment. If you win, your payoff 
is calculated as follows: bid you have proposed – actual cost of the 
project – investment in research.  
We will now run through three examples. 
A screen will appear with your pay-off calculation. You can write down the output 
on your answer sheet. First, you indicate who your competitor was in this round. 
Secondly, you can write the respective investment and mark-up that you have 
chosen. Afterwards, indicate whether you have won or lost the tender. The 
program will also show the lowest bid and whether the winner was experienced or 
inexperienced (you may also note that down on your sheet). Depending on winning 
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or losing, your pay-off will be calculated as described above. You will only have 
40 seconds to note down these numbers. 
Some things to bear in mind: 
- Winning a contract does not necessarily mean that you make a profit; 
- Project costs are normally distributed, so there is positive and negative 
risk; 
- In the output screen, only the lowest bid will be reported, not whether the 
winner of the bid made a profit or a loss; 
- You do not know in advance against who you are playing, but you will be 
randomly matched with other people in the room. 
Then, the next round will start and you will be able to enter new investment and 
mark-up efforts for the different cases. The pay-offs in each round are 
INDEPENDENT of the pay-offs of the other rounds. That means that pay-offs will 
not be added up during the game. Afterwards, I will announce that we move on to 
the second part of the session. In that case, the project cost will be more uncertain 
(more risk). 
At the end of the session, you will be requested to fill out a questionnaire form 
with your contact details. This is also to calculate your final score. Again, pay-offs 
will not add up during the entire experiment. Instead, afterwards, we will randomly 
select 6 rounds to calculate your score in this tournament. You will also receive a 
sheet of paper to write down in a few lines what your strategy was and why. 
I am soon going to start the program and you will see appear the input screen for 
the first trial round. You will also see what your identity will be in the game 
(INEXPERIENCED or EXPERIENCED). Because it is a trial, I will give you first 
5 minutes to think about your strategy and ask any remaining questions. Also, you 
have received a form about the informed consent. This experiment has been 
approved by the KU Leuven ethical commission. So please, also use these 5 
minutes to fill this out. Afterwards, there are a few more trial rounds and I will 
announce when the payment periods will start.  
In case of troubles during the experiment, please raise your hand. 
We would like to thank you again for your cooperation and let’s hope we get some 
interesting results. 
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